⁴⁷⁴⁶⁹

Tuesday, 24 January 2006

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

WITNESS: MILAN KOTUR [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Kotur, how did the information from this Court in closed session reach you and your wife to explain what Mr. Ciaglinski had said in private session?

A. In Belgrade, from my colleagues. Where they found out, I don't know.

Q. Which colleagues?

A. The colleagues who worked with me.

Q. Well, give me their names, please. Because to take information from this Court and disseminate it when it's been given in private session is an important matter and this Court is entitled to know how it happens. Please tell me who told you what was said in private session.

A. Well, I couldn't say exactly who it was who said it now. It was a couple of years ago. And I really am not going to name any names because I'm not quite sure who said it so I don't really want to give anybody any trouble.

Q. Why aren't you going to -- exactly. Why aren't you going to give ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁰ a name? This is an important issue. If people give protected evidence or if evidence is protected in this Court, it's for reasons of security. Name the names, please.

A. I'm not sure who it was, that's why I said that I cannot say exactly.

Q. Oh, can't you. And what was the mechanism whereby they got this information from a private session? Did it come from the accused?

A. I couldn't say. I don't know. Even books are being written in our country. The Serb Radical Party writes books about what goes on here at the trial every day.

As for this information in closed session, I don't know, but everything that is not in closed session was written in books, day by day, who said what to who from day one, ever since the trial started. So all this information --

Q. Is that a party, Mr. Seselj's party, of which you're a supporter?

A. How did you get that idea that I am a supporter of Mr. Seselj? Well, that's what you said. That's the claim you made. No, no. No, I'm not. I'm not a member of any party and I'm not supporter either.

Q. Before we turn from Mrs. -- Mr. Ciaglinski and your wife, you won't tell us, then, what if anything you know about the source of the information. Let's go back, please. You told us yesterday your wife made two efforts to contact Mr. Ciaglinski. He was in the -- he was in the embassy in Sofia at the time, wasn't he? How did you manage to track him down there?

A. Since Mr. Ciaglinski said that after his duties in Kosovo and ⁴⁷⁴⁷¹ Metohija he would be military attache in Sofia.

Q. He told you that, did he?

A. Yes.

Q. So how many years ago was it that your wife made contact with him?

A. My wife knew him as far back as when he was in the Verification Mission. I had an office in the Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija, and that's where my wife worked, too, and that's where we had contacts every day. I mean Mr. Ciaglinski and I. So my wife and I have known him since 1998, when the Verification Mission came to Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. Your wife was contacting him on your behalf to try and get him to go and see you in Nis, wasn't she?

A. No.

Q. So the suggestion that he was invited to lunch or dinner completely untrue, is it?

A. Untrue.

Q. So she simply rang this person to remonstrate with him, to complain to him on your behalf about what he'd said in evidence in private session. That's really your case, is it, your evidence?

A. No. This was an unimportant matter, what she said to him.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you, Mr. Kotur, if it was unimportant, can you think of any reason why Mr. Ciaglinski might be misrepresenting what happened, and indeed misrepresenting his relationship with you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't quite understand. You mean if this question was unimportant, why my wife asked him in passing how he testified? Is that what you're referring to, or is it something else? ⁴⁷⁴⁷²

JUDGE BONOMY: No. If -- if you think the matter is unimportant, can you explain why he would be allegedly making a claim that it was an invitation to go to Nis to see you? In other words, why would he be lying about the situation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My wife called him because of the apartment in Nis, where we had some problems. So if Mr. Ciaglinski said something to you, he should have been very truthful and honest about it, not to make up some kind of story here. My wife has an apartment in Pristina, and immediately after we left the area of Kosovo and Metohija, a family from Podujevo moved into that apartment, and since we do not have a home -- I lost my home twice in this state; the first time during the war in Croatia in Vodice and the second apartment in Kosovo and Metohija, and I am a temporarily displaced person living in the Republic of Serbia. My official home address is in Kosovska Mitrovica, in Glavaseva Street number 1, apartment number 6.

This apartment that we had in Pristina, since we knew Ciaglinski, Ciaglinski entered Kosovo and Metohija when NATO troops entered Kosovo and Metohija. General Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski did. He got in touch with our officers. He asked about me. He asked where I was. I was not in Pristina then when their forces entered. They -- he asked whether I was alive and well. He said hello to me, and this is Jackson the KFOR commander in Kosovo and Metohija then, and Ciaglinski, when he talked to him, he said that these forces that were stationed in -- or, rather, in Kumanovo in Skopje in Macedonia, the British troops, he said that he was training those troops and that he had quite a few people there, officers ⁴⁷⁴⁷³ whom he knew.

The basic reason for contacting Ciaglinski was to see what we can do with our apartment in Pristina in Beogradska Street. That is the same street where the headquarters of the Kosovo Verification Mission were, about 50 or 100 metres away from that building in Beogradska Street. We wanted to find out who was in that apartment and --

JUDGE BONOMY: I mustn't take up the Prosecutor's time. You're making no attempt to answer my question, so please bring it to an end and the Prosecutor can ask his next question.

MR. NICE: Obliged, Your Honour.

Q. And the answer you're giving now is not an answer you gave yesterday, Mr. Kotur, and let me just conclude this passage of my questioning of you in this way: For someone to say that there was a plan to kick out all the Albanians is extremely significant in this case where that allegation is levelled against this accused. You understand that, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. For somebody to make up a piece of evidence of that kind and to put it in your mouth when it lies at the very heart of this indictment could hardly be more serious in terms of the interference that that would have with the due course of justice. Do you agree?

A. I am trying to tell the truth. It's not only that I'm trying to tell the truth, I am telling the truth, and there is no need for me to say anything different.

I had wanted this session to be an open session as far as ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁴ Ciaglinski and his statement are concerned because I really have nothing to hide. All the officers who were in the Pristina Corps know that there never was any such plan ever. There was never such a plan, and things like that were never done. And also when Mr. Ciaglinski testified in open court and when he was using a marker to show where the forces were supposed to be expelled and where they were supposed to go, and then when we finished with the KLA, then we would expel the Siptars. If we were to expel them, then we'd expel them together with the army and --

Q. Let's just deal with my question, if you wouldn't mind. You've accepted how grave Ciaglinski's behaviour is on your account, and you're now asking the Judges to accept, are you, that notwithstanding that, you -- or, rather, your wife rang him in connection with your flat in Pristina.

My suggestion to you, Mr. Kotur, is that that is absolute nonsense. You would never do such a thing if the position was as grave and as serious as you reveal it to be. Nonsense.

A. Mr. Nice, in relation to the apartment, Ciaglinski informed my wife later that a young married couple from Pec is in that apartment. He checked it out. I think that my wife only wished him a Merry Christmas then. What I'm telling you now is the truth in relation to Ciaglinski and my wife's contacts with him. I think that dragging my wife into this, and Ciaglinski and whatever, is really pointless, because we are not going to reach what you want to reach this way. The truth is what I am saying now. I did not say anything to Ciaglinski about any plan of expulsion. No such plan ever existed. I never knew anything of any such plan. And what ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁵ Ciaglinski explained on the map, that was in open session. That is nonsense. To expel people --

Q. Mr. Kotur, if Ciaglinski, who, incidentally - I must tell you this - notified the Serb authorities in Sofia about your invitation to lunch, if he had gone to Serbia, which was about an hour away from Nis, almost anything could have happened to him, couldn't it, for having told the truth about this plan. It's a dangerous and violent country. Was he being pulled there for that sort of reason?

A. What country is violent and dangerous? I didn't quite understand.

Q. Your country's violent. People get assassinated. People get dealt with in violent ways. You know that. What were you doing trying to get Ciaglinski into Serbia?

A. I do not know what would have been achieved if somebody had assassinated Ciaglinski. What would have been achieved by that? What would have been gained? I really don't understand this thesis.

Q. Now, you and Ciaglinski actually got on very well together, didn't you? You spent a lot of time travelling around together in the same car; correct?

A. No. We never travelled in the same car. He travelled in his car and I travelled in my car.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.

MR. NICE: You certainly spent a lot --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, Mr. Nice. Colonel, you're being asked to move closer to the microphone. ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁶

MR. NICE:

Q. You spent a lot of time in each other's company.

A. Not in each other's company, in a working environment, at work meetings. Not private meetings or anything like that.

Q. You got on well together.

A. I don't know what that means, "well," but I tried to have a proper relationship. I tried to be true to my word. I tried -- well, I think that he was also very fair, at least in terms of what he exhibited in his contacts with me. And we can also quote some things from the transcript here, the things he said to me and how he said them to me.

Q. And you never bragged to him, didn't you -- or you told him truthfully things. You didn't brag about yourself, did you?

A. There's no need for me to brag. Why would I brag?

Q. So just so that we can understand a little bit more about you, Mr. Kotur, explain, please, what you told Mr. Ciaglinski when you took him to the place where Holbrooke had been filmed on comparatively intimate terms with Kosovo Albanians. Do you remember that visit to the house -- or, rather, the place where Holbrooke had been familiar with Kosovo Albanians, going inside and taking his shoes off and all that sort of thing? Do you remember?

A. I remember that.

Q. Yes. Because I used the word the place where that house had been for good reason, don't I? Because the house had been destroyed, hadn't it?

A. Yes. ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁷

Q. It had been destroyed simply because it had been the location where Holbrooke had been familiar with Albanians. That's the reason it had been blown up; correct?

A. No. Or, rather, I cannot confirm your claim. It was set on fire, it wasn't blown up, and it was not the only house that was set on fire so I cannot really corroborate a claim like this.

Q. And you explained to Ciaglinski that it was you who'd done or had that destruction of the house done, and it was done simply for that reason, Holbrooke's association with Albanians; correct?

A. No. That is a pure lie. Let me just explain this to you. Let's just -- let me just explain what happened. Don't just take into account some kind of excerpts that are wrong.

He asked to tour the units in Junik. Mr. Ciaglinski and I toured the units that were in the town of Junik. We talked to the local people, and we asked about the relationship between the military and the population. It was him and me, and we were in civilian clothes, and there were some UNHCR people or whatever. And when we talked to the residents, we asked where this house was where Holbrooke had his meeting with the Siptar terrorist forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija when he toured the area. I didn't know where this house was or what it looked like.

We went there. They showed it to us, the local people, and that's the first time I saw that it had been burned down. It wasn't blown up. Ciaglinski took a few pictures there and he said, "Let's take a picture here," and okay, let's take a picture. ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁸ So that is the whole truth. This has nothing to do with it, that I organised the torching of that house and that it was burned down only because Mr. Holbrooke was there or that I knew where this house was. Beforehand we had to ask the local people where it was, and I told you why we came to Junik; not because of that house but to see the units that were located in Junik. That is the truth, the real truth.

Q. You can think of nothing, can you, that you would have said to Mr. Ciaglinski that would lead him to believe that you were acknowledging blowing up or burning down the house or having that done yourself. Nothing at all?

A. No.

Q. This is the last point on this little topic: The Office of the Prosecutor has been seeking an interview with you since 2002, hasn't it?

A. Yes, I have been informed about that.

Q. Yes. So you knew the Office of the Prosecutor wanted to speak to you. When you discovered, by whatever channel you did discover, that something false had been placed in your mouth by Ciaglinski, did it occur to you to contact the Office of the Prosecutor and accept their invitation to speak to them?

A. I had first accepted to be a witness for the Defence, and we notified the office in The Hague in writing about that. And this commission, or whatever it was called, attached to the federal government, knew.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the truth. ⁴⁷⁴⁷⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't understand how it would have been in his interest to have acknowledged to Ciaglinski, who works with the OSCE, that he was responsible for burning down this house.

MR. NICE: This is a measure of their trust that existed at the time. It's not a measure of anything else. If you remember, I prefaced it by saying that they got on well together. And we'll be looking at Ciaglinski's statement a little later for other things that it said that this man did.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. It seems a little strange to me, but please move on, yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. And one other thing, if you're able to help us: When Ciaglinski's evidence was given about his being told by an official of a plan to expel all Albanians after the KLA had been kicked out, it was done in neutral terms. You say that there was, of course, no such plan, so that whatever he said couldn't have been attached to anybody. Can you explain, if at all, how that piece of evidence might have been connected by anyone to you so as to lead people to believe that it was about you that Kotur was speaking in private session -- that Ciaglinski was speaking in private session? How was it attached to you? Do you know?

A. As for a plan of expulsion, I don't know that he talked about that, but what he showed on the map, that this high official told him about the expulsion of the Kosovo Liberation Army from Kosovo and Metohija, what he used a marker to denote on the map, that's what people linked up to me. And it's not that difficult to link up to me, because ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁰ Ciaglinski was in contact with me every day. That's how the Kosovo Verification team and the Pristina Corps team for cooperation with the KVM worked. And this was in open session. It was on television.

Q. Three phases of the history. First 1998 up and until the October agreements. What you were doing in that period of time?

A. I was in the command in Djakovica at the forward command post, as a member of the command, from the month of April 1998.

Q. A member of the command. We've had evidence dealing with the excessive use of force by Serb forces throughout that period of time from a range of people: Crosland, Ashdown, Mustafa Draga in relation to Padaliste, that was the MUP, Beqaj in relation to Racaj, Lirij Imeraj in relation to, for example, Dubrava prison and a helicopter, matters of that sort. The allegations of excessive use of force, do you say they're all totally false?

A. I don't know about this evidence of yours. I did not follow it, and I am not au courant, but what I know from 1998 onwards when I worked with the Kosovo Verification team as a member of the Pristina Corps team, I'm trying to tell you that not in a single report of ours will you find that the military used excessive force in any action. That's what I've already said.

I did not testify for all of Kosovo in 1998 and for 1999, the police, Dubrava, whatever, all these places that you referred to here just now.

Q. I'm dealing very briefly with the period of 1998 before the October agreements. We know there were human rights reports, there were ⁴⁷⁴⁸¹ Contact Group reports, all sorts of reports alleging abuse of human rights in Kosovo and excessive use of force by the VJ. Do you say all those reports were false or do you accept -- by the VJ and the MUP -- or do you accept that there were human rights violations in Kosovo at the hands of the MUP and the VJ?

A. I testified yesterday to the period from October 1998 until the end of the war in 1999, or more precisely, until the 10th of March, until when I was heading that liaison team on behalf of the Pristina Corps. That was my testimony.

And in 1998, at the forward post in Djakovica, they dealt exclusively with securing the state border and preventing incursions from Siptar terrorist forces from Albania and Macedonia. That command had only that role.

Q. You were a colonel in 1998, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you telling us you simply can't help us one way or another with whether the use of tanks on houses, as Lord Ashdown told us, or Suva Reka being an area of widespread destruction with domestic property on fire, or the destruction of crops as spoken of by Crosland, you can't help us one way or another with whether that is true?

A. No, because the command in Djakovica did not conduct a single operation in that area. It dealt exclusively with the border area towards Albania and part of the border area that was later extended up to ten kilometres maximum. That was their assignment.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the October agreements which ⁴⁷⁴⁸² followed reports of what was happening in Kosovo, as you know, just to remind the Court of this, as you understand it, this is the first time the Kosovo incident had ever become internationalised, isn't it? First time the accused had ever let Kosovo be the subject of international oversight, intervention, or whatever you like. Is that right?

A. Well, I as a soldier did not get involved in politics. We did not influence the charting of policies, we only executed tasks given to the army.

There was the first time that we had to deal with the Verification Mission that arrived in order to verify certain things in Kosovo and Metohija. So whether it was the first time or the second time, I really don't know. I wasn't involved in that.

Q. From that moment on, then, either with the Verification Mission - and you know nothing about what went before - but from that moment on you know what was happening with the Verification Mission, and then from March onwards, you were on the territory, and just remind us again, what was your function? You were a colonel, and what were you doing?

A. I was only a member of a command that executed its missions. They had to do mostly with inspecting units, checking the condition of those units, planning, et cetera, and the commander was Colonel Lazarevic.

Q. And --

A. I was not -- I was never in such a place in the chain of command that I -- that would give me an opportunity to command. My basic function in the Pristina Corps was chief of infantry. And the Pristina Corps has 60 per cent of its troops in infantry, so my role was to take care of the ⁴⁷⁴⁸³ status of those troops, possibilities for command and control, et cetera. As for deciding how the units would be used, that was never my role.

Q. You appreciate, don't you, that a large number of the allegations made here against the accused are said to reflect the activities of the Pristina Corps, amongst others. You understand that, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. The Pristina Corps --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- had --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... about Drewienkiewicz or about Walker, but you come with no single document, no single account that deals with any of the allegations of criminal offences made against this accused; correct?

A. No, I don't have any documents. I never had them, and I don't have them now. I was not in a position to obtain any documents.

Q. Well --

A. I never had my own private archive. I never sought to have any, because that was not my job. I told you what my job was about.

Q. I'm not going to spend more than a couple of minutes, if I can avoid it, on the matters upon which you spent a lot of time involving Loncar and his appointment.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, in the meantime, can I ask one thing to clarify some issues? The -- when we go back to the dialogue, the conversation that took place between this witness and Colonel Ciaglinski, ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁴ according to Ciaglinski's evidence, when this witness allegedly told him about the plan, was there the presence of an interpreter?

MR. NICE: There was.

JUDGE KWON: Interpreter for Mr. Ciaglinski?

MR. NICE: There was.

JUDGE KWON: So -- Witness, you do not speak English at all?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

MR. NICE: I'm coming back to the conversation in its chronological point when I deal with the other matters.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. So far as Mr. Loncar is concerned, the history as you gave it yesterday is that he and Walker had got on well in the United Nations operation in Slavonia, UNTAES, and they respected each other as professionals; correct?

A. That's something I observed at the first meeting that was attended by Colonel Loncar, Mr. Walker, and Colonel Mijatovic in Pristina.

Q. One way or another, and it really doesn't matter, it was because of this relationship that the accused appointed Loncar to the coordination function that he had. Do you accept that?

A. Who appointed who?

Q. The accused, this accused, appointed Loncar to his job.

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. In fact, as I said yesterday, Mr. Walker apologised to General Loncar for depriving him of his leisure in retirement and getting him to that job, saying that he was there due to ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁵ the request he, Mr. Walker, made. That's what Mr. Walker said at the first meeting. And the entire 90-minute meeting was led by Mr. Walker and Mr. Loncar. And as I said before, despite the original plan, neither Colonel Mijatovic nor I had an opportunity to speak because he was taking the chair, and from that we observed that their relationship dates back to some previous period, and that's what I could see and witness for myself.

Q. As to who asked who to be the person in Loncar's position, do you accept that it may have been the accused who, discovering the history, said to Walker, "Would you like to work with Loncar again?" rather than Walker asking for that to happen? Do you accept that that might be possible?

A. I only repeated what I had heard. I only told you what I heard.

Q. Well, I'm putting to you what Loncar has told us, because unlike you, Loncar responded and spoke to us, and I'll make his statement available to the accused. I've got a couple of things I want to put to you from what Loncar told us, and I can lay it on the overhead projector for speed.

Loncar was actually too senior for the job he had, wasn't he?

A. He was qualified. I don't know whether he was too senior, but he was certainly qualified for that job. He was a lieutenant general, a very experienced commander, experienced officer who had graduated from all the military schools, and he was qualified for what he was doing.

Q. You see, again I don't want to take a lot of time, but the reality was that you, for the MUP -- for the VJ, were the person with authority; your colleague for the MUP had authority; and that Loncar actually had no ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁶ authority. He was really a conduit. Isn't that about right?

A. Just as Loncar did not have any authority, I did not have any authority either in terms of command and control. But as for contacts with the Verification Mission, Loncar did have authority because he was head of the liaison team with the Verification Mission on the federal level that was headed by Sainovic, whereas the General Staff had its own liaison team. You saw the schematic of communication that we presented yesterday. I was at the corps level, not the 3rd Army or the General Staff of the army. General Loncar was in the federal commission headed by Mr. Sainovic. And from those positions we had our parallel relationships. At my level was Mr. Ciaglinski, at General Loncar's level was Mr. Walker and Mr. Drewienkiewicz. In his absence, I contacted with Mr. Walker and Mr. Drewienkiewicz. At joint meetings I assisted him in his work. Those were our authorities.

Q. And authorisation for inspection of any premises wasn't dealt with by Loncar, it was dealt with by Sainovic or above; correct?

A. No.

Q. Are you saying Loncar --

A. Localities were requested by verifiers, and we approved them in the spirit of the agreement.

Q. Can you tell me, please, why unannounced inspections, which would seem perhaps to the outside observer to be the most reliable form of inspection, were so completely resisted by the VJ?

A. They were resisted because, according to our interpretation of the agreement, it was not within the competence of the Kosovo Verification ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁷ Mission to inspect within barracks, and that's what they wanted, to inspect within barracks and within installations, and to precisely locate and position various types of installations and get precise data. The army interpreted the agreement as meaning that that was not their mandate and that it did not have authority for that. On the ground, they could do that, but on the ground there were only three companies, and they were only company-level units, whereas units that were located in the border belt --

Q. What is there to hide, what is there to obscure by denying this Verification Mission, which you accepted certainly at the beginning was there in good faith, what was there to obscure by denying them unannounced visit access?

A. We had nothing to obscure that would violate the agreement, but as for precise positioning of depots and what is contained in each and every depot, we thought they did not have authority for that, and they insisted on it.

Q. Because, of course, they were there to verify that equipment and troops weren't being brought in in excess of the permitted levels, and that's something they could do by unannounced visits, but they were always denied the advantage of making them. Correct?

A. I have told you about the position of the army and the federal commission. Their explanation was requested regarding the interpretation of that agreement, and that interpretation was that the KVM did not have authority to inspect within barracks. Not a single unit was brought to Kosovo without notification to the KVM. There was not a single movement, ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁸ not a single entry or exit from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Nothing was done without notifying the KVM. All arrivals of new conscripts and departures of those who had already served --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that. Can you tell us, please, when, where, by whom there was advance warning given to the KVM of the Racak incident?

A. I told you yesterday that my first contact concerning Racak with the KVM was between General Drewienkiewicz and myself, took place on the 15th, at around 11.30 p.m. when he called me at my home.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... maybe. Are you going to suggest, or are you going to be able to give evidence to the effect that KVM was given advance notice of the incident at Racak so as to be able to observe it?

A. I cannot testify about that because, like Ciaglinski had liaison with me, the KVM had a man who contacted the MUP, and MUP operations were notified to them by Colonel Mijatovic, and Mr. Ciaglinski was a coordinator. And in the transcript, in the record that we read yesterday, you saw that General Drewienkiewicz was notified. He was informed, and he didn't tell you that. He did not -- they could not learn about that from me because I was liaison from the army, and they had their own liaison man from the MUP, and General Drewienkiewicz spoke about it at the meeting of the 16th.

MR. NICE: The accused wants to say something?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want to ask the witness to speak a little more slowly because I can see in the transcript that the ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁹ interpretation does not cover all he is saying. There are certain omissions, and I suppose that's because he's speaking so fast.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm much indebted to you, Mr. Milosevic, for that.

MR. NICE:

Q. As to whether this was an operation of the MUP or a joint operation, what's your summary position?

A. It was a MUP operation.

Q. Presumably the VJ would have to be notified about it in advance, wouldn't they?

A. I don't know that.

Q. Well, if you've got a big operation like the one on a whole village said to be a nest of KLA, the VJ would need to know about it in order not to get involved or not to be troublesome or something of that sort; not, for example, to have training exercises happening immediately adjacent to the scene of the event. They would need to know, wouldn't they?

A. Well, if the VJ was notified, the corps commander would have known about it, the Chief of Staff of MUP forces in Pristina, brigade commanders whose units would be located there. So along the chain of command, they would know. I could not have known because I was not included in the chain of command and decision-making at such a level. And I really can't tell you anything about it, because I was not in a position that would allow me to know that. All that was decided in the Pristina Corps in concert with the MUP would -- would bypass me because I was not on that ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁰ level.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could only guess.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, is it your contention that the agreement required that an anti-terrorist operation should be notified in advantages?

MR. NICE: As a matter of -- if it was an independent operation by the MUP, it would be a matter of common sense in military terms that it would be notified, yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, no, no. Sorry. You misunderstand me. I don't mean notified by the MUP to the VJ or vice versa. I mean is it your contention that it was part of the agreement that brought the mission --

MR. NICE: It's been said before that they were notified, yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: -- that there was an obligation to notify them of an anti-terrorist operation?

MR. NICE: Your Honour is right to remind me of that separate issue, and my first answer -- approach would be to see what the witness would say of that, and then I'll come back to --

JUDGE BONOMY: You've actually asked him that question.

MR. NICE: Yes, I have.

Q. Do you accept that an operation of this kind, the one that we know about at Racak, should be notified under the agreement to the authorities?

A. I would certainly inform them, as far as the army is concerned, because it is in the interest -- it was in the interest of the army and the MUP for the operations to be monitored. It would be in our interest ⁴⁷⁴⁹¹ and to our benefit.

Q. That's interesting common sense, but His Honour is concerned to know from me and from you whether, first of all, it is being suggested that the agreement required notification of such events to the KVM. Do you say the agreement, the October agreement itself, required that KVM be notified of something like the Racak event?

A. I think it was a requirement.

Q. Thank you. Well, did you ever sign orders -- no.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'll come back to Your Honour's question about the interpretation of the agreement, if I may, a little later. There's been a great deal --

JUDGE BONOMY: I'm content with what's been explored so far.

MR. NICE: Thank you. Can you just look at this clip, please, which is a Sanction clip.

Your Honour, I'm afraid we have to move on the clip a little bit. I can't hear anything at the moment. We're seeing the English.

Q. Can you hear anything, Mr. Kotur? Can you hear anything?

A. Yes, yes.

[Audiotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] And another part of the police forces moved out from another side of the village to push the terrorists back."

JUDGE KWON: Is the video being played?

[Videotape played]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We are not having the video, Mr. Nice. ⁴⁷⁴⁹²

MR. NICE: No, I'm sorry. Well, there are technical problems. Time is at a premium. We may come back to that. Perhaps if we can just look at this physical document first and then we'll come back to it.

Q. I'm not quite sure whether your last answer was different from an earlier answer. Are you allowing, by reason of your simply not knowing the position, are you allowing that this Racak exercise was a joint operation of the police and the army?

A. I don't know that. I only know what I heard and what I was informed about. I wasn't there when the operation took place. I wasn't there when it was planned. I only had communication with the verifiers in the Urosevac garrison that notified me about it. And if any forces were involved anywhere, I was informed by officers on observation duty and officers who were on the ground, through Ciaglinski.

Q. Well, if the usher would be good enough to place page 4 of the English -- well, first of all the front page of this document on the overhead projector.

I believe this has been seen before -- this has been seen before but hasn't yet, I think, been produced as an exhibit. It's a daily operations report from the Yugoslav Army General Staff, and it's dated the 16th of January of 1999.

And if you'd go, please, to paragraph 8, and if Mr. Nort would lay page 4 of 6 on the overhead projector. What we see in this document --

A. Point 8.

Q. Paragraph 8. In fact, it's 8.4, I think. Incidents and changes of significance. ⁴⁷⁴⁹³ And then under 3rd Army, which you'll see as a subheading, and in the second paragraph it says this: "Some of the forces of BG-242-1 were deployed to seal off the village of Racak, Stimlje ... where MUP members conducted an operation against Siptar terrorists who had killed a MUP member."

Now, you say you don't have personal knowledge. You accept that joint operations occurred. This report reflects - and it's as plain as daylight - this report reflects that Racak was a joint operation; correct?

A. It says here that part of the units made a blockade of Racak, but I told you, and I'm going to tell you again, I was not in the chain of command, I was not in the chain of planning. I only received reports through the liaison officer located in the garrisons, and I have reports that I sent on to the General Staff but along another line from the liaison team with the Verification Mission and the liaison team with the army.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. So I did not have this information --

Q. You've come here. You've been prepared to give interpretation of what Loncar did, what Drewienkiewicz did, what Walker did on secondhand information. This is something within your expertise, and it's a very, very simple question, and I'd like you to look at the document, as the military man with decades of experience that you have, and to tell us, with forces of the army deployed to seal off the village where the MUP are conducting an operation is described, what is being described is a joint operation, and it's very, very simple, isn't it? ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁴

A. Yes. That is not in dispute. I did not contest that. But what I said about Drewienkiewicz and Loncar, they were the men I worked with, and I was able to talk about that. I cannot talk about things that I didn't work on.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... this document, unless of course the document was typed in error or something like that, we may take it, may we, that Racak was a joint operation, from this document.

A. It emerges from this that the forces of the 243rd Brigade were engaged in the blockade of Racak, and a blockade can mean taking up certain positions in the area, but it doesn't mean that the forces were reinforcements during an operation. Its very location here at Canovic hill and the surrounding parts can imply that that was, from that side, a sort of security measure, because that side of Racak had been blocked. And I don't want to enter into the details of it now. These forces were not reinforced, they were blocked. But it wasn't the word "reinforcement" that was used. The word "blocked" was used. Now, whether you took an active part or not, that is something else again, if you follow along the lines of logic and reason. So I don't think this is to be challenged. It says it was in blockade. If you say that a place was blockaded or sealed off, that's one thing, and it's quite another thing whether you were actively engaged and involved in an operation. So that is my explanation of this term "blockade," or the word "blockade."

Q. The last answer seems to be an effort to say that perhaps it wasn't a joint exercise. Are you trying to get out of a difficulty you ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁵ think that this document may create for this accused?

A. No. I'm not trying to get anybody out of any difficulty or any acts. If they perpetrated those acts, they must be held responsible. You asked me for an interpretation and understanding. I said that all that it said here was sealed off, or blockade, and I said that when the word "blockade" is used it means that a terrain was blocked and doesn't mean that it actively participated as reinforcements to other forces, and so you can't see that from this report by the General Staff. Now, my knowledge was not that there were --

Q. You never knew anything, did you, one way or the other? I think -- I hope I've correctly summarised your evidence.

A. I didn't know what -- about what I didn't do myself.

Q. No, of course not. So you don't know now, you didn't know then. Correct?

A. Well, I couldn't have known.

Q. No, quite. Well, let's look, then --

A. I attended the meeting, as I said yesterday, between General Maisonneuve and Mr. Jelic, and Jelic did not confirm that, that there was participation on the part of the army.

Q. We're going to look at a record of that document, which is Exhibit 178, and it's tab 28 of the Racak documents, if Ms. Dicklich would be so good. Because although you were asked comments about other meetings where you weren't present, you weren't taken through this one in detail where you were present.

Now, it's in English, but I can read the relevant parts of it to ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁶ you for your comment.

If we lay first of all the first page on the overhead projector. It has you opening -- we can see the list of people. A bit further down, please, Mr. Nort. A bit further up, whichever way it is. Let us see a bit more of the document. It says that the meeting started with you, K, with pleasantries, dealing with the return of the 40 bodies from Racak to Stimlje. It deals with reference to Sainovic meeting Keller, with autopsies allegedly saying that all were dead due to distant fire, but that wasn't yet signed by the Finns. And then you said this: "... this was mainly a police action, but the military was present for one part. The VJ were several hundred metres away when the attack started. They did not enter the village but acted only on some specific points."

Now, that's what's recorded as being said by you. As it's in English, I'll repeat the material lines. "... the military was present for one part. The VJ was several hundred metres away when the attack started. They didn't enter the village but acted only on some specific points."

Two questions arising from that. First of all, has the note-taker correctly reflected what you said at the meeting?

A. I cannot remember now after so many years whether it's really correct, but if the note-taker wrote the minutes correctly, then what Mr. Jelic said at the meeting should not differ from what I said, because everything I learnt about that action I learnt from Commander Jelic. He carried out some training and exercises along the axis close to Racak, and ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁷ he said he had been attacked and opened fire on certain facilities. I know that because that's what he said. So that is how I got involved in the discussion not to remain completely passive and silent. But Jelic was the person who was speaking. It was his area of responsibility, he was the commander, and he was responding to the deployment of the forces. I just took the floor to say what I had learnt from Jelic about the matter.

Q. I see. It was accidental proximity of his unit that was on training and exercise in the area of a major operation by the MUP that led to their firing back; is that what you're saying?

A. Not those words. I didn't use those words. You're giving it in caricature form now. The unit was permanently located in the area underneath Canovic hill, which is close to Racak, and according to a separate plan and programme, he was conducting exercises and training of units, and he had training and exercise of the units on that day near Racak. Now, whether that was agreed upon or whether it just happened to coincide with the other, I can't give you the details of that. You had Jelic here, so he was able to tell you about that, but as I say, I was not informed about that. I wasn't in that chain of command nor was I commander of the brigade or the unit nor had I taken part in the planning of the MUP action or the involvement of the training of the army or its engagement along that axis. All I can say is about the information that I had received, and the best information you'll be able to receive from the brigade commander himself.

Q. The second page in English, to conclude this. Towards the bottom of the page, Mr. Nort. There is a passage -- ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁸ that's fine. A bit further up. A bit further down. That's perfect. We'll get to the other side. Thank you.

Jelic is, having given his account - and we don't have time through it all, the Judges have been through it before - says they weren't attacked from the village but from the high ground between Racak and Belince. They had a 2 to 300 metre higher elevation "This was not a military operation nor was the VJ responsible for any destruction in the town. Our operation happened at the same time and the MUP operation." Maisonneuve said, "What -- on the 15th of January between 0800 and 0900 in the morning?" Jelic said, "Yes." "You were attacked from the direction of Racak and Belince?" Jelic said "Yes," and then you made this observation, according to the note-taker: "Let me simplify," you said. "The unit did not move from camp, therefore they were not surrounding the village. They fired on targets between Racak and Belince." Did you say that?

A. Well, you could see that because there was tension between Jelic and Maisonneuve, and Jelic -- Maisonneuve insisted whether the army had taken part in Racak, whereas Jelic told his own story. I just stepped in and said, "Let's make things simple," and I said that I had concluded from what I had heard what I said. I know that I said something in that connection, but I'm telling you why I reacted, because there was a sort of tug between Maisonneuve and Jelic, Maisonneuve wanting to know one thing, Jelic claiming that it was how he described it, and from this it would emerge that the army did not enter the village or what you've just read out, your version. ⁴⁷⁴⁹⁹

Q. What you said we now know to be untrue, because of course the army blockaded or sealed off the village for the MUP. So of course it left camp. Now, why would you, in a meeting like this, please, Mr. Kotur, say something that you either had no knowledge about or, alternatively, knew to be untrue?

A. No. I didn't even have any idea of it not being true. But listening to what was said at the meeting, what Maisonneuve had said, Mr. Maisonneuve and what Jelic said, I just commented on that. So if you take the whole course of the meeting and everything that evolved, you'll see that that was my comment. So let's make things simple and state how things stand, nothing more than that. So that was my involvement at the meeting. And I state again, if anybody knew about the situation, it was Mr. Jelic and the verifiers who were there, and they could have given you the best and most correct information.

As I say, I was just head of the team for liaising with the Kosovo Verification Mission in Pristina, and all I know is what is stated at the meeting through the chain of command. I said that as a member, although a head of the team of the Pristina Corps for liaising with the Verification Mission, by the same token became a member of the staff collegiate of the corps. Otherwise, I wasn't a member of the collegiate corps by virtue of my post and function, and the very fact that I wasn't --

Q. Forgive me. As a member of the corps, you must have known what the corps was up to. You must have known if this was a joint operation.

A. No. I did not have to know --

Q. Well, help us with this -- ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁰

A. -- nor did I know. Why would somebody have had to inform me about that at all cost?

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... please. If the army was deployed to seal off the village, and if the event lasted a day or so and involved many people dying, either at the hands of the MUP or the army being, for purposes of this question, immaterial, the army would have prepared a report, wouldn't it? It would have contemporaneous documents, and there would be a report prepared on what had happened.

A. Well, there would have had to have been a report. The army could not have been involved somewhere, on assignment somewhere without any record of that existing.

Q. Where is it?

A. Operative reports must be in the operative section.

Q. You see, the document we -- the document that I showed you which revealed that the army sealed off Racak, Exhibit 934, is a document that it's only taken us four years or five years to get hold of, but we got hold of it eventually. Well, can you tell us, please, where we can find the relevant report - because we've been trying to find it - from the army about this joint operation? Once we know where we can look, perhaps somebody will give it to us. Can you tell us, where can we find it?

A. All documents referring to units are archived at the end of each year, and all the documents and material can be found in those same archives. If something was written, then it should be there. But the deadline for storing documents is always set and not all documents are kept for the same length of time. I think that this particular document ⁴⁷⁵⁰¹ was probably kept for a number of years.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I should simply tell you we have been trying to get this document, as the Court knows, for several years. It's never been suggested that it's been destroyed in the course of routine destruction.

Q. Can I turn to something different. I haven't got time to go through almost any of your exhibits, but I'll just look at one, if I can find it. We will look at, just as a sample, really, of your exhibits, tab 14. We'll look at tab 14 of your exhibits. This -- this is a report of a meeting held on the 10th of March between yourself and Ciaglinski. You deal with resolution of problems in talks that there have been, planning a visit of General Dizet, as described. Concern about militaries training of VJ units in Nevoljani and Bukos and the targets that were engaged, described there by Ciaglinski, tanks firing live ammunition at the houses of Albanians, or so it was claimed. You're saying that you didn't believe that the buildings had been fired at.

Item 3, General DZ visiting Kacanik and Ivaja and establishing that there had been fighting there and shooting, that some houses were damaged. No plundering. DZ saying he was going to visit Vucitrn. And C informing that 26 new liaison officers were coming. Well, that's the report for the 10th of March. Let's look at events of the same time as a single exercise recorded, please --

A. Ciaglinski was informed that he would be coming.

Q. Yes. Let me look at this document. There are three tabs, please, ⁴⁷⁵⁰² three yellow markers. This is Exhibit number 321, part of 321, the blue book.

Mr. Kotur, if you would just look at it. This is part of the routine reporting process of the KVM. You've made some observations about its reliability as a reporting body, but you didn't give any specific details. This is, I think, for the 10th of March -- sorry, this is the 8th of March. It runs through to the 10th of March. Again it's in English, but I can deal with it sufficiently slowly, I hope, for you to follow it.

What the KVM reported was that a "... MUP company size unit and a VJ company, augmented by an AAA platoon ... had conducted an operation in Djeneral Jankovic Salient. At that stage, no direct observation of the objectives could be conducted by KVM due to the blockade of all secondary roads. Part of the Serb contingent remained in the area for the night, indicating a probable resumption of fighting on Tuesday the 9th." Is there any reason, Mr. Kotur, to doubt the accuracy of that piece of reporting by the KVM? "AAA" stands for anti-aircraft artillery; for example, Pragas. Any reason to doubt the accuracy of this part of their reporting?

A. No. I don't know.

Q. Next item, please. Well, it's you who were there and who you were liaising and dealing with these things, amongst others, with Mr. Ciaglinski.

On the 9th of March, it says this: "The VJ/MUP operation to clear the KLA from ... Jankovic area continues. KVM patrols initially blocked ⁴⁷⁵⁰³ from proceeding to the affected villages. MUP and VJ forces then followed their pattern of surrounding the local villages and forcing the inhabitants to flee, through the use of direct and indirect fire. By mid-afternoon, houses were burning in Gajre, Ivaja, Straza, Alil Mahala." And it goes on to say: "The MUP units appeared intent on destroying these villages."

Now, is there any reason to doubt the accuracy of this bit of KVM reporting on a joint VJ/MUP operation?

A. Now when I see what Ciaglinski informed me about at the meeting of the 10th of March and what has been written down, I have reason to doubt the veracity of this, the truth of it, because I'd like to see what Ciaglinski said, word-by-word, in point 3, if I may.

Q. Shall we come back to that. Just for convenience, we'll look at the last entry, which is the 10th of March, and then we'll come back to the document.

A. But it is related to the document you mentioned about Ivaja and Kacanik and so on.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. So just for comparison purposes, because we spoke about the 9th, and on the 10th you have Ciaglinski's report about it. With your permission, may I read it out?

Q. Can we come back to that and can we just look at the 10th first so that we've got the reporting from the KVM complete. Here's the 10th reporting, and it says: "KVM escorted UNHCR convoy in the heart of the salient. They were stopped by VJ and MUP but ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁴ authorised to proceed. Three bodies in civilian clothes were found in Ivaja, which is totally deserted as is Gajre." And the comment is that: "Although no significant activity was reported... on the 10th of March, the VJ maintains a small garrison of soldiers and equipment ... in Djeneral Jankovic." Now, is that all likely to be accurate?

A. I wasn't in the area so I can't really say whether what the Verification Mission is saying now is correct or not. As I say, I wasn't in all the places to see for myself, but I have to judge on the basis of the reports I receive and comments I hear. So any comment on my part would be improper to say yes or no, because I don't know the details. But I do have what Mr. Ciaglinski said at the meeting of the 10th, and with your permission, I'd like to read it out to the Trial Chamber.

Q. If it relates to this, of course.

A. Ciaglinski said that General DZ was in Kacanik and in Ivaja and established that there were conflicts and that there was firing, that certain houses had been damaged, that there was no theft but that certain houses had been searched from which the KLA had fired, which I consider to be normal. Therefore, the situation is far from being as has been described by the media, some media and the KLA, where it was claimed that the villages were destroyed and burnt. He said that we did have witnesses in the field who in their report will deny the allegations made by the KLA.

He also said that General DZ would visit Vucitrn to establish on the spot what the problems are, that he would visit Vucitrn, as I said, to ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁵ establish what the problems are in the work of the KVM centre, and he said that the command of the coordinating centre was replaced yesterday because of supplying the KLA.

And then I informed him about the arrival of 26 new liaison officers from the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia whose exclusive duty was to liaise with them, not to have to read on. That was on the 10th, and that was the last meeting I had with Ciaglinski while he stayed on in Pristina for another ten days.

Q. Now, what do you say arises from this, that the KVM were reporting matters and being fair in giving a balanced view to everybody's opinions, or what?

A. What I'm saying is this: I do believe in what Ciaglinski said, whereas the report about the houses burnt and the destruction of the villages is incorrect, to my mind.

Now, I know that the information that were received from the regional centres at the staff level in Pristina of the Verification Mission, that they had a separate body which reviewed all the documents and made their assessment, because certain verifiers were inexperienced and wouldn't be able to assess the situation on the ground properly, and that is why a uniformed team was set up, providing information in Pristina, not those coming from the regional centres, because they didn't always believe their reports, the reports from the regional centres, at face value. That's the information I have about the way in which they came by their conclusions.

And then when Ciaglinski presents this at the Kosovo Verification ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁶ Mission, the head of staff, the assistant to General DZ in charge of the army, I completely believe what Mr. Ciaglinski wrote and not rely on certain documents that you're presenting which differ quite a bit from what it says here. Now, I don't want to go into the details. All I am saying is that I accept this, whereas I myself was not on the spot to be able to give you my own value judgement taken from the spot, on the ground, as I saw it.

Q. This document that we have been looking at, document 14, has been prepared by Slana for production to whom?

A. That's the group for cooperating with the OSCE mission of the Foreign Ministry. It is somebody from the Foreign Ministry pointed out, and it says Soskic from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And all those who attended the meeting -- this was recorded by Soskic: All those attending the meeting, Mr. Slana, as the head of that particular post and office, signed the document. The document was sent out to the Pristina Corps and to General Andjelkovic. Depending on the importance of the documents. Not all documents were sent to Belgrade to Mr. Milosevic's address or the foreign minister, for example. Depending on their importance, on the importance of the meeting and what was said at the meeting. So that's how they were distributed. But anyway, this document is from the SMIP of Pristina, and a member of theirs recorded it at the meeting that I attended with Mr. Ciaglinski.

Q. Do you see Mr. Ciaglinski's signature on it?

A. No, there's no signature. ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁷

Q. Is there no suggestion --

A. Ciaglinski or I myself or anybody else signed it -- did not sign any reports like this, records and minutes. May I tell you something about the records and minutes now.

Q. I only asked you that because you said everybody signed the record. This is a confidential document within the Serb authorities --

A. No, no, no.

Q. Does it show that it was copied to Mr. Ciaglinski?

A. No, it doesn't show that.

Q. Was it copied to him?

A. No, I don't think it was. I don't think that was the practice, to send them out, to copy them out, just as they didn't reciprocate; they didn't send any to us. And this is like the minutes from Urosevac that you presented here. That wasn't signed either by the members who were present at the meeting, either Mr. Jelic or myself or I don't know who else. And this was incorporated as being one of Mr. Maisonneuve's documents. So that was the standard practice. But there's no reason for the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the note-taking clerks and experienced persons working in embassies to sign a document that wasn't true. We didn't write these documents for the purposes of The Hague or anything like that. We never knew that they would come up anywhere like this so that somebody could write something in a certain way so that you could read between the lines.

These are valid documents which fully reflect the meeting and conversation and discussions taking place at the meeting, and this -- you ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁸ can't take it with a pinch of salt and any reservations. You must accept it as it stands on face value because, as I say, I was present at the meeting and I do know that these records and minutes were very properly conducted and presented later on.

JUDGE KWON: Before we break, Mr. Nort, could you put the blue book on the ELMO again, starting from the 10th of March, and 9th of March, and 8th of March. I don't remember whether we heard about this from Mr. Coo.

Mr. Nice, it's about the comments of reliability of each report. At the end of paragraph there appears a letter, B2, A2, something like that.

MR. NICE: No, I don't recall having an explanation of that code.

JUDGE KWON: Could you remind me of that?

MR. NICE: No, I don't recall having an explanation of it. But --

JUDGE KWON: See, here it says -- 8th of March, it says "reliability assessed as B2." What does it mean?

MR. NICE: I don't recall that it's in evidence. If it is, I'll find it. If it's available in some other way, I'll offer it to you as soon as I can.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we'll take the break now. We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, please continue.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁷⁵⁰⁹

Q. Mr. Kotur, there are probably in principle three periods of -- probably in principle three periods of time that it may be helpful to view separately to a degree; 1998 until the October agreements, October agreements until the withdrawal of the mission, and then the mission until the end of the conflict. At all of those times you were a member of the Pristina Corps; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. We've been looking at a divergence in reporting between what's contained in your exhibit 14 and what's contained in the KVM, and I may come back to that with the suggestion that what we see there is just another reflection of the degree of autonomy, and perhaps criminal autonomy, exercised by the Pristina Corps; autonomy to the extent of being outside the normal chain of command. That's the topic. I'm going to deal with it very briefly with the use of the overhead projector and Mr. Nort. This is an exhibit, 769, tab 23. I'm afraid it's highlighted but that makes it easier.

That one for the witness, please, and I'll follow it. The first page, you will see is -- reveals this to be a letter from Perisic to the accused. Top of the page, please. It's the date -- we want to see the date. It's the 23rd of July, 1998. Down the page, please, Mr. Nort. Thank you very much.

He complains to his president of the constant tendency to use the VJ outside the institutions of the system. Can you go over two pages, please, Mr. Nort. Just at the foot. Page before, please, so that we can just follow ⁴⁷⁵¹⁰ it, and then turn straight over. So under "General proposition to how to remedy the position," he says: "In practice, the commander of the Pristina --" oh, next page, please. "... the commander of the Pristina Corps plans what he has been ordered to do --" I'm so sorry. I didn't ...

[Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm so sorry. I didn't realise you were occupied with something else.

Q. "... commander of the Pristina Corps plans what he has been ordered to do, and this is at the request of Sainovic and Minic and the MUP, and so turns into something like a service of theirs, for planning and execution. Since it is his wish and that of all of us that the plan be realised if others will not or cannot, he executes it with the Pristina Corps units, which leads to an illegitimate, unsystematic and inadequate utilisation of VJ units ..."

Now, the description here by General Perisic, the man in charge, as he was until removed, is that Sainovic and Minic were running your corps on their own account. Is he right about that?

A. Was that a question?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't know about Sainovic and Minic running the corps. That's a bit strange. I just know that the corps commander commanded the corps, and his commander was the army commander. As for our forward command post in Djakovica, our commander was the corps commander, and then there was his deputy, his Chief of Staff. He was the commander of the forward command post from April 1998 up until later. ⁴⁷⁵¹¹

Q. You were there negotiating with KVM in the middle. We'll see what you were doing between the departure of KVM in June 1999 shortly, but you were quite a senior officer. The suggestion here is, by Perisic himself, that this was being run outside the chain of command by Sainovic. Do you accept that that may be right?

A. No, I do not accept that, because I've never seen any such thing, anybody else commanding the units except for the commanders of these units.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, could you give me the exhibit number again?

MR. NICE: I'm correcting the exhibit number, I gave the wrong number.

JUDGE KWON: Yes, you cited the wrong number.

MR. NICE: I misread it, actually, and the correct number is 469, tab 23. I apologise for that.

Q. I want you to look, please, then, if that's what you say, at some clips which come from a television programme. General Dimitrijevic, you know who he was, don't you?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. He also went out of office at the same sort of time and maybe for the same sorts of reasons, but he's one of the people we'll see, and I want your comments very rapidly on the points that were made.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, we have a series of very short clips. There are transcripts, to assist the comprehension, in both languages, and it all relates to the Pristina Corps, really. So if we can play the first -- when these pages have been distributed. Your Honour, in the format ⁴⁷⁵¹² you have it, each clip is sequential, one after the other. I'll probably, if they don't take too long, go through all of them because they're not very long.

We can play the first clip, please.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE: No soundtrack. Can we -- in case there's a problem with the -- here we go. Right. Sound, please. I have no sound.

Q. Mr. Kotur, do you have sound?

A. Yes, I have sound.

Q. I don't have sound, but it doesn't matter. Pause there. In the course -- we can read it in the English. In the course of this, and that's General Dimitrijevic, Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, head of the security administration until 1999, saying: "Because of misuse of the Pristina Corps, the situation got more and more complicated." Now, do you accept that the -- there was criminal violence on the territory and it was committed by the Pristina Corps? Do you accept that?

A. I'm not aware of any such thing being done by the Pristina Corps.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I hope that that -- that the overall soundtrack of that was "I still remember that in 1998 there was a meeting with the president at that time, Milosevic." I hope that was correct, because I just simply wasn't getting any sound. Was that clip number 1? Can we try clip number 2 and we'll come back to clip number 1. And if I could have some sound I'd be grateful. I don't know what I have to do to make it work.

JUDGE KWON: What is the provenance of this film? ⁴⁷⁵¹³

MR. NICE: It's a television documentary containing interviews with a number of people, and in particular with Dimitrijevic, Pavkovic and Perisic.

JUDGE KWON: What television?

MR. NICE: It was a video programme called Strictly Confidential, and it was broadcast by B92. And I haven't got the broadcast date at the moment, but I think it was last year.

Can we try the second clip and see if I can hear some sound.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] And then because of the misuse of parts of the Pristina Corps, the situation ..."

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot see it any longer.

MR. NICE:

Q. That clip ends with "... the situation got more and more complicated."

Can we try clip 3, please because it's still Dimitrijevic.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] I think there was a situation when General Perisic asked for reports as to whether the army was involved somewhere in some action and that he received reports that it wasn't, but then he remembered to demand from the operative organ of the General Staff daily information about the use of large calibres. And of course when a corps commander tells you that he did not engage anyone, but you can see that during the course of the day a certain number of ammunition was used, what -- or, rather, whom would you believe?" ⁴⁷⁵¹⁴

MR. NICE:

Q. Thank you. Now, taking these two clips and the first one that you heard together, what's being said here is that the Pristina Corps, until Perisic's departure or until some time in any event in 1998, was so out of control that the chief general, the top general had to ask for an accounting of ammunition in order to support claims being made by that corps that they were not engaged in wrongdoing. What do you say to that?

A. I don't know what happened in the top echelons of the military and what kind of relations prevailed there. I was at Djakovica at the forward command post there, and I know that the use of the army in certain operations was for the liberation of Orahovac. That's what I know. And this was selective use of part of the units only. The use of the army, since we were exclusively engaged in providing security for the state border or, rather, defending the state border from terrorist groups that were coming in from Albania, that was the main preoccupation of us in Djakovica. Everything else that happened during those months we did not even go to the corps command.

Q. When you say this was selective use of part of the units only, are you acknowledging that there had indeed been misuse, as Dimitrijevic puts it, of the Pristina Corps by Sainovic? Is that what you're acknowledging?

A. I don't know about that, so I cannot accept it or reject it. I really don't know. I just know that the first time the army was used in Kosovo, as far as I know, was for the liberation of Orahovac because that is close to Djakovica, so I know that the army was engaged. And we were not in charge of that action. ⁴⁷⁵¹⁵

Q. Let's look at the next clip, clip 4, please. This is Perisic, head of the General Staff, and the next --

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE: I have no sound again.

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] This team with Sainovic tried with insufficient persistence on Pavkovic's part and the ever-growing insistence of Milosevic --"

MR. NICE: That should have ended "... to misuse the army." It got cut off. Can we look at the next clip as well, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Comes August, and then Sajo, who in the meantime was figuratively called General Patton, said that they would certainly destroy terrorism by September and that observers who were in Kosovo and Metohija at the time said that they only have to continue that way and if they destroy it until September, that's good, and if they don't destroy it, it would not be good."

MR. NICE:

Q. So "Sajo" is an abbreviation for Sainovic. This is the Chief of the General Staff saying that the army was being controlled by Sainovic at the insistence of this accused, with an intention to destroy the terrorism by October 1998 but acting outside the command. Do you accept that?

MR. KAY: Can I raise a matter here? The witness is being asked to deal with statements made by others in a TV film, some of which doesn't contain all the points being put by Mr. Nice, and he is adding the words which aren't on the original transcript, or the original recording that ⁴⁷⁵¹⁶ we're listening to. How can the witness possibly deal with the thoughts or opinions of these others? This isn't evidence relating to him. He's not a party to the discussions, he's not a party to the moment when the particular general or politician is making a statement. And in my submission it's unhelpful evidence to the Tribunal because it's actually valueless. It's another form of trying to introduce the video statement in his evidence as a part of the cross-examination.

JUDGE ROBINSON: He is an army colonel, and these are matters that one would expect him to know about and to have a view of, but I do take your point that there isn't much utility in the evidence. Mr. Nice, you might consider how much longer you will spend on this.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What I had wanted to ask you, Mr. Nice, what is the significance for the Prosecution case of the evidence that you're seeking to lead that the Pristina Corps was a kind of renegade corps and was out of control? Would it be your case that that then would tend to confirm your position that they intervened in Racak? Would you then be saying that that kind of corps was more likely to intervene in Racak, or isn't it the case that if they did intervene they did so on the basis of properly formed instructions and orders?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm grateful for the opportunity to explain our position. Our position is that it had become quite clear by 1998 that this accused was controlling parts of the army, the army in Kosovo, directly through Sainovic, and that therefore he commanded and ⁴⁷⁵¹⁷ would have known exactly what that army was doing, and that in that way he was able to determine whether things were done unlawfully or not. And when we see, as we saw, a divergence in reporting of what was being recorded as having happened within the corps, in, for example, tab 14 of this witness's exhibits, a divergence from what the Chamber may accept was the reality on the ground, this is all part of the same overall endeavour to have de facto what you want without letting it being apparent either de jure, through the proper reporting system, or otherwise. So that in relation to Racak, this is not, of course, the case of a military unit out of control. It's under control, but it's under the control of this accused, and that's where it's important to our case. And the very disappearance of Dimitrijevic and Perisic in 1998 when Perisic seeks lawful operation of the army is consistent with that part of our case, indeed indicative of it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'll look at the -- we've got clips 6, 7, and 8. Let me just take a moment. I will just ask a question.

Q. Malisevo, what do you know about the incidents at Malisevo in 1998, please, Mr. Kotur?

A. Malisevo, 1998?

Q. Yes.

A. I cannot recall, no.

Q. Can we just look, then, at clip 8, which will be the last one in your bundle, and then I'll move on to something else.

[Videotape played] ⁴⁷⁵¹⁸

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] And then they say we destroyed the terrorists. For example, Milosevic himself wrote with his own hand right in front of me that the terrorists have been defeated. And I said, Come on, President, let us not deceive the people. Well, it's not me who is going to give that information. Rodjo will, that Djordjevic, whatever they call the police general. He will pretend he wrote it. And then he writes it for Rodjo and he gives the information to the public that we had defeated the terrorists, and publicly he says that we defeated the terrorists and then they say that publicly at a meeting. And then there was Vlajko Stojiljkovic who was -- and then there was also Milosevic and all that gang from the Joint Command, and there was Aco Dimitrijevic and the military deputy. And I say that terrorism is not defeated." Now, you heard there General Perisic talking about what he describes as the plan to announce destruction of the terrorists when that wasn't realistically possible, but most important, we see him referring to something -- or more important for these purposes, we see him also referring to "the gang from the Joint Command." And I'll move from this video with this question: Perisic used the phrase "Joint Command." This is in 1998. What did you understand "Joint Command" to mean?

A. I understood that term to mean a coordination body which from time to time spent time in Kosovo and Metohija. I'm referring to political organs that dealt with the question of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, especially in June and July when a decision was made to make a plan to strike at the terrorists in several stages and the army and the police had to be coordinated. Then the arrival of General -- I mean Mr. Sainovic, ⁴⁷⁵¹⁹ Minic, Andjelkovic. Andjelkovic was already there. He was the Prime Minister of Kosovo, the provisional government of Kosovo, as it was called. Lukic was, according to establishment, the commander of the MUP forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. So their mutual cooperation in terms of the realisation of these plans to break up terrorist groups in stages, well, that's how all this was carried out.

Q. Very well.

A. But just -- just -- let me just say this.

Q. Yes.

A. However, in that entire period when these terrorist groups were destroyed in these stages when it was decided to have all of this done by September, the forward command post in Djakovica, where I was, and Colonel Lazarevic all the time, even in these stages, and all the rest, we did not have any other task but to prevent terrorist attacks and their infiltration from the territory of Albania into the --

Q. Please don't run on. We only have limited time. You've made it clear that your understanding was that the Joint Command was set up in 1998 with the decision to strike at several stages and the police and the army had to be coordinated.

A. No, I did not say --

Q. Well, do you say that the Joint Command continued from 1998 through 1999?

A. No. Perhaps I wasn't -- perhaps I did not quite understand what you were saying, or perhaps I was not clear enough. I did not claim that a Joint Command had been established. You asked me about what Perisic was ⁴⁷⁵²⁰ saying, this so-called Joint Command, what I understood it to mean, and I talked about a coordination body, not a Joint Command. So I really don't know of any -- well, maybe I made a mistake in terms of interpretation, but --

Q. Why is it so important to distinguish --

A. -- or --

Q. -- between a coordination body and a Joint Command? The Exhibit number is 387, tab 46.

Why is it so important for you as a witness to distinguish between a coordination body and a Joint Command?

A. Well, you see, when you have a command, then that command has the right to issue orders and to use the forces, they issue direct orders, but when something is coordinated, then these are different commands that coordinate something amongst them. The command is not the one --

Q. Mr. Kotur, listen to me, please. You're a moderately senior or senior military officer. You've denied knowing lots of things that I've put to you, you know one or two other things, but you are now firmly of the view that there is a difference between a coordination body and a Joint Command.

In the time of the conflict, an army operating on the territory of its people needs to be controlled by politicians. Who controlled you? Who controlled your army?

A. Well, in Djakovica, General Pavkovic had the command. That's where I was.

Q. And to whom did the generals respond? ⁴⁷⁵²¹

A. General Pavkovic was answerable to General Samardzic, the army commander.

Q. And to whom did he respond?

A. Samardzic to the General Staff, to the Chief of General Staff.

Q. And when you weren't in -- I see. So the joint -- look at the document you're looking at. Can you just explain it to us? We'll look at it. The first page, please, shows it's 25th of May, 1999, 3rd Army, forward command post.

Last page, please, Mr. Nort. It's an order and it's signed by -- bottom of the page, please. It's one of the many -- several documents we've got now. Pavkovic. And it comes from -- sorry, I should have looked at the top. And it comes from the Joint Command, if you can see that.

Can you explain how he is signing something? Can we go back to the top of the first page, please.

JUDGE KWON: I don't think it came from Joint Command.

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.

JUDGE KWON: First page, Mr. Nort. It says Supreme Defence Command.

MR. NICE: Yes, that's right. This is the last page. I'm grateful to Your Honour.

Q. Just look at the last bit before the signature block, where it says -- thank you -- "On the subordination and leave the command of the forces of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior - staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo ⁴⁷⁵²² and Metohija through the Joint Command as has been the case." What function does the Joint Command have to be described in this way? This came through Vasiljevic, I gather.

A. Well, you see here it says command of the 3rd Army on the document itself, at the forward command post. The forward command post of the 3rd Army was at the command post of the Pristina Corps. So General Pavkovic spent 90 per cent of his time at the command post of the Pristina Corps during the course of the war. This is the forward command post of the 3rd Army. It pertains to the commander of the army and his command post. What he wrote here, this document, the one that he signed, too, I see that -- well, I didn't see the part that you read, though.

Q. The Joint Command is not a coordinating body, it's a commanding body. That's what we are concerned with in part of this case and we want your help with it.

Can you look at this document as well. It's another one. It's earlier. It's 23rd of March. Have a look at this, please. This is the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, and it's the 23rd of March, and it's an order. And then if we look at the last page, Mr. Nort, we'll see who it's signed by.

It's simply signed the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, and the previous line says: "The Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija from the Pristina section shall command and control all forces during the combat operation."

Now, can you unlock this puzzle for us? What is the Joint Command that gives orders? ⁴⁷⁵²³

A. I really -- I want to be fair and cooperative. I'll just remind you how it came about that this was called the Joint Command. I have to tell you this. There's no stamp here, nothing. I will just tell you briefly what I know.

I told you that I was at the forward command post at Djakovica. I was not in the corps command and I was not at the place where what you call Joint Command made its decisions, and I don't know how they did so because I had no contact with them. I can tell you that in the first clip that you showed when General Perisic was visiting Kosovo and Metohija the army commander, General Pavkovic, was there. We met him, and we took him to one feature from which you to see the area of Metohija, and we reported to him on the situation in that area.

I just want to tell you this: General Perisic never in my presence or the presence of the army commander - and I was there, I even made my own report - he never expressed any suspicion or gave me reason to believe that Perisic was not in the chain of command, because he toured with us the forward command post in Djakovica, and that was what the first clip refers to. I was there.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. That's one thing.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... quite a long time, but you haven't explained how the thing is called the Joint Command. We've been wrestling with this problem for months and we still haven't got an answer.

A. I will do so now. I will tell you. When Mr. Sainovic arrived to the area of Kosovo and Metohija to gain an insight into the situation that ⁴⁷⁵²⁴ prevailed, they had a meeting in the building of the MUP. There was General Lukic, Sainovic, and the corps commander - what was it - Pavkovic. The second time they went to a meeting in the corps, Colonel Djakovic, who was an operative officer at the time, since we lived together at the hotel, I heard the story from him secondhand but he was a direct participant. He said Pavkovic invited him and told him, "We are going to a meeting in the MUP to agree about actions, and you will keep the record." So he did. Colonel Djakovic did keep a record. He asked Pavkovic, "What shall we do with this record? Shall it be turned into an order, some sort of enactment?" And Pavkovic told him, "Find a number in the register and put it under a number." He took the main number and added 1, 2, 3 or whatever, and then he asked, "What shall I put in the heading?" And Pavkovic answered, "Put Joint Command and then our command, Pristina Corps." And then the man asked, "Who shall sign it?" And Pavkovic said, "Just write Joint Command." That's what I know. That's how these documents came to be recorded like that, and that was Pavkovic's sentence: "Write Joint Command." There is really no signature here. There is no name of the commander. There should be the name of the commander or the Chief of Staff, because everybody has their own register for documents.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... explanation you've given us that -- that Joint Command simply means Pristina Corps. Is that it?

A. In the Pristina Corps, these documents were filed and records were kept of these meetings in the Pristina Corps. That's what I said.

Q. So any senior officer; Jelic, Delic, whatever you like, would ⁴⁷⁵²⁵ automatically know that, because this was Pavkovic's decision, that Joint Command simply means Pristina Corps.

A. No. They could never obtain a document which would say Joint Command. If Jelic or Delic received any documents, they needed to receive documents signed by the corps commander, not like this, without any signature at all or with just "Joint Command" at the bottom.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, can you help me with one thing? Is that a reference to the document that the witness has been looking at, or is his reference to the keeping of a record a reference to another document?

MR. NICE: I think it's another document.

JUDGE BONOMY: So is that one that we have, or does that suggest that there are more Joint Command documents that we don't have?

MR. NICE: I'm grateful to Your Honour.

Q. Can you answer His Honour --

JUDGE KWON: What is the exhibit number first?

MR. NICE: First of all, this was 300, tab 356. My apologies. I get carried away and should have mentioned it earlier.

Q. You heard His Honour's point. The Joint Command document where Pavkovic said, "Say Joint Command," what was that document? When was that document? What was it all about? So that we can try and find it.

A. All the documentation filed in the Pristina Corps is archived. It is to be found in the archives.

Q. You've given an explanation of the -- it sounds from your explanation as though this is the very origins of the word "Joint Command." Pavkovic is presented with a nomenclature problem and he ⁴⁷⁵²⁶ resolves it by saying, "Use the word Joint Command." Now if you can take us to that document, you see, we'll be able to solve all this problem about Joint Command because we'll have the first document and then everything else will follow. So what was the document?

A. I don't know that there exists a document about the establishment of a Joint Command, not as a document, but if you want a particular detail, I'll tell you what I talked about with Djakovic concerning how Pavkovic came to say that this was a Joint Command, if that can be of assistance, but that's only our speculation. We saw this, and we realised it did not have any elements of the Joint Command. When Djakovic and I talked, he said he thought this would grow into a Joint Command, and Pavkovic had this expectation. So that was our mutual discussion.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. And now when you insist, I wanted to tell you that as well. Really, all I know is what I told you.

Q. I'm going to ask you --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I didn't quite understand the question about the document, because the witness's evidence was that the term came about as a result of a conversation. He didn't say that that was documented.

MR. NICE: No, no, but it relates to a document. The first use relates to the instruction of Pavkovic to apparently use the phrase. And of course if we can track down that first document we can test the consistency of this account against all other documents which bear the ⁴⁷⁵²⁷ same name.

JUDGE BONOMY: He actually said that he remembered Djakovic kept a record at the meeting of the MUP. He asked Pavkovic, "What shall we do with this record? Shall it be turned into an order, some sort of enactment?" and Pavkovic told him, "Find a number in the register and put it under a number." So there is a document according to that evidence.

MR. NICE: There is a document. And that's --

Q. Do you understand that, Mr. Kotur? His Honour's question, and I probably didn't reflect it adequately, is for you to identify this very document that you were describing or identifying in the register, by its number as well as by its title under the Joint Command.

A. Maybe you did not quite understand what I just said. The record that was made at that meeting, the minutes that were made, rather than leave them in the notebook, were turned into a document reflecting what was done at the meeting, what was discussed, what was agreed. And when Colonel Djakovic asked Pavkovic, "What shall I do with this? Shall I turn this into a document? Shall I file it, put it into a register? Will it have some weight?" Pavkovic told him, "Find some number in the register, file it under a number, and put on top the command of the Pristina Corps," and the first one asked, "What shall I put in the signature?" and Pavkovic answered, "Put Joint Command." And that's how it started, this practice of registering documents from coordination meetings. They would take a main number, /1, 2, 3, et cetera. Those are documents from a series of meetings of the same nature, coordination meetings where something would be agreed and -- ⁴⁷⁵²⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: Who would have that document, that first document showing the words Joint Command? Where would it be?

MR. NICE: Those actual minutes we have. They were provided to us indeed by Pavkovic, but they only cover a period of 1998. In fact, the Joint Command minutes, because -- that's one more question I need to ask, with your leave.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. You're not suggesting, are you, Mr. Kotur, that there is any difference between the Joint Command as a concept, body, or idea from 1998 from that that existed in 1999; it's a continuum.

A. Well, especially in 1999 I didn't hear anything about the Joint Command. I was not in the command of the Pristina Corps. At the place where I was, I didn't hear anything about the Joint Command. We didn't receive any documents from the Joint Command, us in Djakovica. I wasn't there in 1999. There was Colonel --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- Zivkovic, but I don't know that he received a single document signed Joint Command. Not to my knowledge, although I was not the person who received or read all the mail.

Q. Can we stay with this topic, but I'll approach it in a different way. Can we look at Ciaglinski's witness statements, please, which is --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, could you check the exhibit number again of last exhibit. You said 300, tab 356.

MR. NICE: It's D300. So sorry. ⁴⁷⁵²⁹

JUDGE KWON: And tab number?

MR. NICE: 356. Can we have a look at Ciaglinski's witness statement, please. Your Honours, Ms. Dicklich is quite right. This was under seal. The same consideration as to protection probably arise as arose yesterday. I would apply for the seal to be lifted so that the statement can be viewed publicly. It's a matter for the Chamber.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, granted.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. In which case we can hand out a copy to the -- it's only in English. It's only in English this document. It's blacked out as to certain details, but never mind. Just put that on the overhead projector, please. And there are a -- this is Exhibit 98. Yes, of course. Now, if we look at page 6 of this, Mr. Nort, that's bottom right-hand corner 6.

Q. I'm going to read just a couple of passages of this to you. And at the -- on the screen at the moment, Ciaglinski in a statement now as long ago as March 2000, said this -- tiny bit further up, I think. No. Page 6 it is. Let me have it. At least, it's page 6 where I've got it. It's different pagination. I apologise. These documents print sometimes differently.

JUDGE KWON: There should be 6 of 11.

MR. NICE: Yes. That's what I've got, but it doesn't work. Yes, there it is. It's at the bottom of -- it's that bit there. There's a slight slippage in the different printing format that I've been working on. ⁴⁷⁵³⁰

Q. You see, it says at the bottom here: "Kotur left the commission about 10 days ... before our mission ended. He told me that he left because he hated the politics of the whole thing and it wasn't getting anywhere. Kotur and I both suspected that it was because he and I were getting too close. My general impression of Kotur was that he was an efficient, loyal, and patriotic Serb officer, but he was very open to us and supplied us with material that he probably shouldn't have supplied. In particular, he supplied us with the 1:100.000 mapping that was subsequently used in the NATO offensive and with details of the Serb strength and positions within the border regions. It was clear to me that he was supplying this material without authority of his superiors." Now, looking back across the years, Mr. Kotur, is the reality perhaps this: That you didn't much like working in an army unit that was subject to the sort of political control that's reflected by the things we saw on the video clips, Perisic's letter, and the use of a vague political Joint Command? Is that actually the truth?

A. No, that is not true.

Q. And is it true, whether those for reasons or others, that having got close to Ciaglinski in a perfectly understandable professional way as professional soldiers, you did land up telling him more than you should have done and giving him, in the form of mapping, more than you should have done?

A. Mr. Ciaglinski did not receive a single piece of information on the map. What Ciaglinski asked for from me was a map of Kosovo and Metohija, because -- he meant the kind of maps we have, because their maps ⁴⁷⁵³¹ did not correspond to reality, and there was frequently -- there were frequent cases of misunderstanding and confusion and mistakes. So we did provide a map, 1:100.000 with the authority of the corps command. I had informed the corps command of the request and that was the map that was provided with its authority, without any information on it. As for the rest, that he and I were getting close, I told you a bit earlier that 20 or so officers, new officers arrived, professional officers, who only dealt with that, and they remained the team headed by Colonel Petkovic. I remained on that team. And I have here a document wherein the embassy of France --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... we have your answer and I must press on with the next part of the same statement. If we look at the next paragraph, please, because it's important to bear in mind that in this statement Ciaglinski did not mention what you said about kicking out the Kosovo Albanians. He explained that when he came to court, concerned, as he expresses in this statement, to protect you. But the next part of his statement says as follows: "Sometime during his last weeks, I was surprised when Kotur told me confidentially what the proposed manoeuvre plan would be for the operation to eliminate the KLA. This occurred when we were sitting at a table in front of a Kosovo map. Kotur pointed how the operation would commence in the Vucitrn area, with the aim being to push the KLA west over the mountains towards the Glogovac area, then to swing around with a cut-off force to Glogovac and eliminate whatever stragglers managed to get across the hills, and once that operation was complete, for another force to work west from Podujevo and force the KLA ⁴⁷⁵³² back towards Mitrovica right into the arms of another group of Serb forces waiting in Mitrovica." Then he goes on to deal with the operation swinging towards Prizren via Malisevo and Suva Reka and then swinging north through Djakovica and Pec.

Very detailed. It's true, isn't it? You gave him this account.

A. That is a complete lie. That's absolutely not true. First of all, I don't know how somebody who doesn't know the territory of Yugoslavia could memorise all those details no matter how clever they were. Wouldn't it be logical for me to give him a map I would have drawn myself. And third, if he was already aware of the plan, wouldn't he have informed his superior immediately so that they would know what was going to happen? Drewienkiewicz, if this were true, would have known the same day. He would not have protected me nor would he have any reason to. It was his objective to find that out. I knew that he was an intelligence officer of the army. He told me that was his main occupation. I never told him if that had been mine. If we had gotten as close as it is claimed, wouldn't I have told him immediately what I was doing? To an intelligence -- to an intelligence officer who is educated, trained, and intelligent, it would have been enough to receive a map with all the features, installations, movements, forces, positions drawn. So this is completely untrue. Did his boss know about it? Did General Drewienkiewicz know about these plans? He would have had to know. That's sure. Did Walker know? That would have changed the entire conduct of the verifiers. They would have had to do something. I know that on the 20th I recorded that at a senior staff meeting ⁴⁷⁵³³ of the corps --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- I have a note on the 23rd --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- Talks in Pristina. Ciaglinski -- that's what I said. I can tell you. I can give you that now. But that's not a notebook where I kept records constantly. It was from February to March --

Q. Mr. Kotur --

A. -- to the 9th of March, and in fact I found it --

Q. Can you think of any reason why Ciaglinski should completely fabricate a plan of this kind coming from your mouth?

A. That's something you should ask of him. I cannot know what he was thinking, what he was expecting. Maybe he thought that he had achieved much more than everybody else in that area. Maybe he was expecting some awards. I cannot imagine why he would have fabricated that. But I know he would have had to forward that information to his superiors if he had found out some plan to cleanse Kosovo.

THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please slow down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, you're speaking much too fast.

MR. NICE: Can we look at the next paragraph as well.

JUDGE KWON: I notice, Mr. Nice, the witness has brought a notebook.

MR. NICE: Yes, he has.

JUDGE KWON: Can you find out what it is about.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁷⁵³⁴

Q. The notebook, you flicked it open and closed it again. I think you said it has a note of the meeting with Ciaglinski. Can you lay it on the overhead projector, the page that shows the meeting with Ciaglinski.

A. It's not a note. It's not a record. It's a very short note to remind me that I should inform the next day. It includes the note and what I said, and there's "- NATO - Ciaglinski," and I informed the commander the same day.

Q. Can you just point with your finger to the --

A. Yes, this entry here. "Talks in Brussels - NATO - Ciaglinski." On the top it says "22nd February, meeting with the commander," meaning corps commander.

Q. Yes.

A. In the office of the corps commander in Pristina. And then, "protest note delivered --"

Q. Where does it deal with the termination --

A. This is the 24th.

Q. Just go through them, because we haven't had a chance to look at them in advance and I can't deal with them, but can you just take us to the note that records the conclusion of your working in this particular capacity. Can you find that for us?

A. Yes.

Q. What does that say? 9th of March, yes? What does that say?

A. "9th March, 1999. Two dead. One soldier and one staff sergeant from the 53rd Battalion. Actions in Vukasin-Kacanik continuing."

JUDGE KWON: Read a little bit slower. ⁴⁷⁵³⁵

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "37th group brought in."

MR. NICE:

Q. Read more slowly, please, you were asked.

A. "37th group brought in -- or brought. Indirect reinforcement. There are problems. 70 border soldiers -- border troops arrived." Underlined. And then, "Sanitise --"

Q. Sanitise?

A. Not --

Q. Sanitise what?

A. "Dealing with -- dealing with the emergency or extraordinary event." It was a unpleasant extraordinary event that happened --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] To use this transcript it will be necessary to hear the tape and then rewrite the transcript, because there are many omissions, probably because the witness is speaking too fast. For instance, here it says, "70 soldiers less than envisaged arrived," and the transcript says "70." So there are many bits and pieces that are omitted in the transcript. And I'm saying this to have it on record.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Witness, you heard that. Please spoke more slowly.

MR. NICE:

Q. Now, this is dealing with the conclusion of your service. Can you point us to and read slowly the entry that explains how your service has come to an end.

A. I don't have that entry.

Q. So the last entry's on the 9th of March. ⁴⁷⁵³⁶

MR. NICE: Your Honours will remember that this is one of the books that the Court made an informal -- not an informal, a request or order to the authorities to find, and they said they couldn't find it.

Q. Where has this book been, Mr. Kotur, in the last few months; in your possession or archived with the authorities?

A. Let me just tell you something about the archiving of official notes and official diaries.

Q. You haven't answered my question. Where has the book been over the past couple of months?

A. It was with me, in my possession.

Q. Was it ever archived?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I wanted to explain that to you a moment ago. These are original working notebooks. You can see the coat of arms of Yugoslavia, and it says "Official Notebook." I'll leave it here on the ELMO for all to see. You can see that.

Secondly, this notebook, on the last page, has this. This is what it looks like. This is what the last page of the notebook looks like. And this is what it says here: "This working notebook contains 100 (one hundred) pages. They are numbered from 1 to 200 and it has been recorded in the list of notebooks issued out under a given number." There is no number there and there is no signature by the clerk issuing this notebook. So this is the notebook that I myself used. It has not been recorded under a registry number and is not archived. That is one point. ⁴⁷⁵³⁷ That is where I kept very short entries from February to the 9th of March. Otherwise, working notebooks that have been registered and recorded must be handed back, either when they have been filled out or when you are reassigned to take up another command.

Q. In the relevant period there will be an official notebook that has been archived and should still be in the archive?

A. That's why I've explained what I have. Official notebooks that I had and that were registered and recorded were handed over in the year 2000 to the Pristina Corps when I left to take up my new duties in the command of the Novi Sad Corps. Those official notebooks, pursuant to material regulating archive material says that official notebooks are stored in an archive for one year after they have been handed in. Once the year is expired, that material is destroyed, so that the official notebooks which all officers in the army have and keep and are recorded and registered in this way, these are the original notebooks, after one year -- after having been archived for one year, they are subsequently destroyed. So that during this period notebooks kept in 1998 and -- have certainly been destroyed, but you have traces of them in the archives. Before I came here, I was called up by the military security organs to make a statement concerning the notebooks, and I gave them that statement, the notebooks were handed over to the Pristina Corps once I left to take up my duties elsewhere in the year 2000. Now, leafing through - and this was three or four days before I came here - leafing through the notebook since I moved house five times and still don't have an apartment to my name, all my notebooks, exercise ⁴⁷⁵³⁸ books, private and otherwise, when I look to see what I had with me, whether I had made entries and written down anything, I managed to unearth this official notebook, and I found it because I hadn't been issued -- rather, I hadn't had a number registered and recorded and that's why I happened to have found this notebook and why I didn't return it, because it was never issued under a number to me. It wasn't recorded and registered.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you how you got it, how you got it in the first place if this is an official book that has to be registered when it's issued?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, we are given those notebooks but they are not registered until we begin using them. They don't have to be registered and recorded until we begin using them.

JUDGE BONOMY: So that means there could be any number of official Yugoslav notebooks that are never registered that are used and never returned; is that right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is right.

JUDGE BONOMY: What sort of -- do you think that's a satisfactory system for official documentation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is not, but not that much attention was paid to that, because the notebooks were more to record matters rather than them being confidential. And the fact that they were only stored in the archives for just one year and then destroyed meant that they weren't very important confidential documents, or not considered as such. So not -- strict procedure was not applied. ⁴⁷⁵³⁹ You could record certain things and make entries in exercise books or in other forms of notebooks, but some people, after filling them out, destroy them themselves, other people keep them, but they're not of any special significance, and we never knew that we'd have to produce them here one day.

JUDGE KWON: I'm not clear about this. Mr. Kotur, my understanding is that this notebook which is in front of you was not registered officially, so that's the reason why you didn't return it to the authorities. When -- during your service, you used it as a -- as if it were -- it had been your private notebook. Am I correct in so understanding? Because it was not registered.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you've understood it correctly.

JUDGE KWON: During that same period, were you keeping an official record separately that was -- that had been registered by the authorities? Other than this one.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During that period of time, I did not make entries in other notebooks, no.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: May we have sight of the notebook.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: We won't, of course, be able to explore it in detail but if we could have sight of it, please, we'll have a look at it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please pass it to the Prosecutor.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: So we can also look at it. Mr. Nice, I wanted to find out: Do you intend to explore the circumstances that led to the colonel being replaced as a liaison officer?

MR. NICE: Yes, I'm coming to that next. If we could go, please, to, Mr. Nort, the witness statement that we were looking at, the immediate follow passage in Ciaglinski's statement.

Q. What Ciaglinski said, and I'll read it out for you, it's 7 probably. Paragraph beginning: "Kotur was replaced as liaison officer by Colonel Petrovic and General Ilija Brankovic replaced Loncar as head of the FRY Cooperation Commission."

That was Ciaglinski's impression. And he went on to say this: "My impression of Brankovic was that he had been sent by Belgrade to toughen up the negotiations and relationship between ourselves and Belgrade. It totally broke up the good working relationship we had with Loncar and Kotur. Brankovic wouldn't make himself available to me and insisted on advance notice of meetings ..." and then he goes on to deal with Brankovic.

Is it right, as Ciaglinski says, that you ceased to operate and that, overall, Petrovic and Brankovic took over from you and from Loncar?

A. No. General Loncar continued in the federal commission --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There was not a proper interpretation to the witness of what Ciaglinski said. He said that he was sent from Belgrade to toughen up relationships, whereas the translation the witness got was to strengthen relations, which was quite ⁴⁷⁵⁴¹ the reverse. So the witness cannot understand and cannot comment on something that has been explained to him and interpreted to him in quite the opposite way. Here it says toughen up, "zaostri" relationship, and that's the essence of what Ciaglinski said, not to strengthen the relationship.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That is actually in the English. So let the witness answer the question. What was said was that Brankovic was sent to toughen up the relationship, not to strengthen it. So what is the answer you will now give?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer is this: That had General Loncar remained in his post in the commission for liaising with the Kosovo Verification Mission, Colonel Petrovic -- or rather, he remained there, Colonel Petrovic came to head the new team that was established between the Pristina and army team, we no longer had two, we just had one team, and I remained in that other team but I wasn't -- in that team but I wasn't the head of the team.

And the third situation is this: General Brankovic came from the General Staff, from the General Staff team down there to be able to coordinate action faster, not to have to write documents and send them back to Belgrade, that you have this link between the army and Belgrade. So he didn't replace Loncar and he didn't replace me. I wasn't replaced from my duties, like Petrovic. This was a new organisation being set up with new men, new people and different relationships established. So Loncar remained in his position. Now his assistant for military matters was Brankovic, to all intents and purposes, who was to contact with ⁴⁷⁵⁴² Loncar, and Petrovic was supposed to contact all the officers, the liaison officers in the garrisons and in the border battalions, something that I used to do, and to send Brankovic feedback information.

MR. NICE:

Q. So Brankovic did take over your job. It's quite simple.

A. Well, you -- you could say that Brankovic was something in between, something that Loncar and I were, those positions. I as being Loncar's assistant. Brankovic came to be his assistant because I was Loncar's assistant and head of the team, and now this other man turned up who had to do that job. So that was the relationship. It wasn't between me and somebody else but it was a matter of the creation of a new novel organisation to be able to conduct affairs of that kind.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... paragraph 75 of the Loncar statement. It's not an exhibit, it's not evidence in the case, it's just for your comment. This is the document provided to the accused this morning. Paragraph 75, you've got it in the original, I'm reading it in the English, says this, this comes from Loncar: "I do not believe that I was replaced by VJ General Brankovic. I heard this from DZ during his televised testimony in the Milosevic trial. I don't know if Sainovic made some agreement with Brankovic, but nobody told me. I was told by Sainovic that Brankovic was there to take over [Realtime transcript read in error "observing"] Kotur's function. This was the end -- towards the end of the mission. Specifically, Sainovic said he was coming to reinforce the team and to be the chief officer in military issues. When Brankovic came, Kotur remained for some time. I had one meeting with Brankovic. He spoke ⁴⁷⁵⁴³ fluent English. I knew Kotur for a long time. I knew that he was a good officer and he did his job well for military issues." What he said in this paragraph was that Sainovic was there to take over your functions. Is that true?

MR. KAY: "Observing" was the word I have on my monitor rather than taking over.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What was that?

MR. KAY: I was just picking up on what Mr. Nice said, but what I've got on my monitor here is "observing Kotur's function."

MR. NICE: "... take over Kotur's function" is what it reads on my monitor. If I'm looking at the exhibit rather than whatever I said. Paragraph 75, line 4.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's "take over" on the exhibit, line 4. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. It's true. He was there to take over your functions.

A. That's what I told you a moment ago. I was Loncar's assistant for military matters, and at the same time head of the team of the Pristina Corps for liaising with the mission. Now Brankovic came to be Loncar's assistant. That's the difference. So it was no longer the leader of the team. Brankovic arrived and Loncar led the team. Not the team, I don't mean Loncar. No, I apologise, I don't mean Loncar led the team.

Q. One last question on this because I really must try and finish, which I wanted, one but last topic. Ciaglinski makes it plain that you in your special units uniform, which was unusual, were a man of great ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁴ authority in Kosovo, feared where you went, respected by people of your rank and above. Now, do you accept that description of you, that when you went to places, people knew you, they respected you, they even feared you. Do you accept that?

A. That some people feared me, I don't know about that. I don't believe so. That they knew me, well, I had spent a long time in Kosovo and Metohija, so they did know me. That I was head of the largest branch in the Pristina Corps, the infantry, that is, the service of the infantry, whose head I was, that is true.

Q. And despite all this expertise, Mr. Kotur, the truth is that you had to be replaced because the fear of the authorities, in particular Sainovic, was that you'd got too close to Ciaglinski and you'd fed him too much information.

A. I am not informed of that type of background. I have told you what I know. Now, other background information, that can only be conjecture and surmise. I don't believe that that could have been the case, that it couldn't -- that it could be like that because I can't find any evidence to bear that out. Let me just tell you one thing: There is no reason why I would be saying things differently to what had happened.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, do you have any other explanation for why you were replaced? I mean, if it is not that the authorities, your superiors, had formed an unfavourable view of you because of your close relationship with Ciaglinski, what other explanation would there be?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, probably, since it seems that the interpretation is to be blamed here, I've heard that the ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁵ interpretation wasn't good, I heard that there had been some reorganisation in our teams for liaising with the Verification Mission, and according to the schematic and diagram that I showed you -- if it's here, I can show you again and to tell you where the difference lies.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But this was just the result of a reorganisation, a structural reorganisation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely. All 26 officers arrived who could speak English, including Brankovic, and it says here that he spoke English very well. So people arrived who could better answer to their responsibilities or carry out their duties. That's a fact and nothing more than that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: In any new structure it would have been possible to so reorganise it that you could have retained your old job.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remained in the team, and I helped Petrovic, especially when he initially started up his duties. I helped him in his job, in those first steps. But on the 13th of March, I saw off an Albanian delegation to Rambouillet. That was my duty, it was my duty to do that, and to ensure their safe passage in and boarding of a plane so that there would not be any problems of Atachi's [phoen] arrest, because a warrant had been issued for him. So on the 13th, I was still active and taking part. And then several days later I helped Petrovic, and in the space of seven days, that is say on the 20th of March, the mission withdrew from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. So this entire process went on for another five or six days without me at the head of the team in charge of liaising with the mission. ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we are at the time for the break. We will break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Alerted to one fact from the transcript.

Q. Mr. Kotur, you said that you turned over official notebooks to the Pristina Corps that you kept in 2000, but later -- when you were transferred to Novi Sad. Later, you answered a question from the Bench that you kept no official notebook for the period. Which is the answer for the period of February and March of -- February, March, April, May, June of 1999? Did you or did you not keep official notebooks?

A. I think this was a misunderstanding or I did not understand His Honour the Judge properly. He asked me about the time when I kept this particular notebook, the one that was not registered, the one that was not archived, whether I had another notebook at the time for the period of February and March, and I said that in that period, no, I didn't.

Q. And why weren't you keeping an official notebook in such a critical period?

A. In that period, the official notebook was the one I just handed over to you now. Had I not recorded it in that notebook, I would have recorded it in the other one. I did not have two parallel notebooks that I kept and that I did keep one and not the other.

Q. So this is an official notebook, but because it hadn't been formally log out to you and because it had been obtained by you in some ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷ way without being logged out, you felt able to keep it. Is that it about?

A. Yes, that's right.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the position on these notebooks is that they were requested by the Court. We were initially told they couldn't be found -- requested or ordered by the Court. We were initially told they couldn't be found. We were subsequently told such notebooks might be destroyed under the routine system of destruction. We drew to the authority's attention that if notebooks are destroyed, by their own regulations they have to record the destruction. We've been provided with no evidence of a recorded destruction. The Chamber will also remember that similar notebooks from Sel and Odak were provided. I turn to another topic. Can the witness please have from Exhibit 143, and for the overhead projector, that to the witness, and that for the overhead projector. There are only a couple of passages.

Q. A witness called Niki Peraj, a captain in the army, gave evidence in this court. He gave two statements -- three statements, actually, all of which have been exhibited. If we turn, please - and we'll deal with this very rapidly - to paragraph 13 in both B/C/S and English because they're conveniently numbered, in his first statement dated April 2000, at paragraph 13, Niki Peraj said this: "I know that the big military operation carried out at the beginning of May 1999 in Mullah e Isufi area and at Cabrat hill in Gjakove was led by VJ Colonel Milan Kotur and by MUP Colonel Kovacevic and by the reservist commander Major Nikola Micunovic from Korenica. This was the biggest operation carried out in Gjakove. Many civilians were massacred. I know about the involvement of these ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁸ three persons because they commanded all the military operations in the area."

True? Is that true, Mr. Kotur? It's a very simple proposition, and it's a very memorable event. Is it true?

A. What Peraj said is not true, what he presented here in this statement of his. As for an operation in Djakovica in May 1999, if the MUP carried out or Major Nikola Micunovic, I certainly was not involved in any way in that nor did I have anything to do with that operation.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... paragraph 30.

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice is kindly requested to slow down. Thank you.

MR. NICE: I certainly will, and I apologise.

Q. He gives this explanation for Meja -- should we just remind ourselves, Mr. Kotur: Meja involved hundreds of people being killed, butchered, and their bodies were found transformed into Serbia. Do you remember that, Mr. Kotur? It's a matter of public record and knowledge. Bodies from Meja went to Serbia. Do you remember that?

A. I don't know whether they're from Meja or wherever, but I know that in the grave that --

Q. Not interested in where bodies that landed up in Batajnica and Petrovo Selo came from? Not interested?

A. No, no. You didn't understand me. You didn't hear me out. I'm saying that the bodies that were exhumed in Batajnica on the basis of the documents that were found on the bodies say that these are people from the area of Meja. That's what I wanted to say. That's what I know from the ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁹ newspapers and from --

Q. Thank you.

A. -- from the newspapers that wrote about it quite a bit.

Q. Let's go to paragraph 30 with those two features of background in mind.

"I recall that three or four days before the massacre in Meja Nikola Micunovic, also known as Dragan, told me that the valley of Carragojs was going to pay a very high price. I immediately thought about the killing of Milutin Prascevic that had been committed on the 20th of April in Meja. Prascevic used to be the chief of the state security in Gjakove. Together with him, four other people were killed. One of them was the brother of Sheqer, a local policeman from Ratis village. His brother committed crimes in Meja on the 27th of April. Milutin Prascevic was the godfather of Nikola Micunovic ..." Then in this first statement, at paragraph 33, the witness said this:

"Nikola Micunovic, Dragan; Milan Kotur and Kovacevic are the men responsible for the massacre of Meja and Korenica. They planned and led the entire operation."

What part in the Meja operation did you take, please, Mr. Kotur?

A. I did not take part in any operation in Meja, in any part of it except in the MUP two or three days later, when it was agreed to clean up the area and the so-called Reka, that the MUP would do that in order to secure our forces that were to the north -- or, rather, to the east and west of the Reka area. To secure their positions, there was a blockade of ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁰ these areas and one of our units took part in the search of that terrain because the MUP did not have sufficient forces to do it. That is what was agreed upon. As for the agreement on the use of these forces for the clean-up, that is to say for the forward command post to involve, and that was -- the approval was received from Colonel Zivanovic.

Q. This is what, cleaning up the results of a massacre of 300 or so men; is that right?

A. No.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... is it cleaning up the result of a battle of 300 KLA, all of whom got killed with no fatalities on the Serb side? Which is it?

A. That operation -- actually, the army never took part in any impermissible action. When an attempt was made from Albania to get to the area of Kosare and Junik in this broader area of Djakovica, then there were terrorist forces there that were trying to support the forces from Albania that were attacking in Junik and it was necessary to cleanse the area from terrorist forces. That was done by the MUP. It was a MUP operation and the army had its own forces in the vicinity.

Q. As we see what Peraj says in his first statement, and we'll look at his second rapidly, but before we do, are you now allowing for the possibility that there was a massacre of the innocent by the MUP or are you saying that the whole operation was a justified anti-terrorist action? Which is it?

A. The operation was justified from the point of view of what I was saying a few minutes ago. If this massacre had happened, that was not the ⁴⁷⁵⁵¹ objective of the operation of what the MUP -- of what the army did, and the army never took part in any kind of massacre. As for Peraj and his statement, as a whole what he said here has nothing to do with what was actually going on. There are many things here that he simply invented, many things that are quite contradictory about this brigade coming from Republika Srpska with Serb insignia, and Colonel Vukovic was the commander. He says the man who testified here --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down.

MR. NICE: Pause for a minute.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just slow down, please.

MR. NICE: You've prepared yourself by considering Peraj's evidence and his statement, although we heard nothing from you about it in chief, because I haven't taken you to the passages you've just dealt with. To save time, so we can have a look at all of it, can we go to the second statement. One for the witness in B/C/S, one for the overhead projector. And on this if we can go, please, straight away to paragraph 47. Put that on the overhead projector. This is a statement made a little later, in 2001. 12th to the 15th of February. A captain in your army gives this explanation part way through paragraph 47. Deals with a meeting of Stojanovic where Stojanovic addressed Micunovic and Kovacevic, ordering them to carry out an operation in the Carragojs valley where at least 100 heads had to be eliminated - and that meant human beings - and all the houses burnt in retribution for the killing of Prascevic. If you would be good enough to go over, please, to paragraph 52. He makes the point at paragraph 52 that the commanding officer of his ⁴⁷⁵⁵² unit, Djosan, did not agree with the operation and tried to arrest or did arrest Micunovic, although he stayed in prison only for three days, I think.

And if we then go to paragraph 58, this is how this witness dealt with these matters so far as they concerned you. He said: "Colonel Milan Kotur was not at the informal meeting for the Meja incident but had already arrived in Djakovica with Lazarevic's HQ." Is he right about that, that by that time you had arrived with Lazarevic's HQ?

A. No.

Q. And he says: "... and deployed from there --"

A. Can I explain why it is not true?

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. First of all -- first of all, here in paragraph 52 - I think that's what you said - it says General Lazarevic -- you did not read all of it out and I would like to do it.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they do not have the text.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Goran Stankovic, Novica Stankovic and other low-ranking officers, a week after the operation in Korenica and Meja, were commended because --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "... for the way in which they carried it out. Novica Stankovic was deputy commander of the Artillery Rocket Brigade of the Pristina Corps in Djakovica of Milos Djosan. Djosan did not approve of the operation in Korenica and Meja so he arrested ⁴⁷⁵⁵³ Micunovic because of his participation in it. However, Micunovic stayed in prison only three days. As for the arrest of Micunovic, I heard from his brother Aco Micunovic, who was a sergeant in the army of Yugoslavia in Djakovica. Micunovic was released because of the personal intervention of Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic, known as Arkan. I don't know at what level, perhaps political. That is what Sergej Perovic said to me." Mr. Nice, all of this here in paragraph 52 that you quoted from is a pure lie and fabrication. I shall explain how come. There is no mention of citations and commendations. General Lazarevic was not in Djakovica at all. The arrest of Micunovic: No one ever arrested Micunovic. I would have heard of it had it happened. And then him being released from prison and then Seselj and Arkan intervening. These are such fabrications and lies that it could not be corroborated through any kind of check. And that is what Peraj said. And most of his statement is along the same lines; guesswork and stories that have nothing to do with the truth. Probably did -- let me just tell you this.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Kotur, I'm afraid you have given very long answers which is why we have taken so long, much longer than I intended, and I'm going to ask you to be brief and just listen to the questions. Now, if you're saying that this is all untrue, nevertheless there has to be an explanation for the large number of bodies found at Meja, driven down into that position at the end of the valley, to explain how they died. Can you tell us, please, where we can find an official report that deals with that? Military, or MUP, or both. ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁴

A. I'm going to tell you what I know and as much as I know, but I would just like to caution you about one thing or, rather, I'd just like to say --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I asked you a question and I'd be grateful for an answer to it, please. Where, please, can we find an official VJ record, official MUP record - come to think of it, since you were on duty on those days in April - an official record of what you were doing on those days in April when one of the gravest massacres of individuals in Kosovo is said to have happened? You see, while you're thinking about that, we have, of course, sought from the authorities the Pristina Corps forward command war diary, not a document that would be destroyed. It's never been provided to us. Now, then, you tell us: Where's the records of what you and your fellow soldiers were doing when these men died? Can you tell us?

A. You put it very well. An operative journal is kept in a unit, and if there is something, then it exists in these operative logbooks or journals. Every unit, battalion level upwards, has this kind of logbook, and all important events during the course of the day are recorded there, and also where army units were engaged and what they did therefore. Since you've read out this paragraph to me, I just have to -- well, I will answer this question but I want to say something in connection with what you said previously when you said that Stojanovic ordered this. Let me just see in which paragraph this is, that 100 heads should be blown.

Q. Moved on from that. It was paragraph 47 and I don't have infinity ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁵ of time. One comment only the 100 heads.

A. Well, I have to. That Stojanovic ordered Micunovic and Kovacevic to carry out an operation near Carragojs and that in retaliation at least 100 heads should have been eliminated.

I have no idea who said what and who was where. I was not in contact with them. But then Stojanovic, according to his position and post, could not have ordered Micunovic or Kovacevic, because Stojanovic was just chief of the security organ in our corps, and one of the people working for him was Nik Peraj. Nik Peraj, probably to justify this behaviour of his and to create some kind of legend for himself in order to be able to survive among his own people, he is saying here what he knows and what he doesn't know and whatever people said to him.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. I just want to say what you asked me about this operation. The operation was planned for two days, the 27th and the 28th of April. That's when it was supposed to be carried out. This operation was carried out by the MUP of Djakovica with part of the army of Yugoslavia. Part of the army took part in this action. Since you're asking me for a brief answer, I'm not explaining why we did this, but that was to eliminate terrorist forces among our own force. And since the MUP did not have enough forces to search the terrain, they asked whether they could have part of our forces that could take part in this. As for our forces, only, I think -- I think that it was only the 63rd Parachute Brigade, 30 or 40 men. And I know that full well because, since these were professional soldiers, that they should go through the ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁶ terrain that was the most complicated one, that is to say the one covered by forest. This operation --

Q. Your part in all this? Your part in all this?

A. I did not have a role in this, a part in this. I just said that the MUP carried this out but that the MUP was supposed to take part in it in coordination. The MUP was not subordinated to us and we were not subordinated to the MUP, so there was this coordination, and in the MUP building on behalf of the forward command post in Djakovica -- well, the commander of -- who -- it was Colonel Zivanovic -- rather, Zivkovic Veljo, who was the only one who would be authorised to issue an order for this to be done. No one knows -- so he doesn't know who was at the command post. And he said that he was there and saw Lazarevic and Jeftovic [as interpreted]. Well, Lazarevic and Zivkovic are not one and the same man, and if Peraj knew this and if this were the truth, then he would have said who was there at the forward command post in Djakovica.

Q. You see, you've now told us a lot of detail about this operation. What were you doing on those days, the 27th and 28th? We know you weren't involved. What were you doing?

A. My engagement was in the 125th Motorised Brigade, and that was the brigade that was defending the area of Kosare down towards Junik. In that brigade there were quite a few problems. There were also major losses, and this is the brigade that sustained the greatest losses during the NATO bombing --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... doing? Is that what you were doing on the -- ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁷

A. Yes, that's where I was engaged.

Q. Why did you say you couldn't remember what you were doing on the 27th? It was about the first question I asked you.

A. I did not lie to the Court. Your first question was the 27th, and I could not remember the 27th, and then later on, when I realised what this --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. No, no, there is no need for you to make this kind of comment because what I'm saying here is what I know. I have no reason to say anything different and I am telling you what I'm saying. If you want to have any kind of benefit from my statement, then hear me out, and if not, that is not really fair.

Q. We'll see what Mr. Peraj says about you at paragraph 58 and 60. Paragraph 58, he says this: "Colonel Milan Kotur was not at the informal meeting for the Meja incident but had already arrived in Gjakove with Lazarevic's HQ --" I'm sorry, I've done that already. At paragraph -- sorry, he then says you were at the command post at the Catholic church north-west of Osek village. "From there he had a clear view of the Carragojs valley to direct the Meja operation." He says that the MUP were at the Dervish prayer house in Dusnje [phoen] village. Is he right about your being in the Catholic church?

A. He is not right that I had a command post.

Q. Were you in the Catholic church? Were you in the Catholic church?

A. I don't even know where that Catholic church is near Osek Hilja.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁸

A. I don't even know of there being any.

Q. All these deployments will be revealed in the war diary and other contemporaneous documents, won't they, Mr. Kotur?

A. Yes.

Q. There is no conceivable reason, on your evidence, why that material should not have been provided to us, is there?

A. No.

Q. Concluding what Mr. Peraj says, at paragraph 60, so far as it concerns you in particular, he says that he saw the Carragojs valley after the operation on the 28th, going to see if anything had happened to his own house and his parents-in-law. He got authorisation to go to Ramoc from Lazarevic and Jeftovic. They passed this authorisation on to you at the command post in the north-west of Osek. Now, are you really saying that all these details are just completely made up? Are you?

A. First of all, this detail that Lazarevic was in Djakovica is totally made up, and that's why I'm telling you. If he doesn't know who General Lazarevic is, if Peraj doesn't know, then I don't see how he can be trusted in terms of everything else that he was saying. And he said that he was in Djakovica and that he got authorisation from General Lazarevic to go to Ramoc. That's a pure lie. I'm telling you once again that Lazarevic was maybe once or twice at the forward command post in Djakovica, but his deputy, Colonel Zivanovic, Veljub -- Zivkovic Veljub, sorry, was at the forward command post as commander of the forward command post and no Lazarevic, no Jeftovic. Well, he was in the staff, but since ⁴⁷⁵⁵⁹ we're talking about that kind of person like the corps commander and he says that he was there, I am asserting to you here with 100 per cent certainty that that is a total lie. And it can be established where Lazarevic was on the 27th or 28th or whatever date. In the operations logbook of the corps command, in the absence of -- the absence of the commander is always recorded. It has to be recorded. So that's why I'm telling you that all the things that Peraj spoke of here are pure nonsense.

MR. NICE: May we go into private session for a couple of minutes?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session.

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The private session was for the purpose of protecting the security of a witness.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't think I'm going to place anything on the overhead projector. I'm only go to read out, I think, three paragraphs, or four, or parts of them. I can identify the paragraph numbers. ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁴

Q. Mr. Kotur, a former VJ soldier, expressing the position in neutral terms, says two things on which I want your comment. First at paragraph 34. He says that there was an occasion when Pavkovic gave a speech in Pristina, I suppose encouraging morale, but in the course of which he said that, "As soon as the first NATO bombs fall on Kosovo, we will have to 'clean our back from the Albanians,'" which can be interpreted as meaning get rid of the Albanians.

Do you know of any address by Pavkovic where such a thing was said?

A. I don't know about such a speech made by Pavkovic. Maybe it happened at a police battalion when he was touring units. Maybe it's something he said before them, policemen, but I was never present when Pavkovic made that kind of speech.

Q. And then paragraphs 40 to 42, in summary as follows, the same soldier says this: That after the conflict with NATO had begun, that's in April of 1999, he was instructed - and I'm not going to identify the commander in open session - to clean the area of Albanians and send them all towards Korenica, because they were waited for by the MUP with a list of names of terrorists. The witness explains that it was clear to him that this was a cover-up story and that the purpose of the operation was to cleanse the villages.

And then I'll read the next paragraph and give you a chance to comment. He said that the following units participated in the operation: The 63rd Parachute Brigade, part of the 52nd Battalion military police, and the PJP, the Special Police Unit, and that the first village that was ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁵ sealed and where cleansing started was Dobros, that the operation started at 6.00 in the morning, lasted for two days until the following daily at 1700 hours or 1800 hours, and the soldier explains they went through several villages. "Hard to say how many villages we went through because sometimes we would find 4 houses, sometimes 20, sometimes 40, and one doesn't have to count villages to learn the names of villages." The area was predominantly Catholic and they operated in a range of a 3 kilometres frontage, PJP on the right, another group to the middle and left, and I shan't name those in open session.

Is that account by this soldier of this operation that you now do remember accurate? Is it?

A. Part of it is accurate, but as far as objectives are concerned and why it was done, that part is not true.

Q. Which part of it is accurate, please?

A. The part that's correct is that army units were involved as well as special units of the police; PJP. But as for the existence of lists and that they were pushed somewhere, I don't know anything about that. His own commander should have explained it to him. I believe there was only one company-level unit from the 52nd Police Battalion. It was with Pavkovic and Lazarevic, whom they were securing, and there was only a small part of that unit left there.

Q. Are you conceding that there was, as described, an operation to drive people down this valley from west to east, conducted by the police and the army jointly?

A. No. No. There was no such concept or such assignment. ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁶

Q. In paragraph 42 of the same document, we hear: "During the operation, we only encountered civilians, sometimes arriving in villages already empty because the civilians probably see smoke and hear machine-guns and flee." He describes how the mortar platoon was two or three kilometres behind in case there was contact with the KLA, but explains that hundreds of Albanian civilians were expelled on the first day and that, after they were expelled, their houses were set on fire in accordance with the order given.

Is it true that hundreds of houses were set on fire?

A. I have no such information or knowledge that hundreds of houses were set on fire, as you say.

Q. Well, how about some houses set on fire?

A. Some probably were.

Q. Why? Why set people's houses on fire, Mr. Kotur?

A. When I say set on fire, I mean that they were burnt accidentally during combat operations. I didn't mean that they were intentionally set on fire. I was not involved in the operation. I don't know, but definitely it's not true that hundreds of houses burned. Since the MUP was involved, maybe MUP was doing something I don't know about. I don't know that the army ever burned houses. I don't know it. I think it definitely doesn't hold as far as the army is concerned.

Q. You see, Mr. Kotur, in relation to Meja, for which there is a mass of evidence, as you know, from bodies like Human Rights Watch collecting witness statements, witnesses we've called, the bodies at Batajnica, for Meja there are two soldiers who have provided -- at least two, but two ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁷ soldiers who have provided accounts explaining that this was ethnic cleansing with mass killing. And that's the truth, isn't it? That's what Meja was all about, was a revenge attack, ethnic cleansing, and mass killing.

A. I do not accept that for the simple reason that that operation did not have such an objective. And if at the end of the operation something happened, that had not been planned, one; and two, we were not informed of any details.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'll ask a few questions about the notebook we've been able to identify. I simply don't have time. I see the Court may be concerned about that, but ...

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Nice, the second statement of Nik Peraj --

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: -- was that exhibited?

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: In the same number, 143?

MR. NICE: According to our records, yes. In fact there were three statements. The last statement's a correction statement, which dealt with a few typographical errors.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm reminded that you're now using almost 100 per cent of the time spent by the accused.

MR. NICE: I'm quite aware of that. The Chamber will have -- so sorry. The Chamber will have in mind the way the answers have been given and the topics that have been covered. And as to this particular ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁸ document, it's a document we wanted a long time ago. It's apparently the only record we're going to get --

JUDGE BONOMY: You're getting to a stage where it's actually going to be impossible for you to comply with the order that was made about time.

MR. NICE: It's going to be difficult. We have it in mind as a problem.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's -- I find it very difficult to see how you are if you continue to continue cross-examination at this length.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, the Court's -- I'm in the Court's hands, to a degree, and I ask the Court to be understanding of the difficulties we face when we're not provided in advance with material and statements that enable us to know what's coming. This is a document that may be of interest to the Chamber, I don't know. We've been able to look at it and there are a couple of entries in it -- there are quite a number of entries, they probably boil down to a few topics. What should we do? Leave it altogether? Ask for it to be translated and made available post facto when the witness can't deal with it, or simply abandon the prospect asking any questions on it altogether? It seems to me, where there is such a dearth of contemporaneous material evidence associated with this witness, that the Chamber might be helped by hearing one or two things, but I'm not going to press it. If the Chamber is against me, I'm quite happy to stop.

JUDGE BONOMY: No, no, no doubt that's right. The issue is a much broader strategic issue. It's not an issue related to this one subject ⁴⁷⁵⁶⁹ about which you're about to cross-examine. You have to give thought to how you approach cross-examination in general if you're going to assist the Chamber to ensure that its order is implemented.

MR. NICE: Well, it's always been our desire to maintain the ratio of time that the Court wanted, and indeed to better it, but there are real practical problems where we are presented with the sort of evidence we are presented, and it would have been wholly wrong not, for example, to have taken this witness to the evidence about Meja which implicates him even though he didn't deal with it in chief.

JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer will you be now?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm actually prepared to abandon the book. Just let me just take one moment.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. NICE: Can I ask a few general -- just a couple of general questions that I know arise from the book.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let a copy be provided to the accused.

MR. NICE: There is no copy, there's just one document.

Q. Just this: Your book shows, doesn't it, Mr. Kotur, throughout the relevant period gathering up reservists 600 at a time. That's not rotation, that's preparing for war ahead of the end of March and in contravention of the agreement; correct?

A. As we interpreted the agreement that had been signed, it was not contrary to it. It's true the reservists were coming in to be trained. Yesterday, I started saying but I didn't finish there was an assessment made in March by the corps command concerning the strength of the ⁴⁷⁵⁷⁰ so-called KLA under arms, and the number of villages affected by combat operations, about our operative and tactical position of the corps itself - it was assessed as very unfavourable - and on the basis of that assessment and taking into account -- let me tell you which document it is. It was signed --

MR. NICE: Can I cut the witness short. I have two questions I want to ask him. I'd ask the document be made available for translation, we have it translated and consider its potential as an exhibit later on if that's acceptable. It's the only way we can get through things quickly. But there are two entries. Can we just look at this entry. Mr. Nort, that entry and that entry.

Q. Read them out and interpret them for us because they will need your interpretation. That one and that one. First one, please.

A. "Search of the terrain south of Junik. Participation in the blockade of a terrorist group. No changes in mobility."

Q. No, finish. That's enough.

A. "Plan of drills not received. You ask for it. Course for squad commanders, method-wise it --"

Q. Stop, please.

A. "-- does not hold."

Q. Could you read the word "pretres of the terrain" out. And if so, what -- just read "pretres" again. I'm not sure you read that.

A. "Search of the terrain."

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... interpretation. Next entry, please. Just read the second entry I pointed to. ⁴⁷⁵⁷¹

A. "Damjane village photographed. Combat Group 3."

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter doesn't know how to interpret this. Something involving force.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Nikodin village near Urosevac, explosion. Admission of reservists and their briefing. Plan of disinformation and deceit."

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... without more time than I'm prepared to devote in light of the concern of the Court and without parallel documents to go to work from in photocopy form, I'd ask that the document be made available, we'll have it translated, and then we will address the issue of its being an exhibit.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do, Mr. Robinson. Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Colonel Kotur, would you please take this document placed before you by Mr. Nice entitled "Daily operative report of the 15th of January, 1991 [as interpreted], General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, department for operations." Do you have that document?

A. No, I don't have it. I returned it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be given to the witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 1999, not 1991, as is on the transcript.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought I said 1999. Maybe it was a slip of the tongue. I don't know.

JUDGE KWON: For the record, it is Exhibit 934. ⁴⁷⁵⁷²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Have you received it now?

A. Yes.

Q. Look at page 2, item 8.4, because that's the only thing that refers to the 3rd Army.

A. No, I received the wrong document, dated the 10th of March. I see it only now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated].

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found it. What point did you want me to take a look at?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Point 8.4. Just the section referring to the 3rd Army. So it's the paragraph, a very short one beginning with 3rd Army. The first thing it says is -- or you can read it out.

A. "During tactical exercises on a mechanised company of the Urosevac 243rd Mechanised Brigade in the sector of Dulje, near the village of Sefer, the Siptar terrorists opened fire with infantry weapons after which they retreated towards the Dara Glava feature. Our forces were unharmed."

Q. So that, then, is a tactical exercise that was going on; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And it was being performed by part of the unit at Dulje; is that right? Can you see that?

A. Yes, we can see that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just for my benefit, just say what ⁴⁷⁵⁷³ a tactical exercise is. No, no, not you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's a regular --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A tactical exercise means training the army.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's what they're doing with the object of training the troops.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It says that there were no consequences, and all this took place near the village of Sefer. That's what it says. Now, was this an event which was completely separate from the one in Racak?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Or does it have anything to do with Racak?

A. This is at the Dulje pass, which means separate from Racak.

Q. All right. But we're talking about that same combat group that was at Dulje near Stimlje and Canovic hill; is that right?

A. Yes, it was divided in two parts; one was at Stimlje, one was at Canovic hill or, rather, Dulje.

Q. Now, this other part, this second part, does it refer to the combat group that was at Canovic group, because it says some of the forces the BG-243-1 were deployed to seal off or block the village of Racak.

A. Yes, that's part of the group, of that same group.

Q. Now, tell us, please, since when was that part of the group located in the area stipulated? ⁴⁷⁵⁷⁴

A. It was at that location since 1998. That is to say, the month of April 1998, in fact.

Q. Now, the deployment and disposition of that part of the Tactical Group, did it have anything at all to do with the operation or, rather, the anti-terrorist action in Racak?

A. It was there for several months. It went on for several months and wasn't exclusively intended for Racak. It wasn't intended to be there for Racak but to control and provide safety along the communication lines.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, if there is an anti-terrorist operation in the close vicinity, it's very existence in that locality, could that be considered blocking off an access or sealing off an access?

A. I've already explained that. Its very existence can be interpreted as having blocked the region, blocked the area.

Q. Right. Now it goes on to say the village of Racak, the Stimlje municipality, that's just an identification, Racak is the essential point, and then what does it say?

A. "Where the MUP members conducted an operation against Siptar terrorists who had killed a MUP member."

Q. Very well. Fine. Now, does it say quite literally here that the operation was carried out by members of the MUP?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Now, in an operative report of this department for operations, had the army taken part would it have necessarily said members of the MUP and units of the army of Yugoslavia, such-and-such a unit had a unit been there and taken part in that action? ⁴⁷⁵⁷⁵

A. Yes, that would have been the normal way to formulate it in a report. If they had taken part together, then it would have said the MUP and the army, that they had taken part together.

Q. So you're saying that that would have had to have been recorded?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And what does it say here?

A. It says that it was only the MUP members who launched this operation against the Siptar terrorists.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, these questions are either tendentious or leading in effect and form. We can see exactly where the accused is going. He knows how he can ask questions neutrally if he wants to. The last one is quite a good example of how he can get away with it, really. He asks where something might have happened, and then the next question is - what is it he said? - "It would have had to have been recorded in that way." It's all pretty clear, but there it is.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, reformulate the question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If it says here "who launched and conducted the operation" can we then imply that somebody had taken part in it who wasn't recorded here, who hasn't been written down here?

A. I've already given an explanation about that in my previous response, that the people conducting the operation are included here and written down here. Anybody who wasn't included was not written down here. Now, part of the blockade or support - and I explained earlier on that those are two different things; support means one thing, blockade means ⁴⁷⁵⁷⁶ another, or to seal off means another - when I discussed paragraph 8 or, rather, point 8.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We must stop now and break until tomorrow morning 9.00 a.m. We are adjourned.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th day of January, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.