⁴⁸⁰⁹³

Tuesday, 7 February 2006

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are allowing you to complete your examination-in-chief in relation to Bosnia. I expect your questions to be focused and specific and non-leading, and please don't ask questions, "Is it so-and-so or ..." where the latter question, the alternative, is clearly suggesting the answer to the witness. I'm told that tabs 28 -- yes. So that matter has already been dealt with. And we're expecting you to conclude in the first session.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Professor Kostic occupied the highest posts in Yugoslavia. I don't know how I can go on with leading questions if he should answer simply what he knows.

WITNESS: BRANKO KOSTIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examination by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Professor Kostic, in the book "The Balkan Odyssey," Lord Owen, on page 182 of this book, which has been exhibited, writes about Mladic, but I would like to quote only one brief passage. "When in June 1991, when the Serb Croat war began, Ratko Mladic was Chief of Staff of the 9th Army Corps based Knin. Like other corps, this one was disintegrating because the personnel started declaring themselves as Croats or Slovenes, and leaving the JNA in order to join their national ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁴ armies. Some of them left army service altogether or left the country completely. Those who remained serving on the JNA had no longer any freedom and many were besieged by the Croatian army in their barracks, which is one of the reasons why the JNA reacted so forcefully in places like Vukovar. At that stage, a traditional civil war developed --"

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The accused is again on the Croatia indictment, and he was actually told he can only deal with Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Absolutely, Mr. Milosevic. Move on to Bosnia.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this question where Lord Owen, who represented the European Community in the entire peace process and chaired the peace conference speaks about a traditional civil war, my question to Mr. Kostic would relate to both Bosnia and Croatia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was there a civil war there, or was it, on the contrary, an aggression, an occupation, or something like that? To the best of your knowledge from that time.

A. It is obvious that both in Croatia and, unfortunately, later in Bosnia we had a typical textbook civil war, with a proviso that it was waged between two ethnicities, between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, whereas in Bosnia it took an even more drastic form; everybody waged war against everybody. For a while, there was a war between the coalition of Muslims and Croats against Serbs. Later, Croats and Muslims fought one another, and that is the most traditional example, the most classic ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁵ example of a civil war.

And if you allow me, I have a CD here, and four minutes of it will tell you more than a half hour of my talking, because that's something I said on Sarajevo TV that caused an outcry in the Croatian democracy.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. You have answered the question, and I do not wish to listen to the CD.

Ask another question, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Kostic, what kind of efforts were taken by the SFRY Presidency to stop the conflict from spreading on to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. On several occasions, already in the second half of 1991, we evaluated the political and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and issued very serious warnings that the situation was getting more tense with every day. And we warned also that unless all the three ethnic leadership in Bosnia steered to another course, there will be a civil war in that country with no winners.

In addition to that, in its reduced composition, the SFRY Presidency organised a Conference on Yugoslavia on the 3rd of January, involving various movements, individuals from all over Yugoslavia, but mostly from Bosnia. Unfortunately, members of the SDA, the Socialist Democratic Action Party of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, were not taking part, and the same goes for the Croatian Democratic Union of Mr. Tudjman.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have this footage that Mr. Kostic has offered? If it is ready in the AV booth, we can see it. ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁶

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's only three and a half minutes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What does it show? What does it show, Mr. Kostic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is an interview I gave to a Sarajevo television studio called Club 92 -- or 91, on the eve of the Catholic Christmas, after all discussions that took place in the Presidency and just before the war in Bosnia started.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Does it add anything to the comments that you have just made about the nature of the conflict?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It adds something.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, we'll not hear it. Proceed to another matter, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What do you know and what can you tell us about the so-called Belgrade Initiative? Let me draw your attention to tab 72, where we have your book, and the text of the Belgrade Initiative is included. You can open this tab and use it.

A. The Belgrade Initiative was signed in August 1991. The highest ranking representatives of Serbia took part in the formulation of this initiative, including you and Mr. Momir Bulatovic from the Presidency of Montenegro. There was Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not as a representative of the Serb people but as speaker of the Bosnian Assembly. There were other participants in this Belgrade Initiative, and you can see that from the document under the tab. ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁷ The principal purpose of the Belgrade Initiative was to define a framework for a way to organise all those who wish to continue living in a common state. Thus, the Belgrade Initiative opened a door to all those who believed it was in their interest to continue living in one common state. They had the option of committing themselves along those principles, because elections in Macedonia, for instance, and -- were not conducted yet -- or, rather, the referendum.

Q. Was there some sort of draft proposal for the way to organise a future state?

A. Yes. A proposal was made, and the main thing about it was that this future state should have a two-Chamber parliament, one of which should be representing republics with proportional representations, thus ensuring equal rights to all republics and all entities in that future state without the possibility of anybody being out-voted by anybody else. That's in tab 84.

Q. We heard many speeches here, including Mesic's speech and testimony given here to the effect that we had pushed the so-called close-knit firm federation. Now, look at this document in 84 and see what we actually proposed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Belgrade Initiative, which we haven't found in the book, is actually Exhibit 338, tab 9, or D272.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is correct, Mr. Robinson. I didn't even tender it because it's already exhibited. I just wanted the witness to comment upon it, because he was one of the key politicians in Yugoslavia of that time. ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't miss the point. You should be providing this information. It should not be left to Judge Kwon. Proceed.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tab 84.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What does paragraph 1 say?

A. "Yugoslavia is a common state of equal peoples, republics, and citizens.

"2 --"

Q. You don't have to read all the paragraphs. Look at the most important ones, such as 4.

A. "Republics in Yugoslavia shall enact their constitutions independently, whereas the bodies of Yugoslavia shall act within their purview independently, as established by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. "Republics in Yugoslavia shall independently establish international relations and conclude international covenants outside areas governed by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. Such relationships and covenants may not be to the detriment of the common interests within Yugoslavia or to the detriment of the interests of other peoples and republics in Yugoslavia."

Q. Point 5.

A. "Republics and nations in Yugoslavia may step out of Yugoslavia in the way and according to the procedure stipulated by the Constitution and the legislation of Yugoslavia, with the proviso that interests of other nations and republics may not be damaged." ⁴⁸⁰⁹⁹

Q. Point 7.

A. "Yugoslavia shall be based on the principle of equality of Yugoslav peoples and republics. National minorities shall have all minority and human rights recognised for them as established by the corresponding international covenants."

Q. Point 9.

A. 9: "Market economy, equality of all forms of property, freedom of movement of people, commodities, capital," et cetera, "and freedom of entrepreneurship, are the basic principles on which economic life in Yugoslavia shall develop."

Q. Point 10.

A. 10: "In Yugoslavia, state authorities shall be organised on the principle of division of power in the form of multi-party parliamentary republics based on the rule of law and social justice."

Q. These proposals for organising internal relationships within Yugoslavia, what kind of powers are envisaged for the bodies of Yugoslavia? That is written in item III. What was planned? What were to be the common elements exercised at the level of the joint state?

A. It was envisaged that at the level of Yugoslavia, legislation in the area of banking, monetary policy, customs policy, foreign economic relations should be adopted, as well as laws governing the tax system, trading within the Yugoslav market, science and technology, defence of Yugoslavia, the position, the composition and the use of the Yugoslav army, representation of Yugoslavia abroad and foreign relations, et cetera. ⁴⁸¹⁰⁰

Q. And what about 5, freedoms and rights of citizens?

A. Freedoms and rights of citizens envisaged by international laws and covenants. I said already that the parliament was supposed to have two Chambers.

Q. So an Assembly, the president of the republic, the government. Those were the bodies envisaged by this proposal. Can you tell us very briefly, who was Adil Zulfikarpasic?

A. Dr. Adil Zulfikarpasic was one of the most prominent and very respected intellectuals from Sarajevo who first joined the SDA party of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic but soon made a turnabout, distanced himself from the SDA and formed another party with Mr. Muhamed Filipovic, a Bosniak party.

Q. Why did he make this turnaround from the SDA?

A. Because at the first rallies of the SDA that he attended on the eve of the first multi-party elections to the parliament, he had the impression that that party was becoming more extremist, more fundamentalist every day in its policies, and he even says in one of his writings that some of his friends, officials from Germany, from their liberal parties abroad, that he had invited -- he meant to invite to come to Bosnia and Herzegovina but gave up when he saw how extremist these rallies were.

Q. Yes. He writes that he cancelled all these visits of his foreign friends when he saw the iconography of the party, the SDA party. He speaks about it at length in one of his interviews that we will not deal with separately here. But do you have that interview he gave to the Nin ⁴⁸¹⁰¹ magazine?

A. Just let me see if I can find it here.

Q. Well, if you can't, I'll ask the following: Are you aware that as he was one of Izetbegovic's sponsors and closest associates for a long time, he came to see me in connection with the Belgrade Initiative?

A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Q. And that we had a lengthy conversation about all these topics at the time. And could you please put on the ELMO just a brief quotation of his where we can see what he discussed with me, inter alia. I have it here.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Which tab number is it?

JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the tab number, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Zulfikarpasic's interview was too long, which is why I did not include it in the tabs. So I will present just a brief quotation from it. It's from the weekly Nin, and the interview is 50 pages long.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just the part that's been highlighted. Could you please some in on it. And I will ask you to read what he says here about what I suggested to him, the part that's been circled.

A. "He proposed that the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia be chosen in alphabetical order and that Bosnia and Herzegovina provide the first president. Milosevic told me that he agrees that a Muslim be the president of the country for five years, with competencies similar to those enjoyed by the president of France; that is, that he be able to ⁴⁸¹⁰² appoint military leaders, diplomats, and so on."

Q. Thank you. This was a time where we were trying to find a way to set up Yugoslavia again and have relations as friendly as possible with, first of all, the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you imagine a Greater Serbia of which Alija Izetbegovic would be president for five years with all these powers?

A. This is a very important detail, which only goes to confirm what I said at the outset, that there was no intention whatsoever of establishing a Greater Serbia.

Q. According to the Belgrade Initiative, this new Yugoslav union, would it have been open to Croatia and Slovenia, those who had left and who might possibly want to join again?

A. It was envisaged as open to all, even if they did not join right away. But later on, if they concluded that such a union would suit them, they would still be able to join it. These talks between Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic and you on the basis of the Belgrade Initiative are well known publicly, and they are referred to as the historical agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims.

Q. Who accepted the Belgrade Initiative and who rejected it?

A. According to what Mr. Zulfikarpasic himself writes, he didn't come to talk to you in Belgrade on his own initiative. He was authorised by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic to discuss this agreement between Serbs and Muslims. Alija had told him that the Serbs saw him, Alija, in a bad light and that it might be better if it was Mr. Zulfikarpasic who attended the talks. Mr. Zulfikarpasic agreed to this, and he accepted the agreement drawn up ⁴⁸¹⁰³ in Belgrade. He went back to Sarajevo and informed Mr. Alija Izetbegovic of this. It seems that on that very day or the next day Alija Izetbegovic was to travel to America. He agreed with the agreement but said that it should wait until he got back from the USA. When he did get back from the USA, he said that the agreement reached by Mr. Zulfikarpasic in Belgrade was no longer valid.

Q. We saw the document in tab 84. What about the commission of the Presidency which prepared this Belgrade agreement? And you were its vice-president. It's a document of the 5th of September, 1991, and it's in tab 32.

A. We've already commented on this document. The Belgrade Initiative and that document of the 5th of September, which is in fact only a communique whereby Mr. Stjepan Mesic spoke at the inaugural meeting in The Hague.

Q. Was this a document that the entire Presidency headed by Mesic accepted?

A. Yes, I've already said that.

Q. Yes, but now we're looking at it from another angle. What you said in connection with Mesic is one thing. Now we are discussing the Belgrade Initiative and this document in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Zulfikarpasic, at the time, was -- he was not mentioned in your response to my previous question, but now we are discussing Bosnia.

I won't dwell on this because I want to get through the questions as quickly as possible. I won't dwell on his standpoints, the description ⁴⁸¹⁰⁴ of the political situation.

Zulfikarpasic, as you said, speaks of the extremist and fundamentalist nature taken on more and more by the Party of Democratic Action. Before and after all the events mentioned by Zulfikarpasic - and he mentions all those rallies and so on - were there any clear indications of Izetbegovic's fundamentalist standpoints and those of the ruling Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. Yes. This was very evident. First of all, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic is the author of the so-called Islamic Declaration, which, although it was drawn up as a platform, represents very extremist standpoints and extremist views on the organisation of a Muslim state. In one place in that declaration, Mr. Izetbegovic expressly states that in such an Islamic state there is no place for any other political or religious option. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic stated in public that everything that happened in Bosnia during the civil war had taken place 20 or 30 years too early, because 20 or 30 years later on, in a peaceful manner, Bosnia would have become a Muslim majority state, and the Muslims could have organised an Islamic state because they were in the majority.

Q. Were there any indications that in that independent Bosnia the Serbs would not be equal?

A. Yes. There were many indications of this in everyday life. But the grossest indicator was that attempts were made to reach decisions on the most fateful issues in Bosnia by out-voting. The leadership of the Muslims and Croats, against the will of the Serbs and without their presence in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the parliament of ⁴⁸¹⁰⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina, made decisions on all important questions that touched on the position of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina - not just of Yugoslavia - literally stated that Bosnia was made up of three constituent peoples; Muslims, Serbs and Croats, and no people could, to the detriment of the two others -- no two peoples to the detriment of the third could issue a decision, least of all on a major issue pertaining to the fate of the peoples. So that in early 1992, the Bosnian Presidency operated without its two representatives of the Serbian people. And it was a collective organ, a collective head of state, just as the Yugoslav Presidency was.

Q. The Assembly that issued the decision on a referendum after 2.00 a.m., when the Serbs had gone for a break, was it made with or without the Serb representatives?

A. Without them.

Q. We saw a brief clip where Lord Carrington says this was illegal. Did the Presidency of the SFRY draw attention in a timely manner to the unlawfulness of such an action?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. What was the standpoint of the Presidency about this and the standpoint of other organs?

A. The Presidency of the SFRY and all the other political and state organs pointed out that any attempt to make decisions or adopt solutions to which all three nations in Bosnia had not agreed would lead to civil war. Unfortunately, this proved to be correct.

Q. In the Presidency at the time, did you feel it was justified, this ⁴⁸¹⁰⁶ fear of the Serbs in Bosnia, that in a unitary and independent Bosnia they would fall under the domination of a political group which one of its founders, Adil Zulfikarpasic, described as extremist and fundamentalist?

A. We felt that the Serbs had good reason to fear this, but it was the Serbs in Bosnia who felt it most. The Serbs in Bosnia had many negative experiences from World War II, and it was difficult for them to believe at the outset that the Muslims and the Croats would reach decisions on such important issues without the Serbs, and therefore they were afraid that they would be constantly out-voted and that all issues, including issues pertaining to their status, would be made in the same way. They were afraid of having the status of a minority in Bosnia.

Q. Let us look at a brief clip showing the Reis-Ul-Ulema, Mustafa Ceric, which shows what his standpoint was.

[Videotape played]

JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the word that's missing from the transcript before "Mustafa Ceric"?

THE INTERPRETER: Reis-Ul-Ulema, the chief Muslim religious leader in Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] It's God's order to us and human obligation."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So jihad is God's order and a human obligation. Let's look at another brief clip where Izetbegovic is shown and the Mujahedin formation. ⁴⁸¹⁰⁷

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This is sufficient. What could the Serbs in Bosnia think in this kind of atmosphere?

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, first of all, have you a date for this and any indication of what it is? It was absolutely meaningless to me.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a review of the Mujahedin Brigade --

JUDGE BONOMY: I'm asking the witness if he can indicate what it is and when it was.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't see any pictures on the monitor. I could only hear the sound.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, so much for that exercise.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please move to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Kostic, what do you know about the peace efforts on the part of the international community and cooperation between the representatives of the three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which resulted in the Cutileiro Plan? What do you know about that, and what do you know about the Cutileiro Plan as well?

A. Well, about those steps towards peace, I do know something because I was the vice-president of the Yugoslav state Presidency still at the time, and what I know is this: The international community had launched an initiative with the intention of preventing the escalation of a civil ⁴⁸¹⁰⁸ war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the Presidency of Yugoslavia, in its reduced form, albeit, and also the authorities, the state authorities and the political authorities in Serbian and Montenegro, gave their support to the efforts made by the international community unreserved. The Cutileiro Plan provided for a sort of principle of cantonal set-up for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and --

Q. Perhaps it would be useful, because we have tab 62, you have a map from the Cutileiro Plan. Perhaps it would be a good idea to place it on the overhead projector and then you can indicate to us what the idea was for this cantonal organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for those following these proceedings to be able to have a better idea of this. Here we can see the map, but it's all written -- the legend is in Cyrillic, but the horizontal lines is the Serb area, the white is the Muslim area, the dark area is the Croat area, and the diagonal lines are Sarajevo. So it's only Sarajevo that has these diagonal lines which has special treatment. It is a separate canton. The white area is the Muslim area, the horizontal lines are the Serb area, and the dark areas are the Croatian areas.

A. With the Cutileiro Plan, an attempt was made to come by a solution which would in fact mean an end to the civil war.

Q. Or Cutileiro's plan came before the civil war broke out.

A. Yes, yes, before the civil war. That's right. But the basic idea underlying it was that an organisation should be made for Bosnia-Herzegovina as being a whole, one entity, but on the cantonal principle, in such a way that each community or ethnic community would ⁴⁸¹⁰⁹ have its own canton.

Q. Yes, it's own canton, and an explanation is given there in the legend. Now, tell us, please, when the negotiations were completed, did all three sides accept the plan?

A. Yes. All three sides adopted the Cutileiro Plan, including Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. However, as soon as Bosnia-Herzegovina was -- had become a member of the United Nations, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the Cutileiro Plan.

Q. He didn't withdraw the signature then, he withdrew his signature before Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member of the UN, but never mind. Do you know anything about this retraction of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic's signature?

JUDGE BONOMY: May I ask the witness, do you know anything about this plan, because that's twice you have had to be corrected by the accused, who is effectively giving evidence here. Did this plan come into existence while you were in the Presidency?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it did, except that we as the Presidency --

JUDGE BONOMY: In that case, can I ask you, what was your direct involvement with it as a member of the Presidency?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. Bonomy, I didn't come into direct -- or didn't have any direct involvement with the plan. I didn't work on the plan because the Yugoslav state Presidency was not involved, included in the definition of the Cutileiro Plan. All I know is that as the vice-president of the Yugoslav state Presidency from those days, that ⁴⁸¹¹⁰ time, when there was mention of the Cutileiro Plan, we were all vitally interested in finding a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Bosnia. And from that point of view I can certainly talk about those times. I do know, for example, that the US ambassador, Mr. Zimmerman, in fact prevailed upon Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and persuaded him not to accept the Cutileiro Plan, for instance.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it seems to me that this witness is very distant from this plan and that it's one that ought to be dealt with through a witness with more direct knowledge, but that's, I dare say, a question of the weight that the Tribunal -- or the Trial Chamber can give his evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, in the drafting of the Cutileiro Plan, we had the participation of the three sides in Bosnia. No one outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cutileiro and his associates took part in it. They agreed amongst themselves, and the map was published once the plan had been adopted. And we all applauded the agreement because we thought that they had resolved the problem in Bosnia, and that's a fact. We don't have to go into the details of how it came about. The negotiations took place in Lisbon, where the three negotiating parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina were present, whereas this map --

JUDGE BONOMY: All you've just -- it's not for you to give evidence, as you've apparently chosen not to, and all of this is material that plainly there's little point in presenting through this witness. It seems to me that it's a complete waste of the limited time you have to deal with matters that this witness has personal knowledge of. ⁴⁸¹¹¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Kostic --

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. It will be a question of the weight that we can attach to this witness's evidence on the Cutileiro Plan in view of the level of his involvement in it. Let us proceed quickly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You were shown a map a moment ago of the cantonal division. It was published by the mass media. A territorial distribution of the canton of this kind, or the map, can it represent a groundwork for the territorial expansion of Serbia?

A. No. In no case can it do that. As you can see, the cantons were devised in such a way that the large part, that is to say the horizontal lines that -- the area lined that way that should have come to the Serbs in Western Bosnia, was completely cut off, as we can see, according to the cantonal plan; cut off with the cantons and territories under Croat or Muslim control, envisaged for the Croats and the Muslims. And as you can see, this white area here, that was supposed to represent once again a Muslim canton, so that even if you just glance at this map of Bosnia and the proposed cantons, which were agreed upon and accepted and adopted by the Yugoslav side as well with great enthusiasm, indicates that we could not speak about territorial pretensions of any kind on the part of Serbia.

Q. Did the Cutileiro Plan envisage Bosnia as an independent state?

A. Yes, it did. ⁴⁸¹¹²

Q. The Serbs accepted that, did they?

A. Yes, they did. The Serbs accepted being an independent state but with this cantonal set-up.

Q. Well, let's go on to another subject. How did the JNA come to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. The whole scenario as to the position of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed a similar pattern as it did in Slovenia and especially it resembled the way this was done in Croatia. As we in Bosnia-Herzegovina also had a large portion of the military industry there and many barracks during peacetime that were deployed and dispersed across Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had a lot of interest in achieving an agreement with respect to the relationship they would have and the attitude to the Yugoslav army and the soldiers in the barracks, because we were very afraid that the scenario of Croatia was not repeated here.

Q. All right, Professor Kostic. Now, you in your capacity as vice-president of the Yugoslav state Presidency and the presiding officer in the reduced Presidency on the 26th of April, 1992, had a meeting with Alija Izetbegovic, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us, please, where the meeting was held, who attended it, and then we'll go on to discuss it after that.

A. The meeting was held in Skopje on the 26th of April, 1992, on behalf of the staff of the Supreme Command. Together with me, General Blagoje Adzic travelled to Skopje, and the host in Skopje was Mr. Kiro Gligorov. Up until that -- or, rather, the meeting came about after ⁴⁸¹¹³ several attempts on my part, unsuccessful, to establish communication with Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, and at that meeting in Skopje we discussed how, in what way we could solve the question of the position of the Yugoslav People's Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And on that occasion Mr. Alija Izetbegovic told us that the Yugoslav People's Army could stay on for five years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He did ask that the commanders of that army, of those units in Bosnia-Herzegovina, be Muslims, that is to say to have Muslim officers from the composition of the Yugoslav people's army, and Mr. Blagoje Adzic said as a joke, "Then you can propose me as the commander of the Green Berets, for example." Well, that was a sort of joke, but we did note that the question of the JNA's position in Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be solved successfully until a political solution had been found and until a supreme civilian command had been established over the army, which implied and meant the return of the representatives of the Serbs to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right. Now, let's take a look at tab 5, where we see -- it says here some sound records. So this is something that has been taken from a tape recording, not very successfully, I have to say, and it is found in tab 5. They are records or phonetic notes between Branko Kostic and Blagoje Adzic with the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, in Skopje on the 26th of April, 1992. And the discussions began at 1300 hours.

You mentioned Gligorov a moment ago, who was your host. Now, Gligorov was the president of Macedonia, was he not? Before that, that is ⁴⁸¹¹⁴ to say before the 26th of April, 1992, did Macedonia decide to step down from Yugoslavia and to have the army withdraw from Macedonia?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And did the army indeed withdraw from Macedonia?

A. Yes, the army did withdraw from Macedonia without a single bullet having been fired.

Q. Were there any outstanding issues to be settled between Belgrade and Skopje with respect to the withdrawal of the army from Macedonia?

A. No. We had no contentious issues, and I kept stressing that that two-way communication with Mr. Gligorov was highly successful, very constructive, and this meeting that we organised - that is to say Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and I with Mr. Gligorov - was the result of that expression of goodwill and the good communication with we had with Mr. Gligorov.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kostic, what was the date of the withdrawal of the army from Macedonia?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To be honest, I can't give you an exact date now. I can't say. But I can check it out in the documents.

JUDGE BONOMY: Roughly when? Roughly when?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't tell you exactly. Well, by the break I'll be able to find that and give you an answer, to tell you.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁸¹¹⁵

Q. Well, let us briefly go through the transcript of an audio recording of the talks. On page 1, in the last paragraph, you emphasise the following: You say, "I think it is a favourable circumstance that we are meeting in Skopje, Macedonia, which until yesterday was part of Yugoslavia and with which we settled all those issues, including the status of the JNA, in a very fair manner without any conflict or bloodshed in a manner that made it possible for us to talk."

A. Correct.

Q. So that took place before your talks, before these 26th of April talks. And you also say that you expressed the need to have the meeting in view of the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised as an independent state by a certain number of countries, and in view of the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army was present there and that most of the military industry we built together was located there, and so on and so forth, and that the question of a political status of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina had not yet been regulated and that to all intents and purposes there was a civil war going on there, and that talks should start and each for their own part should do as much as they can to put a stop to that war there --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Time for a question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- while constituting Bosnia and Herzegovina as independent and autonomous state.

So is that the substance of what you on behalf of the Presidency proposed to Mr. Izetbegovic? ⁴⁸¹¹⁶

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Now here when it comes to Mr. Izetbegovic, what does he say? Let's take a look at that. He says that nothing can be finally decided because he doesn't have the competence and authority to do so, but that we could begin the talks.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So that talks can be held but that he couldn't take any responsibility upon himself for doing anything. And he goes on to say in the third paragraph: "A new situation has arisen, not only as a result of the proclamation of Bosnia-Herzegovina but also of Yugoslavia, a proclamation of Yugoslavia."

A. That's on page 2.

Q. Yes, that's on page 2, but it's Izetbegovic speaking. So those are two facts. Those are two facts that call for the issue of the JNA or, rather, its elements, and he's talking -- referring to elements stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is there any contention to that?

A. No, nothing contentious there.

Q. "Which are in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be solved so that there should not be violence or illegal measures taken. It would be a good idea if they were dealt with through negotiation." That's what he says. He speaks about the need to avoid all sorts of violence, because until then, as far as the army is concerned, they had no conflicts.

A. Mr. Izetbegovic even told us at lunch, in the presence of Mr. Gligorov, that in all the places where JNA units were stationed, the ⁴⁸¹¹⁷ situation was calmed and there were no inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflicts.

Q. Now, please, he goes on to say that stage by stage they should leave Bosnia, mainly personnel who are not citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that what he said?

A. Yes.

Q. It's on page 3: "Gradually, of course, possibly step-by-step so that the personnel who are not citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina should leave."

I'll skip a bit and then come back to it. Is that what actually happened under that order of the Presidency, all JNA members who were citizens of Serbia and Montenegro withdrew from the territory of BH?

A. On the 4th of May --

Q. That's very soon after this meeting. This meeting was on the 26th of April, and your decision was on the 4th of May.

A. And on the 19th of May that year, Serbia and Montenegro did not have a single soldier stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. But he says, number one, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, among the military personnel, should stay. Number two, the armed forces must accept the authority of the civil government of Bosnia and Herzegovina or, rather, they must recognise the Supreme Command, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina or another body, depending on what it will be based on under a future agreement.

And then in another passage toward the bottom of that page, he says the ethnic composition of the JNA is currently disrupted, of the part ⁴⁸¹¹⁸ of the JNA stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is severely disrupted. "I do not blame the army for that," he says. "A lot of things played a part. We also played a part by denying the deployment of our recruits."

That's what Izetbegovic himself is saying. He's saying in no uncertain terms, "We denied new arrivals from Bosnia into the JNA."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it seems to me that since quite some time now Mr. Milosevic is giving evidence. He is quoting things from a huge document. He's making comments about what it means, what is quoted there. I don't think that this is the proper way to proceed. This is an extensive document, and we hear from Mr. Milosevic all sorts of little snips of it, and I am not in a position to follow what's really meant at a certain stage, and the witness actually isn't asked anything.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it is an extensive document. You must put your questions precisely. Focus the witness. Don't read long passages, and refrain from comments while you're reading, because you're not giving evidence.

What is the precise question that you have for the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson. Are you saying that I am not allowed to quote from this document, that the witness should quote from it instead?

JUDGE ROBINSON: You can quote for it, but don't make comments while you're quoting. That is what the Prosecutor is complaining of.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can I -- can I ask the witness, have you read this ⁴⁸¹¹⁹ document?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Have I read it? Is that a question for me?

JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have.

JUDGE BONOMY: So it --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a document reflecting the talks that I had with Mr. Izetbegovic.

JUDGE BONOMY: That's what I wanted to be clear about. So it seems a pointless exercise, going through it line by line, when we can read it for ourselves. I'm just wondering why Mr. Milosevic doesn't ask you questions about what you ultimately agreed or disagreed upon with Mr. Izetbegovic, and then we could move on. We can read it for ourselves after that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it seems to us that this is a document that we could admit in its entirety. The witness participated in it. Do you have specific questions to put to the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is one of the key issues, why the ethnic composition of the army was unbalanced; what Izetbegovic himself gave as a reason for this unbalance in the ethnic composition of military personnel.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, please. ⁴⁸¹²⁰

A. It is common knowledge, and I've said this before, certain national leaderships one by one started refusing to send their recruits to the army any more. First the Slovenes, then Croats, and as I said, Muslims a bit later. In my view, it is particularly pertinent that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic himself notes this disbalance in the ethnic composition of the army and army units stationed in Bosnia, and he says himself that it's a result of the fact that the Muslim leadership had stopped sending their conscripts to the army. It also has to do with the fact that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic later formed his own Muslim army.

Q. Is that what we saw on that footage?

A. Yes. We saw that on that video. You can see it clearly.

Q. Does he say unequivocally they stopped their conscripts from joining the army any more?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he say, in fact, that he doesn't blame the army for that?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he say that it is a real task to re-establish peace and have people return to their homes?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you quote from the second passage on page 5.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: This is actually a fruitless exercise to put to the witness, "Does he say that?" and the witness simply says "Yes." I mean, either it should be just moved on or the witness would have to tell ⁴⁸¹²¹ what he remembers from this in addition to what we see here in the transcript. I can't really see what use it is to put -- to go on like this.

JUDGE KWON: Did the Prosecution not follow this practice when you introduced something?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you did. You did.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But that's -- I mean, what should be done and I think what the Prosecution did when you have a document, we quote from the document, giving the passage what we are quoting, and then ask additional questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it is tantamount to the same thing. It's a practice that has been used by both parties. It's not one that I'm accustomed to, certainly coming from the -- from my jurisdiction, but we have endorsed its use here.

Mr. Milosevic could, nonetheless, I believe, try to identify issues that arise from -- from this interview and put them to the -- to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please, Professor Kostic, look at the second paragraph on page 5. What does it say? "To return to their homes --"

A. "Serbs to Serb homes, Muslims to Muslim homes, Croats to Croat homes. People should return home and have their security guaranteed."

JUDGE KWON: Could you indicate the English page number?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is page 5.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's in -- yes. ⁴⁸¹²²

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is the second paragraph from the bottom, towards the bottom of the paragraph, the sentence starting with: "First of all, it should be made possible for them ..."

JUDGE ROBINSON: What page?

THE INTERPRETER: Page 5 in the English transcript.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you, we found it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the third paragraph from the bottom on page 4.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What people are being referred to here? What people who had been driven out of their homes are being referred to by Alija Izetbegovic?

A. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic speaks about all the three constituent peoples of Bosnia; Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

Q. Is he talking about them because they are constituent peoples, all of them, or because what they have in common is that they had been driven out from some places?

A. Those places were the battlefield of very important conflicts, and of course there were many people displaced from all the three ethnic groups.

Q. Now, look at the middle of page 6, this very large paragraph.

A. You mean the one that starts with, "The idea is acceptable ..."?

Q. Let me find it. Yes. It's on page 5, the last large paragraph before "Branko Kostic." That's in English. And could you please read what he says. He accepts to create conditions for hundreds if thousands of people. Will you go on reading this. ⁴⁸¹²³

A. "For hundreds of thousands of people who have left their homes on all sides, because in Bosnia and Herzegovina most of the victims are Serbs and Muslims, and Croats to a lesser extent. So there are a lot of Serbian refugees and a lot of Muslim refugees who have left their homes. First of all, it should be made possible for them to return to their homes, and they should be guaranteed safety. This can only be done by a new force that would not be purely Serb or purely Muslim, but a new force, actually a joint Bosnian and Herzegovinian force that would be so organised from top down; the soldiers, the command officers, the military, the tasks it would set itself as a goal."

Q. All right. That's the end of his contribution here. Now, you ask him a question before General Adzic starts speaking. Since he himself said that the -- that force should not be purely Serb or Muslim but must be joint, you ask him: "How do you imagine Joint Command over that army, because you have no Serb representatives in your Presidency?" What did he answer to that? What did Alija Izetbegovic say?

A. He says: "No Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina could possibly be equal without representatives of the Serb people."

Q. All right. Did they have any Serb representatives then?

A. They did not.

Q. Did they hold a referendum without any Serbs in the Assembly?

A. That's correct. They also made their application for recognition to the European Union without any Serb representation.

Q. And when he says, "Representation of all the constituent peoples --" ⁴⁸¹²⁴

A. He says, "All we are saying, we are saying --"

THE INTERPRETER: We would appreciate the reference really.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is this from? The interpreters are trying to find it. Page 6?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. What he just quoted, Mr. Kostic: "No Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina without a Serb in it will be able to guarantee equality, without representatives of the Serbian people." That's what he quoted. And then further down in the same passage, although it's a bit disjointed in translation, it's not so compact as it sounds in the original --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He says: "The Presidency is currently deficient because these two are absent," meaning that there are no Serb representatives in the Presidency. "How can we solve that? Can we organise some new additional elections or maybe get those two to return or maybe achieve some sort of agreement in later negotiations? Because a new type of supreme organ is envisaged, a new forum or a new organ, but in each of these bodies there would be equal representation of all."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And on the next page, you see you ask him how he sees the future of the peace conference.

A. He says: "The last time, I told Cutileiro, Please bring all the parties together. Put forward a solution. We will accept it whatever it is."

Q. How come Cutileiro first made a plan, Izetbegovic first signed it, then went back on his signature? ⁴⁸¹²⁵

A. It's true that our people say that nothing bad should be said about the dead, but the truth is that Mr. Izetbegovic was a very unreliable partner.

Q. He himself characterises the absence of Serbs on the Presidency as a deficiency, a shortcoming.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, please be kind, because I don't want to spend too much time on this. Just tell us as briefly as you can. On page 12, Blagoje Adzic speaks. The first long passage.

A. "The territory of BH ..."?

Q. Yes, "On the territory of BH there are now fewer than 5 per cent members of the military."

A. This means --

Q. Is that Blagoje Adzic speaking?

A. Yes. "This means that the JNA is fully manned mainly on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and over 80 per cent of the members of the JNA hail from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from that territory, and as many as 90 per cent are Serbs. That's not our fault, Mr. Izetbegovic, it's a mistake made by you and your leadership, because you told conscripts not to respond to mobilisation calls from the JNA, and you called on active duty officers to cross over to your side, to the Territorial Defence, which they are doing now on a relatively massive scale."

Q. Very well.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Page 9, Your Honour. Page 9 in the English, the first paragraph. ⁴⁸¹²⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What does he go on to say? He says further: "Apart from that that -- despite that --"

A. "Despite that, thanks to its role, its purpose and mission, the JNA carried out its tasks mainly preventing major ethnic clashes. In areas where there were no JNA units and where various paramilitary formations were involved, disastrous clashes took place. For example, in Bosanski Brod, Kupres, Foca, Bijeljina, and so on."

Q. So where the JNA did not get involved, what does he say?

A. "There were major clashes, although propaganda says otherwise. For example, in Zvornik -- that life, for example, in Zvornik has been brought back to normal very quickly."

Q. Very well. Izetbegovic says that no one should drive anyone out, referring to the departure of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina. And what is being discussed on pages 17 and 18? Who says this: "Mr. President, the siege of all barracks and military facilities must be lifted"? That's Blagoje Adzic speaking, isn't it?

A. Yes, Izetbegovic asks, "Are there any barracks under siege?"

Q. So Alija Izetbegovic doesn't know if there is a barracks under siege?

A. Adzic replies, "Of course there are; Derventa, Travnik."

Q. All this is under siege, Travnik, Zenica? All this is under siege? Today an order arrived from Efendic or a man called Siber, but Izetbegovic tries to justify himself by saying, "I read about this in the ⁴⁸¹²⁷ newspapers." Adzic said, "A person who wants peace shouldn't issue such orders. We can agree. We can discuss. We can coordinate matters, but to make such a decision unilaterally and issue the directive you know about, attacking barracks and so on, this means war."

A. About a month before these talks we had in Skopje, a directive had been issued by the Muslim paramilitary formations to lay siege to all JNA barracks on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what's being referred to here.

Q. Adzic said: "If such an order was not issued with your approval, the person who issued it should be dismissed, because it leads to war." Izetbegovic, "Well, it was withdrawn the same moment but they were not dismissed." Well, was that order withdrawn? Were the barracks under siege? Was he telling the truth?

A. I don't know whether it was withdrawn or not. It may have been, but the barracks in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained under siege. In Sarajevo, in the Marshal Tito barracks, 300 young men of 16 or 17 remained under siege. They were cadets of a military school and they lived worse than in a concentration camp. We had no possibility of lifting the blockade of that barracks by the Muslim paramilitaries.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break. We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁸¹²⁸

Q. Would you please take a look - and we'll dwell on this only very briefly, we won't go into the entire text - but at the end you refer to various matters that you may explain, if you wish, but please look at page 36, which is at the very end, the last passage before Alija Izetbegovic speaks. "If pressure is exerted on us with respect to the status of the JNA --"

A. "If there is a wish to exert pressure on us with respect to the status and place of the JNA and animate the international public, you can rest assured of one thing: We on our part will honour our two commitments. In other words, all your citizens, your nationals, we will send them from Serbia and Montenegro back to Bosnia and Herzegovina in a matter of several days, if necessary."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. What's the question on that, Mr. Milosevic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't finished quoting yet.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can he just finish reading the passage?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Just as we will bring back people who are not from that area, who are not your nationals but ours. All the others stay there. You will then have to face the fact that you have Serbian people there armed and with their own army. You have Muslims and Croats armed and with their own army. You face a threat of a terrible civil war and bloodshed in which all will be killed, a total chaos, an all-out civil war there.

"I think this is not a solution. We should talk about it." ⁴⁸¹²⁹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, please say whether the Presidency of the SFRY actually acted on this and returned all the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Yugoslavia.

A. The Presidency of the SFRY in its reduced composition, on the 4th of May, 1992, issued a decision that all members of the JNA should withdraw from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitution of the 27th of April of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had already been adopted. All those who were nationals of Serbia and Montenegro were to withdraw, and we acted on that. All of them were withdrawn. On the 19th of May, there were no longer any of our soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Professor Kostic, we didn't have time to go through this rather extensive record in detail. At that meeting, did Alija Izetbegovic make any comments to you about the behaviour of the army or anything that might be seen as reprehensible conduct by the army?

A. No, not for a moment. There was nothing like that. As soon as I returned from Skopje, because there was quite a lot of public interest in those talks of ours, which had been postponed many times, I made a public statement in which I said that I was very satisfied with the talks we had had with Mr. Izetbegovic in Skopje and that he had even stated that the army could stay there for five years, if necessary. Unfortunately, a few days later Mr. Izetbegovic held an extraordinary session of his reduced - not to say "Rump" - Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded categorically that the Yugoslav army immediately withdraw from the ⁴⁸¹³⁰ territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And may I take this opportunity, because I owe Mr. Bonomy an answer to his question as to when the JNA was withdrawn from Macedonia, in view of the fact that this was settled in agreement with the Macedonian leadership, the withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia was done gradually and successively, in no great haste, but in March and April the JNA had been already withdrawn from Macedonia.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Kostic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said that on the 4th of May, the Presidency issued a decision on withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without its Serbian representatives, issued a decision. What was it?

A. This session was practically held on the same day, and they declared the JNA to be an occupying army. They addressed the international public, even asking for foreign assistance.

Q. Eight days previously, he had had no objections to the conduct of the JNA, but on the 4th of May when you issued the decision on withdrawing the army from Bosnia based on the results of your talks with him, he called them aggressors.

A. Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you to look at the foot of page 21 in the English, going on to page 22, which is a statement made by Izetbegovic, where he appears to suggest that paramilitary units of the Serbian Democratic Party have certain areas under their control and are holding ⁴⁸¹³¹ them with the consent of the Yugoslav People's Army. That sounds like a complaint about the conduct of the Yugoslav People's Army.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please let me see that in the Serbian language?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'll find it for you.

A. While I'm looking for the text, Mr. Bonomy, let me say the following: In Bosnia, we had most of the Yugoslav military industry belonging to all the republics of Yugoslavia. Much of this was held by the Muslims and the Muslim units. It was under their control. The JNA did not intervene even there in order to lift the siege of those military facilities and retake them. There were quite a few accusations to the effect that the JNA left weapons for the Serbs. I can assert that the JNA left weapons to all the ethnic groups in areas from which it withdrew, for the simple reason that --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it's the reference to paramilitary units of the Serbian Democratic Party having all those areas under their control. That's -- I think that is what should be commented on.

JUDGE BONOMY: Plus it's the -- it's the part after that. "They're holding them with the consent of the Yugoslav People's Army." I understood you to say that Izetbegovic had no complaint to make about the army, but I was suggesting to you that that sounds like a complaint.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Have you found it, Mr. Kostic?

A. No. ⁴⁸¹³²

Q. It's on page 33, the second passage in Alija Izetbegovic's speech.

A. Yes, I've found it now. "So who is attacking whom ..." is that it?

Q. Yes. That's what Mr. Bonomy was quoting.

A. "So who is attacking whom I do not know, but the result is such that at the moment paramilitary units of the Serbian Democratic Party have all those areas under their control. They're holding them with the consent of the Yugoslav People's Army."

What I can say, Mr. Bonomy, is that the entire civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in essence a war between three ethnic communities; Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. It was war for territory.

JUDGE BONOMY: My question is much more specific than that, Mr. Kostic. It was simply to ask you if that was a complaint that Izetbegovic actually made, because you gave an answer a short time ago that he had no complaints to make about the Yugoslav army's conduct.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say that I don't see this as a complaint, because the JNA did not enter into any armed clashes either with the Muslim formations or the Serb formations. It's well known that the Serbian Democratic Army -- Party had its armed units and its Territorial Defence there even before we withdrew the JNA from Bosnia. So I did not see this as a complaint against the JNA.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All the more so as --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁸¹³³

Q. What was the attitude of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the JNA that they took only a month previously on the day when the independence of BH was declared?

A. A month previously the Presidency called on the paramilitary formations of the Muslim and Croat army to lay siege to all the JNA barracks on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this was done and acted upon.

Q. And what was the composition of that Presidency?

A. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina - and I will use the correct term that Mr. Robinson used - was in its reduced composition; that is, there were no representatives of the Serb people.

Q. So on the 4th of May, you issued a decision that all units of the JNA, which was now the Yugoslav army, should leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did the armed formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina permit the army to withdraw without obstruction?

A. On the contrary. In that period while the JNA was withdrawing, we saw the most monstrous crimes committed against members of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. What do you know about the attack on the JNA column in Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo on the 3rd of May, 1992?

A. At that time, General Kukanjac detained Mr. Alija Izetbegovic on his -- when he was on his way back from the Lisbon conference. They took him to the barracks in Lukavica, the JNA barracks, and during those negotiations it was agreed that the siege and encirclement in which the army command was being held by the Muslim forces should be lifted so that ⁴⁸¹³⁴ the command could pull out of Sarajevo. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and General Kukanjac were in that column together. I think that the UNPROFOR representative was also there, the representative for Bosnia, but the Muslim paramilitary formations did not stick to the agreement. Mr. Izetbegovic was released and allowed to go to the Presidency, and then the Muslim units cut off the column in Dobrovoljacka Street and, according to the information I had then, under the direct command of Ejub Ganic, they slaughtered the column which was not in a combat disposition. The troops were in trucks, ready for withdrawal from Sarajevo, and several soldiers and officers of the JNA were killed.

Q. And what happened when the JNA was withdrawing from Tuzla on the 15th of May?

A. An even worse crime occurred with even more victims on the side of the JNA. While withdrawing pursuant to a decision by the Presidency from the Husinjska Buna barracks of the JNA in Tuzla, the army was ready to move in a column with trucks, and soldiers sitting on the tarpaulins, not posing any danger to their surroundings; however, they were ambushed and slaughtered by the Muslim forces, although they were retreating and were not able to offer resistance. According to information provided by the then command of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about 160 members of the JNA were killed on that occasion. There was bestial behaviour. Soldiers were set alight like torches. Even wounded men were liquidated.

Q. And this was the 4th of May decision. The army was pulling out, the part that was from Serbia and Montenegro, but when was the army of ⁴⁸¹³⁵ Republika Srpska formed?

A. The army of Republika Srpska was formed on the 15th of May, 1992, or exactly one month after the BH army was established.

Q. And the Muslim army, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when did you say that was established?

A. On the 15th of April.

Q. So a month after that army was formed, the Republika Srpska army was established; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So there was one army formed, the other army formed a month later. What about the members of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did they join up with the newly formed armies?

A. Well, they did for the most part. The officers and the soldiers and the men, they all joined one or the other army. For example, Mr. Ratko Mladic was a Serb from Bosnia, and he joined the Serbian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and was appointed commander, that is to say the army of Republika Srpska.

Others, for example, other generals and high-ranking officers who were also in the Yugoslav People's Army joined up with the Muslim army or, rather, the Bosnian and Croatian coalition, or the Muslim army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

And Sefer Halilovic is an example. If I'm not mistaken, I think he was even the army's commander. Sefer Halilovic, Rasim Delic, Jovo Divjak, for example, who was a Serb ethnically but he joined the Bosnia-Herzegovina army. So these were all officers who had previously ⁴⁸¹³⁶ been officers in the Yugoslav People's Army and later up took up the top posts in one or the other army.

Even in the 3rd Army, for example, and the example is that Nojko Marinovic was a high-ranking officer of the Yugoslav People's Army. Later on he came to be the commander of the Defence of Dubrovnik, just to quote another example.

Q. With that proviso and difference that Mladic was from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sefer Halilovic was commander of the Muslim army but he was from Serbia.

We're not going to dwell on Alija Izetbegovic now, but just tell us one thing: Were there any consequences? Did this produce any consequences to which the Presidency reacted, apart from what you have described to us, that is to say the massacre of the military column in Dobrovoljacka Street and so on. Did that produce any consequences?

A. Well, it did produce fairly significant consequences with regard to the cadres' status. The Presidency assessed that the way in which the agreement was realised, the agreement to pull out the command of the JNA from Sarajevo and to cut across the column in Dobrovoljacka Street and the casualties that ensued, along with the fact that Alija was nonetheless released and he left without an agreement being reached and without the Marshal Tito barracks being deblocked, where we had cadets living, we in the Presidency at the time considered that this was a move, without entering into the details and anybody who was to blame or the mistakes that were made, we considered that this upset the image and -- of the high-ranking officer cadre, and the Presidency made the decision that ⁴⁸¹³⁷ General Kukanjac should be replaced from his duties. And during the entire operation, General Blagoje Adzic was informed of the situation and kept abreast of it, and he was rather uncritical and supported General Kukanjac and tendered his own resignation, which we accepted, so that Blagoje Adzic stepped down too. He tendered his resignation and to all intents and purposes was pensioned off at the beginning of May. It was the 7th or 8th of May, perhaps.

Q. And what do you know about the involvement of the armed forces of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, before that time and during those months? What was their involvement?

A. Well, I've already said that the basic intention of the Croatian leadership was to transfer the flames of war to its neighbouring territory; Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, to have the conflict spill over. Its attempts to have it spill over into Serbia and Montenegro did not succeed but very soon the flames of war spread to Bosnia engulfed Bosnia. It was easier for them to do that because Western Herzegovina was populated exclusively by Croat inhabitants almost, and before Bosnia was recognised as an independent and sovereign state, for a long time people lived under conditions that prevailed the same as prevailed in Croatia: They had Croatian money circulating, they had Croatian signs and emblems put up. And in Posavina to the north of Bosnia, where the population was also predominantly ethnic Croats, the Croatian leadership succeeded in extending the flames of war to that area and to involve and engage its army in Bosnia as well. And we had to intervene as the Presidency because we knew that at the time on the ⁴⁸¹³⁸ territory of Bosnia there were about 40.000 Croatian soldiers, members of the Croatian army. So not Croats from Bosnia but members of the Croatian armed forces from the territory of Croatia proper.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, Professor Kostic, in paragraph 79 of the Bosnian indictment, it says: "On the 15th of May, 1992 the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution number 752 demanded that all interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subjected to the authority of the government of the Republic, or be disbanded and disarmed."

Is that what Resolution 752 called for?

A. That is only part of what Resolution 752 called for. What you've just quoted to us omits stating that in that same Resolution the same request and conclusion was made and referred to members of the Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the need for their withdrawal from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the members of various paramilitary units. And another thing that was omitted was to emphasise that in the preamble to the Resolution it was stated that the Presidency of the SFRY or, rather, the FRY had already taken the decision to withdraw the JNA units from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. And this is what it says: Resolution 752 states the following: "Having considered [In English] the announcement in Belgrade the 4th of May, 1992, described in report of Secretary-General 12th of May concerning the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army personnel from republics other than Serbia and Montenegro and the renunciation of authority over those ⁴⁸¹³⁹ who remain."

[Interpretation] And then point 3, paragraph 3 with regard to what you say, which is not contained in paragraph 79 of the indictment because it just refers to the JNA to leave and it had already decided to leave and was leaving: "[In English] Also demands that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, including by units of the Yugoslav People's Army as well as elements of the Croatian army, cease immediately ..."

[Interpretation] Point 4: "[In English] Demands also that those units of the Yugoslav People's Army and elements of Croatian army now in Bosnia-Herzegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. So what is the point that you wish the witness to make about the differences between that paragraph in the indictment and Resolution 752?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. At that time, had a decision already been taken -- well, the JNA was pulling out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but did anybody take the decision that the Croatian army should enter or leave Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. No.

Q. Tell us, please, what is the sense of sending in mid-June 1992 by the Presidency of the SFRY a memorandum to General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali on the involvement of Croatia, Croatian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina? The memorandum is to be found in tab 56 otherwise. It is in Serbian, which was published -- the text was published in its integrity by ⁴⁸¹⁴⁰ the mass media or, rather, the daily press. It is Wednesday, the 17th of June, 1992, and the translation is there. It is a memorandum by the Yugoslav Presidency on the involvement of Croatia in BH.

A. Well, the memorandum was sent out by the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The contents of that memorandum in full corresponds to a report by the UN Secretary-General, and of course although to all intents and purposes the process of the JNA's withdrawal was being completed from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 27th of April we had already constituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and we were highly interested in seeing that in our environment, immediate environment, which meant in Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, that a peace be established and a peaceful settlement to the crisis found. At the time, we appraised the situation and thought that no peaceful solution could be found and a political settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be found if on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as an internationally already recognised state which had already become a member of the United Nations, if on the territory of that state there were 40.000 soldiers belonging to another independent state, and in this particular instance the Croatian army in Croatian state. So we considered that it would be in order to have all the armies pull out. Not only the JNA but also the Croatian army withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina and only when that had been done were conditions ripe to have the three ethnic groups find a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right. Fine. We're not going to dwell on that, but what are ⁴⁸¹⁴¹ the main issues raised in the memorandum? The military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What else?

A. Let me just find the text of the memorandum.

Q. It's in tab 56.

A. Yes, I've found it. Well, another issue was -- actually, we have Croatia's military engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the arming of the Croatian and Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although at that time there was an embargo in full force with respect to armaments, and that was one that was brought in by the international community, and it held true for the whole of Yugoslavia, and I think that some prominent international leaders took note of that as well as the UN Secretary-General. They said that independently of the embargo, there was still weapons imports going on unimpeded, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia.

Q. All right.

A. Then the memorandum also addresses the issue of military and police training and the infiltration of sabotage terrorist groups and also the civilian suffering and civilian victims.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Was there any reply from the Secretary-General to this memorandum?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. As far as I recall, no, there was not. And I have to say that we wrote to them several times. But we weren't used to getting answers from them, responses to our letters.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just before we move on, perhaps we'll find a part of the answer -- ⁴⁸¹⁴² not to the letter but an answer to the situation as such in a report by Boutros-Ghali dated the 30th of May, 1992, but before we go on to that, take a look at page 2 of this edition of the Politika newspaper and tell us whether it lists in great detail the Croatian military formations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You have eight -- the 108th, 120 --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down and give us a reference. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreter is asking you to speak more slowly and to provide a reference.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am reading from tab 56. It is a -- the document is the memorandum of the Presidency of Yugoslavia on Croatian engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is paragraph 4.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It is the second column on page 2. Will you read it. "A. North-east Bosnia --"

A. "A. North-east Bosnia, five to six brigades of the Croatian army there: The 108th, 124th, 103rd and 139th Brigade, and parts of the 101st, 109th and 131st Brigade, making a total of 10 to 20.000 men. "B. Western Herzegovina and the Neretva River valley, ten brigades there: The 4th, the 115th, the 126th, the 142nd, the 155th and the 156th, the 119th, the 114th, 110th, and 116th Brigade of the Croatian army, totalling about 20.000 men." As I said, totalling about 20.000 men. "C. Sector Livno, Duvno and Sujica, three brigades of the Croatian army: The 106th, 109th, and parts of the 115th Brigades of the Croatian ⁴⁸¹⁴³ army, and the 1st and 4th ZNG - Croatian National Guards - Brigades, a total of 5 to 7.000 men.

"D. Territory of Eastern Herzegovina, three brigades of the Croatian army: 113th, 114th, and 158th Brigade of the Croatian army, and the Plavi Grom and Pustinjska Lisica armoured units. Part of these forces is engaged in the wide area of Dubrovnik. The carrying out of these forces' offensives is in progress, a component of which is the artillery shelling of Trebinje and Nevesinje."

Q. All right, Trebinje and Nevesinje, what was the composition, ethnic composition there?

A. Mostly Serbian inhabitants. They are towns in Herzegovina predominantly populated by Serbs.

Q. Did we see prior reference to members of these units who were taken prisoner, to they were as well as a number of other details about individuals taken captive from various brigades?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, we will look at this report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the 30th of May, 1992. Are you familiar with the contents of that report?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the basic elements of that report those that coincide with what you in the Presidency knew?

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's tab 83, Security Council Resolution 752.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁸¹⁴⁴

Q. So it's the 30th of May. And I will only ask you whether the basic elements of that report coincide with what you knew as vice-president of the Federal Presidency.

A. What is stated in the report made by Secretary-General of the United Nations not only coincided with our knowledge but coincided to a great extent with what we stated in our memorandum.

Q. I will only quote a few points and you will tell me whether they coincide. Paragraph 5: "The bulk of the JNA personnel [In English] who were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina where citizens of that Republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authorities decision of 4th of May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of them appear to have joined the army of so-called 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the Presidency of that Republic. Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there."

[Interpretation] Is that the same description as what you have just stated about the course of events during the retreat and everything that was happening at that time?

A. It's the same description, and it's what I said to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in Skopje as to what they will be faced with during the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't seem to say anything about units of the Croatian army, or does that come later?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In point 10, Mr. Bonomy: "[In ⁴⁸¹⁴⁵ English] As regards the withdrawal of the elements of the Croatian army now in Bosnia, information currently available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel, in uniform, operating within, and as a part of, military formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it goes on to say that Croatian authorities consistently take the position that Croatian soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina have left the Croatian army and are not subject to their authority, but it says: "International observers do not, however, doubt [In English] that portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina are under control of Croatian military units, whether belonging to the local Territorial Defence, to paramilitary group, or to the Croatian army." [Interpretation] So it is stated here. Now, in point 8, it is stated: "Uncertainty about who exercises political control over the Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina has further complicated the situation. [In English] The Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency had initially been reluctant to engage in talks on these and other issues with the leadership of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina' and insisted upon direct talks with Belgrade authorities instead." [Interpretation] Those Belgrade authorities mean you and Izetbegovic talking on the 26th of April, and we saw the result. "Senior JNA representative ... General Nedeljko Boskovic, has conducted discussions ... but it has become clear that his word is not binding on the commander of the army of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia ⁴⁸¹⁴⁶ and Herzegovina,' General Mladic. [In English] Indeed, as indicated in paragraph 6(b) above, Serb irregulars attacked a JNA convoy withdrawing from barracks at Sarajevo on 28 May under arrangement negotiation by General Boskovic. It also appears that the heavy shelling of Sarajevo on the night of 28/29 May took place on the orders of General Mladic in direct contravention of instructions issued by General Boskovic and the JNA leadership in Belgrade."

[Interpretation] Are you aware about this point that withdrawing convoys were being stopped?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. They not only stopped the convoys, but I have to say they made it difficult for us to negotiate with the Muslim side the lifting of the siege from army barracks. The army of the Muslim Federation had been already established, very massively equipped, whereas the Territorial Defence of the Serb side did not have enough weaponry, and it was in their interest. They were anxious to take over the weaponry of the withdrawing JNA. And they even made it difficult to start the process of lifting the siege from the barracks, making it a condition that officers and personnel should withdraw but to leave their weapons behind. This was typical not only of Serbs but also Croats and Muslims. Everywhere where the JNA was withdrawing, people would put up roadblocks, come out en masse into the street to stop JNA convoys from withdrawing. And the JNA if it wanted to pull out its weapons as well, they had to roll over those people in tanks. And as I said, General Nedeljko Boskovic ⁴⁸¹⁴⁷ visited Sarajevo, and he reported to me in my office, saying that he was going to try to liberate the barracks that held those 300 cadets captive.

Q. Now let us just look at one last thing, item 9 of the report of the UN Secretary-General. "Given the doubts that now exist about the ability of the authorities in Belgrade [In English] to influence General Mladic, who has left JNA, efforts have been made by UNPROFOR to appeal to him directly as well as through the political leadership of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' As result of these efforts, General Mladic agreed on 30 May to stop the bombardment of Sarajevo. While it is my hope that the shelling of the city will not be resumed, it is also clear that the emergence of General Mladic and the forces under his command as independent actors apparently beyond the control of JNA greatly complicates the issues raised in paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 752. President Izetbegovic has recently indicated to senior UNPROFOR officers at Sarajevo his willingness to deal with General Mladic but not with the political leadership of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'"

[Interpretation] Do you know anything about this and about Izetbegovic's position that he should independently negotiate with Mladic, that he did not accept a talk with Radovan Karadzic who was at that time the president of what was then called the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise his rejection of political contacts?

A. I really don't know, so I can't say.

Q. What we read in the report by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the 30th of May, is that approximately the same thing ⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ that you knew in the Presidency?

A. Yes. And in my view it's an objective assessment of the situation in Bosnia. That's one.

And second, later on, when I had already retired from the Presidency, various solutions were sought for the situation for Bosnia in Belgrade whereas that should have been done in Sarajevo. Instead of -- in fact, I -- I already said we have -- we had pulled out all the JNA on the 19th of May, and we publicly stated that we have no longer any responsibility or any powers over the remaining armed forces in Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, did you not refer to this report in the Prosecution's case?

JUDGE KWON: No, it's --

JUDGE ROBINSON: This one? I remember a report you referred to.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. This report was admitted as D91.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was now trying to establish the relationship between what the Presidency wrote in their memorandum and what Mr. Kostic discussed with Mr. Izetbegovic, and I compared all of that to what the Secretary-General chose to put in his report.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And you consider this to be an important part of your case relating to the question of your responsibility, individual responsibility.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, you were telling me yesterday that I should go into specific details, and you see that Mr. Kostic, even while he occupied his post at the top of the whole SFRY, ⁴⁸¹⁴⁹ didn't know anything about those details. So how could I, who was only President of Serbia, know about these details, apart from conducting an investigation on the scale that the people on the opposite side are carrying out?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No doubt we will have some assurance as to the significance of this report in the final briefs.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In paragraph 7, it says that the joint criminal enterprise existed from the 1st of August, 1991, until the 31st December, 1995, and I am now going to ask you -- in fact, paragraph 47 says the entire time to which this indictment refers there was a state of international armed conflict and partial occupation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When was the independence of Bosnia proclaimed? When was it recognised by some countries of the European Union? When did the referendum of the Bosnian people take place?

A. I believe the referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina took place on the 29th of February, 1992. I think. The independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed and simultaneously recognised on the 6th of April, 1992.

Q. The 6th of April is the anniversary of the bombing of Belgrade by Hitler in 1941.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you as a participant in this joint criminal enterprise, how do you view the allegation that there was an international armed conflict and partial occupation in Bosnia for all of eight months prior to the proclamation of Bosnian independence and prior to the outbreak of the war ⁴⁸¹⁵⁰ in that republic? Maybe you as participant in this joint criminal enterprise can see it more clearly than a regular observer.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I think the question that was just asked, that's a question to answer for the Judges in their findings.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I was going to say, tell the witness: Confine your answer to issues of fact that will assist the Chamber in determining the question of an international armed conflict. You're not to pass judgement on that yourself, but you can provide information which is relevant to that question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm not a lawyer, after all, and I don't feel called upon, even if the Court allowed me to make such assessments, but from all that we have discussed so far regarding the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I can only recall all the talks and all the agreements we had reached regarding the status of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, our talks with Mr. Izetbegovic concerning the withdrawal of JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fact that after the 19th of May we didn't have a single soldier left there. What remained were three armies, three peoples, each led by their own leadership and despite all the attempts to find a peaceful solution, a fierce war started raging. That's one part of the answer.

Second, I really cannot explain, but the authors of the indictment might be able to, how come that this large number of participants in the joint criminal enterprise from August 1991 until 1995 is possible if we recall that Mr. Veljko Kadijevic, who is also mentioned, resigned on the 8th of January, 1992, and went straight to be hospitalised. On the 8th of ⁴⁸¹⁵¹ May, 1992, Blagoje Adzic submitted his resignation. I as vice-president of the Federal Presidency handed over my duties to the first elected president of Yugoslavia on the 15th of June and I completely retired from political life.

Those are just some details that I would like to recall, and maybe the Prosecution can explain our participation in the JCE and what it consists of.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, here is what it consists of: You are not on trial here, nor is Kadijevic. It says here in paragraph 28: "Generals Blagoje Adzic and --"

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters missed it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "Generals Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, who directed and supervised the JNA forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were in constant communication and consultation with the accused." Now, I want to ask you: Did Kadijevic and Adzic lead the forces in Bosnia and did they supervise them when the war broke out?

A. Veljko Kadijevic couldn't have.

Q. Very well.

A. Veljko Kadijevic couldn't have been in charge of the forces in Bosnia.

Q. So is this evident, the person who consulted me was retired when the war broke out in Bosnia. Did I participate in this and issue instructions to someone who was retired, a pensioner? ⁴⁸¹⁵²

A. Well, there is a lot of nonsense being reiterated here again and again. We've already seen it in the Croatia indictment. So I see no reason to go into it yet again. All the more so as it is evident here that with regard to events in Bosnia, some of these highest-ranking people from the JNA had already retired or resigned.

Q. But here they are mentioned as a link to me. So according to what is stated here, I was supposed to have influenced -- influenced this, that is the situation in Bosnia, through pensioners such as Kadijevic and Adzic. We're talking about issues of fact here, not law.

A. I cannot assert whether you ever had any communication with Kadijevic and Adzic, but if we take into account the statement made by General Vasiljevic, who knew about all these links better than I did and who stated as a Prosecution witness that you could not influence General Kadijevic even while he was active and while he was the federal secretary of defence, so how could you have influenced him after he retired and after he was admitted to hospital? I myself visited him in hospital, so how could you have influenced the events in Bosnia through him I don't know.

Q. Very well. I won't dwell any longer on this. Have you read the Bosnia indictment?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Have you established to what extent it corresponds to the Croatia indictment?

A. It's almost cut and paste.

Q. Did you find a single statement here that might be linked to any ⁴⁸¹⁵³ activities of the President of Serbia - that is, me - anything that indicates a connection between the leadership of Serbia and my activities and these events?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the question is far too wide. I'm not allowing it. I told you to ask questions that were focussed and specific.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll put a specific question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What do you know about my activities regarding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that's just as wide. We'll get a one-hour lecture from the professor. You have to be -- you have to be -- don't answer that. Don't answer that question. Mr. Milosevic is to be more focused in his questions, and he knows that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Which of my activities linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina are you aware of?

A. During the period I was in the Presidency, that is until the 15th of June, what you did was to use your political authority to advocate a peaceful solution and the acceptance of the Cutileiro Plan.

Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have completed my examination-in-chief, Mr. Robinson, even before I had planned it, in order not to go through the same charges that are found in the Bosnia as well as ⁴⁸¹⁵⁴ in the Croatia indictment.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. Just one administrative question, more or less, about the tabs that we talked about. I assume they will all be admitted, however, I would have an objection against admitting this video clip, this second one with this huge military whatever one would call it, because we don't have no reference to the date or the purpose on what we are really seeing.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will admit the other documents but not the video clip.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just the second video clip. The statement by the Reis-Ul-Ulema, who says it's God's order that jihad be waged, will you exhibit that?

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will exhibit that one.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do you understand, then, that what he says has to do with the Mujahedin Brigade being reviewed by Izetbegovic?

JUDGE ROBINSON: But nobody could see anything on that clip, Mr. Milosevic. It wasn't -- it wasn't intelligible.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And there was no translation, at that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We couldn't make any sense of it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's mostly shouting in the Arabic language of a religious nature, a militant religious nature. ⁴⁸¹⁵⁵

JUDGE ROBINSON: But how are we to know that? You are not giving evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will have the tape examined and then I will tender it once again. Very well. Thank you. I thought you could distinguish between the Arabic language and other languages, Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE KWON: No, no. The witness was not able to see it, and we skipped that part.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't know that the witness's monitor wasn't working. That's not something I can control.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

Q. Mr. Kostic, during your testimony, you commented on several pages, paragraphs of the Croatia indictment. You know it well; right?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that it deals with crimes committed between the 1st of August, 1991, until June 1992; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So -- so, Mr. Kostic, you know that the population figures that you gave us here comparing the data from 1991 with the data of 2001 do not assist this Court. It cannot assist this Court. You know that; right?

A. I don't know that. How can they not be of assistance? The information I provided about the population figures can certainly be of assistance to the Court. We can view the information differently, but --

Q. Mr. Kostic, what this information includes are actually the ⁴⁸¹⁵⁶ results of the Operation Storm and the Operation Flash, these Croat offensives, and this is what really brought about this big discrepancy in relation to the Serb population. That's a fact, is it not? And that's 1995.

A. Throughout my testimony we spoke about the atmosphere that prevailed on the territory of Croatia from the very first day. I'm referring to the areas with the majority Serb population. And it seems to me that we have very successfully explained how the beginning of armed conflicts came about on Croatian territory.

Q. Let me stop you. Let me stop you here, Mr. Kostic. Mr. Kostic, these figures that you gave to the Judges include the changes in population in 1995, do they?

A. They include all the changes from 1991 to 2001. All the changes. That's the final result of everything that happened in Croatia.

Q. Mr. Kostic, you are aware, and you have commented on this, that you are in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the Croatia indictment mentioned as a member of the joint criminal enterprise and you are considered to be responsible for the crimes charged in Croatia and also partly in Bosnia. You are aware of this, are you?

A. I never said that, that I feel responsible for any crimes. I expect you to tell me today what crimes those might be for which I might be held responsible, but I said I never felt responsible for any crime.

Q. That was not my question. I would really ask you to listen to what I'm asking. I asked you that you in this indictment are mentioned to be responsible for these crimes as a member of the joint criminal ⁴⁸¹⁵⁷ enterprise. That's what you yourself said.

A. I only ask to be allowed to establish the difference between what you said now and your first question. I never for a moment stated that I felt responsible or guilty of the crimes mentioned in the indictment. I did say, however, that in that period I was vice-president of the Presidency of the SFRY, and I also said during my testimony that all decisions that we as the Presidency of the SFRY issued, both in our full and in our reduced composition, were aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the political crisis and not towards war. If you insist on this --

Q. Mr. Kostic, let's stop here. It seems that you don't want to understand my question.

Given the actions of the JNA, Mr. Milosevic himself said something, and I quote now from transcript 47771 of the 1st of February, this -- at the beginning of the cross -- of the examination-in-chief: "All these events that are mentioned here in the indictment were taking place up until mid-1992. And here we have a witness who was the vice-president of the Presidency, which was the Supreme Commander of that army which had allegedly committed certain things. So that absolutely does not mean that the crimes happened there, the ones mentioned in the indictment. But it does show who had competency and power and authority at that time ..."

To put it simple, Mr. Kostic, Mr. Milosevic is basically saying if the JNA committed crimes, it's not his responsibility but yours, Mr. Kostic, isn't it?

A. At the time that we discussed, I was the vice-president of the ⁴⁸¹⁵⁸ Presidency, which was the Supreme Command. As the Supreme Command, we had authority over the JNA.

Q. And you would be the one responsible, then, for the crimes charged?

A. If there were such crimes, then I might be held responsible for them, but I neither mentioned those crimes nor did I accept any claim from the indictment that the JNA committed such crimes.

Q. Mr. Kostic, you know the place Sarvas?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, I would like to refer you to the atlas. It's Exhibit 336, and we perhaps can put it on the ELMO.

JUDGE KWON: Page number?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's page 23, Your Honours.

Q. Witness, you know the place Sarvas?

A. I have never been there but I have heard the name of that place from that period.

Q. It's south or -- let's say it's south of Osijek.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours --

Q. Did you find it, Witness? Do you see it here? It's south-east from Osijek, it's close to Aljmas, Erdut, Dalj, in Eastern Slavonia; right?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that in Dalj and Sarvas clashes occurred; right?

A. Yes.

Q. We actually dealt with an exhibit, a Defence exhibit. It's Defence Exhibit 333, tab 26, from the 8th of August, 1991, where there was ⁴⁸¹⁵⁹ a Presidency session dealing with this; right? It mentions that there should be a commission for monitoring cease-fire and that they should have -- they should inquire on what happened in Sarvas and Dalj, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the 13th of August, the Presidency dealt again with this issue of what happened in Dalj, Sarvas, and Lovinac. Do you remember that?

A. I know that we dealt with that. I don't recall every detail, but I do know we dealt with it, yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's actually Exhibit 330, tab 11. It's the draft minutes of this Presidency session of 13 of August.

Q. And I don't think I need to put it to you, Mr. Kostic, because you know about it, and I only want to relate to one point, because it says in this --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff has to show the witness the document. He cannot remember something that happened 15 years ago and just be told, "You know about this." He has to be able to see the document in order to answer the question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We didn't have draft minutes in the Presidency. We only had minutes. What kind of draft minutes are you talking about?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can it be shown to the witness.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I just wanted to make it ⁴⁸¹⁶⁰ short because the witness remembered this issue.

Q. Would you please have a look at the second page --

A. Can I see the document?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have a copy for the accused?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be passed to him.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. It's the 133rd session of the Presidency of 13 August 1991, and in the first -- in the preamble, more to speak, above the agenda, it says that you were present as well.

Under point 1 -- if you look at the next page, there is point 1, and at the end of point 1, it says the following: "The SFRY Presidency decided to ask the Federal Executive Council to form a mixed expert commission for investigating the facts regarding the events in the villages of Dalj, Sarvas, and Lovinac in Croatia and then inform the public." Do you remember that?

A. I don't really recall the details, but as we see here, it was agreed that Vasil Tupurkovski and Bogic Bogicevic should have talks with the leadership of Slovenia. I remember that.

Q. But I'm asking you about the commission that were supposed to look into the events in Dalj, Sarvas, and Lovinac. Do you recall that now when you read it?

A. I really don't recall about this particular commission. What I can say is that we formed such commissions more than once. There was another commission, a state commission of which I was the chairman when ⁴⁸¹⁶¹ Mr. Mesic walked out of the session because I was elected chairman of that state commission. As for this commission here, I really don't recall it.

Q. Witness, do you remember that there were clashes in Dalj, Sarvas, and Lovinac?

A. Yes. Not just there, in many other places too, but there also, yes.

Q. We actually heard witnesses -- witness evidence on the events in these three places, and I would like to quote from a witness statement of a protected witness.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's C57 and Exhibit 607, tab 1. As this is an exhibit under seal, I would rather not give it to the witness but simply read from it the part that were -- are not under seal. Is that something we could agree upon?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let us proceed that way.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. This witness, Mr. Kostic, speaks about -- in paragraph 29 of his witness statement, speaks about capturing Aljmas and the destruction of the Catholic church in Aljmas, and I cannot read to you the full paragraph because I can only read from the public version. It says: "In early September --" and then there is something I cannot talk about. He speaks about the unit that was tasked with attacking Sarvas. That's what the witness mentioned in paragraph 29.

He also mentioned attacks on Aljmas. He says in paragraph 30: "Aljmas was completely deserted save for a dozen elderly people and a few married couples." ⁴⁸¹⁶² In paragraph 31 this witness speaks about the church of Aljmas being mined by Arkan's volunteers.

And then he speaks about the capturing of Sarvas. In paragraph 34, he says: "I saw that the village was completely deserted and heavily damaged by tanks and artillery fire. I had assumed this would be the case because fire had been opened at the village from tanks throughout the day."

And finally, in paragraph 88, the witness told us that: "In spring of 1992, Serbs from Western Slavonia started settling in the area where I was located. They moved into Croatian houses in Aljmas and Sarvas and also in Erdut, and at the same time the names of the villages were changed and new Cyrillic signs were put up at the entrances to the villages. So Aljmas was renamed Papuk Dolina, and Sarvas became Jelenovo." Do you remember that?

A. Please, don't make me laugh. Do I remember Aljmas and Dalj and Sarvas, in the way you're putting your question. Why didn't you investigate who it was that fired the shots and destroyed the Catholic church? How would I know about these details you're asking me about?

Q. Mr. Kostic, stop. I just asked you a simple question, do you remember Sarvas, because I felt you should because you wrote about Sarvas in your book, didn't you?

A. Yes, I did. I'll tell you what I wrote about Sarvas. You don't have to ask me about it, I can tell you verbatim what I wrote about it right now.

Q. Yes, please. Please. ⁴⁸¹⁶³

A. In my book, I wrote about Sarvas. You see, we had concluded cease-fires so many times, and throughout my testimony I kept affirming that every cease-fire was always violated by Croatian paramilitary formations. I often had occasion, and I mentioned this in my book, through television and radio --

Q. Mr. Kostic --

A. Let me answer.

Q. Mr. Kostic, I'll let you answer to my question and the question related to Sarvas. You do not need to repeat all the things that you said in the examination-in-chief. Just concentrate on what your book said on Sarvas, if you remember. Otherwise, I'll put it in front of you. I have it here.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Do as the Prosecutor has intimated. Otherwise, we can just have the book placed on the ELMO. Why don't you do that, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You're right, Your Honour. I think it's easier to put it on the ELMO. It's --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry, it's time for the break, so we'll get back to that in 20 minutes. We are adjourned.

--- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before we discover what the witness wrote about Sarvas, let me just clarify the exhibits. We have admitted tabs 32, 5, and 56. Tabs 84, 62, 81 and 83, which were also dealt with by the accused, had already been admitted as exhibits and therefore will not be ⁴⁸¹⁶⁴ readmitted.

Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't hear you mention tab 5. That was the audio recording of the Izetbegovic meeting, Izetbegovic-Kostic meeting.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's on the transcript. Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

Q. Mr. Kostic, we -- you have now an excerpt from your book, "1991 Not To Be Forgotten" in front of you, page 101. I think everybody has now also the translation, and it says here on this page, it says here: "I first met with General Zivota Panic, 1st Army Commander, and a group of his associates, when opening the Agricultural Fair in Novi Sad on 4 September 1991. Radio and television were reporting daily on Croatian paramilitaries from Sarvas threatening members of the JNA who were placed as a buffer zone to prevent international conflicts. On that occasion, I asked them, 'Is that Sarvas so well fortified that you couldn't take it and chase away those who are threatening you daily?' And they replied that they could mop that up in a single afternoon but that they should not because of a cease-fire that had been signed and because of a strict order of the General Staff to observe the cease-fire. 'If I were you, I told them, I would tolerate the enemy breaching the cease-fire once, even twice or three times, but after that I would silence them, and I would not wait ⁴⁸¹⁶⁵ for authorisation if the lives of our soldiers were threatened.' "On the following week, the Croatian paramilitaries were chased away from Sarvas, but I never found out if our conversation had influenced them taking that action ..."

Do you remember that conversation with General Panic?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the witness. Could the witness repeat his answer, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please repeat your answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember that well. The photocopy of the text is precisely as it is written in my book.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the Prosecution would like to tender this section of the book. I don't know how to do it. The book -- the book has already -- it's tab 72, but just the parts that Mr. Milosevic had provided. I wonder whether we should keep it as tab 72 or whether it should be now a Prosecution exhibit number.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Part of tab 72, yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you.

Q. So, Mr. Kostic --

JUDGE BONOMY: Before you -- before you move on, my tab 72 has nothing in it. Are you saying we already have parts of this book?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: My understanding is that only those parts that were translated here in -- here in the courtroom are admitted.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Mr. Kostic, as you have -- as this book shows, you were fully ⁴⁸¹⁶⁶ aware of the events in that region Sarvas, and as a member of the Presidency you actually should; right?

A. No, I didn't know what was going on in Sarvas. Had I known, I would not have asked General Panic What's going on in Sarvas? And do you allow paramilitaries illegal, irregular members of the Croatian army to jeopardise the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, the only constitutional armed forces. Had I had the details about Sarvas, I wouldn't have asked General Panic that.

And everything we've read out here deserves additional comment in the following sense: That if a truce had been agreed and one of the parties fails to respect that truce, the agreement, and violates it once, twice, three times, four times, then in that case the units of the regular army need not wait for anybody's orders to step in in self-defence. They should and can undertake activities to protect their own lives. And one of the things that I have noticed and one of my observations that you could have found in the book that you're quoting from, although I'm not highly trained -- a highly trained military person, I was just a reserve major in the Yugoslav People's Army, nonetheless --

Q. Would you please concentrate on short answers. I asked you whether you were -- according to this, you seemed to be quite informed about the region, and you say no, you weren't. That's actually the answer to my question.

A. Would you allow me to finish my train of thought? It's not proper of you to interrupt my train of thought if you've already asked me a question. ⁴⁸¹⁶⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, she can. She can stop you if you're not answering the question, but all of that is subject to the ultimate control of the Chamber.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. According to your book, it sounds as if you wanted Sarvas to be attacked.

JUDGE BONOMY: I would like to know where you read that from, because the witness told us more than once in his examination-in-chief that he was the one in the leadership that thought the army should be unblocking the various barracks where the -- their colleagues were held, and that seemed to me a perfectly reasonable approach to take. In fact, I think I may have asked a question about it. Now, what is it that you say in here suggests that he wanted to attack civilians?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I didn't -- I didn't say that he wanted to attack civilians. I'm sorry. I just -- I said it sounds as if he wanted Sarvas to be attacked, the place. I didn't say something about civilians.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, where do you read that in here? It seems to be the paramilitaries he wants to be attacked, to be removed from the blockage they were causing.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I read it actually from the sentence: "If I were you, I would remove --" the sentence that I quoted.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But only after they have breached the cease-fire three times, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Okay. I think I move on now. I made my point. But I've just -- my colleagues just told me that when I spoke with ⁴⁸¹⁶⁸ the witness about Defence Exhibit D333, tab 28, that's the session of the Presidency of the 8th of August, 1991. I was just told by my colleagues that it is actually not tendered. Mr. Milosevic did not tender it, but I would -- oh, I'm sorry, tab 26. I misspoke. Tab 26. The Prosecution would like to tender it, and perhaps we put it to the witness as -- yes. We should put it to the witness so that I can ask you one more question in relation to that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. Let the document be passed to the witness.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The witness should have the Cyrillic, and on the ELMO we should have the document.

Q. Mr. Kostic, I would like you to -- to turn to point 4 in this document, where it says: "At 1300 hours today members of the SFRY Presidency commission and three representatives, each of the government of the Republic of Croatia and the Serbian people of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem --"

A. I apologise, but I don't have that. I haven't got the document.

JUDGE KWON: Tab 26.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Tab 26. Yes?

A. Yes, I have it now.

Q. Thank you. I was just quoting from point 4 on this document where there is the reference to the commission, and I was quoting who participated here, and it says here: "... will visit the villages of Dalj and Sarvas to resolve the pressing issues there. A working group formed ⁴⁸¹⁶⁹ by the Federal Executive Council and representatives of Osijek Municipal Assembly will also participate in the work." And in the following paragraph, it says here: "Persons who have been detained according to lists previously submitted to the commission are to be released by 1800 hours today and activities intended to determine the identities of missing persons are to be continued." Mr. Kostic, I read from what is said here that the Presidency commission dealt with the situation and it was actually a clash that involved victims on all sides or detained people on all sides. Is that what happened?

A. From this document, the one you quoted from, all I can see is that an initiative was taken to establish or, rather, to investigate the case, to establish a commission to investigate the case, but I don't remember whether there was a commission report or what its contents were. I can only assume that since we're dealing with the month of August here, that it was the interim period which resulted in the complete blockade of the Presidency, when the Presidency was no longer able to meet. It was at an impasse. So that I don't know whether the working group that was appointed, that was nominated, I can't say anything about that. All I can do is to assume that the commission worked within the commission of the federal government. But I don't remember that we received a report from the commission at the Presidency at all about the results of its work, what the findings were.

Q. But --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic? ⁴⁸¹⁷⁰

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance, perhaps?

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is it you wish to say?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it would probably be clearer if the first paragraph were read out, where you can see who the commission was, the Presidency commission, led by Vasil Tupurkovski and Bogic Bogicevic, and who the members were, then it would be clearer what this was about, because it is about the Presidency working commission, and then we would know what it was all about.

So, first of all we have to establish who and then what.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That can be easily read from the document, and I don't think we need to go into these details. I will come, actually later on, when we discuss crimes, I will come back to this commission. There is no need to dwell on this now any further.

Q. Mr. Kostic, as a member of the Presidency and later even more so in your function as the vice-president of the Rump Presidency or, as you call it, reduced Presidency, you were part of the body that controlled and directed the actions of the JNA; right?

A. Yes. The Presidency was a collective Supreme Command.

Q. When I say "you," I just mean this collective body; I don't mean you only alone.

And throughout your tenure in the Presidency, the JNA acted on your orders?

A. Yes.

Q. And during the -- ⁴⁸¹⁷¹

A. If I might just be allowed to add -- or to explain, rather. The division of competencies between the Presidency of the Supreme Command and the power of the staff of the Supreme Command as a professional organ was precisely determined. So the Presidency --

Q. Yes. You have already addressed this issue. We don't have to repeat this.

During the second day of your testimony, when you discussed Defence Exhibit D333, tab 69, that's Kadijevic's statement of the 6th of July 1991 on peace and not war is in the interest of all, you confirmed with Mr. Milosevic that the army had never done anything on its own initiative, its constitutional powers and the decisions of the relevant federal organs, in particular the Presidency; right?

A. During my testimony, I said that the Yugoslav People's Army was very restrained in its conduct and that it respected the Presidency as being the Supreme Command, but I also reminded you of the division of powers, because the Presidency as the Supreme Command did not have within its competencies and powers, for example, orders -- it wasn't the body that was there to decide how the units of the JNA people's army would be deployed and on what territory and so on. That came under the powers of the General Staff, the professional organ.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, my colleague just reminded me that this -- we wanted this tab 69 to be admitted as ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it. I'm advised that it's tab 26.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's tab 26, yes. ⁴⁸¹⁷²

JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 26, yes. We'll admit tab 26. 69 is already admitted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. Kostic, as you said, you were a part of the Supreme Command of the JNA. That means that you would be to a high degree responsible if this Court would establish that the JNA and its subordinate forces committed crimes in Croatia and until June 1992 in Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, aren't you doing what you advised Mr. Milosevic not to do, asking the -- asking questions that are ultimately matters for the Chamber? It's not for him to say whether he would be legally responsible.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then I have to reformulate this -- this question. I didn't want to make him that -- I didn't want him to make a finding.

Q. Given that situation, you have a very strong interest in the outcome of the trial; right?

A. I am interested in having the real truth established. And you haven't made any great efforts to arrive at the real truth. And I have come here principally to assist the Trial Chamber in establishing the truth and the facts.

Q. Mr. Kostic, I put to you if crimes would be established here, you would -- it would have an impact on you as a person and your own responsibility. So you did not come here to help this Court to come to the truth but, rather, exonerate yourself and Mr. Milosevic.

A. That's not true, not correct. ⁴⁸¹⁷³

Q. You spoke about the events in Plitvice and Pakrac. This Court has heard evidence in relation to what happened in Pakrac. Would you agree with me that the accounts of what happened in Plitvice and Pakrac are quite different, that people describe what happened different from you, in particular, Croatians? Would you agree to that?

A. Well, I couldn't say where the difference lies.

Q. I would like to --

A. All I can say is that as far as all the details are concerned from Sarvas and Pakrac and Plitvice and other places in Croatia which existed as hotbeds of crisis, I really don't know the details of. And you can insist as much you like. You can insist I tell you the details but I don't know about the details so I can't tell you, and that's why I said it, not in any derogatory sense. If I was in the Supreme Command, I still can't know about all the details, and that's why I made a joke and said I expect that in a while you'll accuse Mr. Blair, for example, of everything that happened in London last night, for the killings and thefts and rapes and so on.

Q. Let me stop you here. We are not talking about Mr. Blair. I was just confirming with you that people may have different accounts about what happened in Plitvice and Pakrac, and you wouldn't really be able to tell us because you were not there; right?

A. I was not there. That is right.

Q. But are you aware that in relation to the event in Pakrac, Mr. Jovic ordered the JNA to intervene without having convened a Presidency -- a Presidency session and gotten their decision? Do you know ⁴⁸¹⁷⁴ that?

A. I have to say that I don't know about that, that Mr. Jovic did that. If he did that on his own, the question arises as to whether he needed a Presidency decision or whether he already had a Presidency decision to that effect. If --

Q. Mr. Kostic, let me interrupt you. We don't -- it was a simple question. I asked you whether you know that Mr. Jovic ordered the JNA to intervene without convening a Presidency session and you say -- your answer is you don't know that. That's sufficient.

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know that he did also order the JNA to intervene in relation to the 9th of March, 1991, demonstrations in Belgrade? Do you know that?

A. At the time, I wasn't in the Presidency, but I was informed about that as well, and as far as I know, Mr. Jovic conducted consultations with the Presidency members and got their agreement to engaging the army, as far as I know. Perhaps it wasn't a session in the plenary sense, in the plenary hall, but because the situation was urgent and the danger of civil conflicts in Belgrade, he might have consulted them by phone on the 9th of March, the other members of the Presidency, and received instructions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: At the time of the events in Plitvice and Pakrac were you a member of the Presidency?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in this mass of dates I would have to remind myself of when the Pakrac situation happened. I can't give you a precise answer. ⁴⁸¹⁷⁵

JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you put that --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We're talking about March 1991, and the witness was not in the Presidency. I only asked him whether he knows about these decisions, and at least he knows -- he knew about the later one.

Q. The position of the president of the SFRY Presidency in urgent situation is quite an important one; right? He could start initiative in relation to the JNA; right?

A. No. The function of the president of the Presidency compared to the other members of the Presidency in conditions of imminent threat of war is not different, no different than it is otherwise. What is different is that the Presidency as a collective organ can meet even if it doesn't have a simple or two-thirds majority, and can make decisions within the composition that it had met. But the president of the Presidency has no greater powers and authorisations in conditions of an imminent threat of war than he does in a normal situation as president of the collective organ, whether as head of state -- whether the organ is head of state or the organ is the Supreme Command.

Q. Mr. Kostic, Mr. Borisav Jovic himself told us here when he gave testimony --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, I refer here to Exhibit 596, tab 1, paragraph 60, where Mr. Jovic writes about the events in Pakrac.

Q. Mr. Jovic ordered the JNA to intervene without convening a Presidency session and without actually getting decision by the ⁴⁸¹⁷⁶ Presidency. And my only question is: At times of urgency, the president had a powerful position and could do something; right?

A. Well, I answered that question. To the best of my knowledge, in extraordinary situations the president of the Presidency does not have any greater powers than under normal conditions. Now, what happened in Pakrac at the time, that was not an extraordinary situation, an emergency situation still. An extraordinary or emergency situation is only considered what happened after the 3rd of October 1991.

Q. In your testimony you said that in Plitvice and Pakrac there were regular police stations manned by Serbs and that they were part of the Croatian authorities. And that's actually at transcript reference 47661 of the 25th of January this year. Do you remember that?

A. I don't remember having stated exactly that in Pakrac and Plitvice there were exclusively police forces, but I said that in those areas where there was a predominantly Serb majority population, that police stations did exist as part of the Croatian police, as part of the Croatian police force, and that where there was a predominantly Serb majority, in those police stations there were policemen who were the local population, and that they were predominantly Serbs. I can't answer specifically whether that was in Pakrac or Plitvice and what the situation was like in the police stations there exactly, whether there was a majority of Serb or Croat policemen. I can't say that and I don't think I claimed either one during my testimony earlier on.

Q. You were aware of the events in Knin in August 1999, and you yourself have referred to it as log revolution, and you know -- oh, sorry. ⁴⁸¹⁷⁷ I said 1999. It's 1990. Sorry. I misspoke. In 1990, the log revolution, and you know that Milan Martic and his police did not accept the Croatian authorities and had actually severed his ties with the Croatian MUP; right?

A. I really cannot tell you any details about it, because simply it was 1990 and I was not yet on the Presidency of the SFRY at that time. What I know is that Croatian police units and special units of the MUP of Croatia tried to penetrate the Knin area and other majority Serb areas to take over their police stations and practically disarm the local policemen, who were mostly Serbs.

Q. Mr. Kostic, I had actually asked you at that point in time when this happened, the local police stations had actually severed their ties with the Croatian MUP. You know that, do you?

A. I really don't know whether they severed the ties or not. All I know is that they tried to prevent special Croatian forces and units from arriving. They tried to enter those areas and to take over power. I really don't know who severed ties.

Q. Mr. Kostic, we heard evidence to that effect that Milan Martic, as an example, rejected the new uniforms, the new flags, and the authorities in the MUP in Croatia in 1990 when there was the so-called log revolution. You claim you don't know about that?

A. I don't know whether Milan Martic refused uniforms or not, but what I have mentioned in my earlier evidence, and I can confirm it in front of you now, is that the Serb population in those areas simply rebelled in fear of what might happen to them. So they undertook to ⁴⁸¹⁷⁸ self-organise in those areas and publicly stated they would not recognise Croatian laws and the Croatian constitution that resulted from rejection of Yugoslav laws. They said they would abide by Yugoslav legislation instead. And I can tell you what Mr. Mesic did as president of the Presidency.

Q. Stop here. My question was actually quite simple, and there need not be a long history answer to that.

Mr. Kostic, neither the SFRY constitution nor the Croatian constitution foresaw any parallel self-declared Serb police acting outside of the competencies of the republican police organs; right? There is no legal foundation for forming a separate police force, a Serb police force.

A. But it was not a Serb police force, a separate Serb police force. Croatian authorities, including the Croatian MUP and police, simply became renegade in rejecting the governing Yugoslav laws, and that in its turn caused the Serb population to reject the new Croatian laws. I don't think you should go on interrupting me. I wanted to say that Mr. Mesic constantly called those people in those areas Chetniks, bandits, renegades, and I kept sitting next to him and listening to that.

Q. You may not like it, but you need to answer my questions, and you are not allowed to just tell whatever you like to say. Let me ask you this: You are aware --

A. But I don't have to say things that you want me to say.

Q. You have to answer my question, Mr. Kostic. That's all you are asked to do, nothing else. ⁴⁸¹⁷⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just answer the questions as briefly as possible.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Mr. Kostic, in relation to Plitvice, was someone killed? Do you know that a Croat was actually killed?

A. I don't know such details. I know that every such incident claimed victims, both Serbs and Croats, but I don't know these details.

Q. You testified - and that's at transcript 47617, that's from the 25th of January - that when in March 1991 the military leadership suggested to the federal Presidency to introduce a state of emergency, four members were in favour of it and four were against it. And actually, Mr. Milosevic also followed this up in further questions and also spoke of this four-to-four deadlock situation. Do you remember that you said that?

A. I remember.

Q. Do you allow for the possibility that you made a mistake and that in fact the situation of the vote in the Presidency was actually four to three? Four opposing to introduce a state of emergency and three only in favour of it? Do you allow for that?

A. I would appreciate it if you could refresh my memory a little, because from what I remember, there were four votes against and four votes in favour. After all, that session lasted three days, and every now and then during those three days there were votings of various sorts.

Q. Mr. Borisav Jovic has testified in this case already, and he was a member of the Presidency at that time. Actually, in March 1991, he was its president; right?

A. Yes. Yes. ⁴⁸¹⁸⁰

Q. And he kept a diary during the events which he later, in 1995, published as the book "The Last Days of the SFRY." Do you know that book?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you read it?

A. Not entirely, but some points that relate to the period when I was in the Presidency, I read those passage carefully.

Q. And as he wrote the book, as he told us here, he did not base it on memory but based it on his daily notes and on official minutes and other documents. You are aware of this; right?

A. Well, all I can tell you about that is my impression. I read carefully that book of Mr. Jovic in the part that covers the period when I was in the Presidency and when we worked together. From what I read about that period, I arrived at the conclusion that after all, Mr. Jovic did not really keep a very precise record in the form of a diary. He probably just took notes and dated them later. I'll give you an example. In that book you are quoting from, he writes about the 15th or the 14th of July - I'm not quite certain at this point - saying that the decision to withdraw the JNA from Slovenia was adopted then. However, it is a well-known fact that that decision was passed on the 18th of July. And from that little detail, I inferred that Mr. Jovic did not really keep a tidy diary.

Q. Mr. Kostic, let's return to the book, and let's return what Mr. Jovic wrote in the book in relation to that Presidency session on the 12th of March, 1991, this long session of three days. And I would like to -- ⁴⁸¹⁸¹

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, it's an extract from Exhibit 596, tab 2, Mr. Jovic's book, and it's his entries from the 12th of March, 1991.

Q. And, Mr. Kostic, it is quite a lengthy document, and I would simply draw your attention to a few particular points made here. Now I have the English. On page 2, we have Mr. Kadijevic speaking about the situation, and he says: "First that a decision be adopted immediately imposing a state of knowledge in the entire territory of the SFRY and that all normative laws in conflict with the SFRY constitution and federal laws be suspended.

"Second, that a decision be adopted raising the combat readiness of the armed forces ..."

And a little bit further down, he says: "Third, that the disrupted system of national defence be restored to its constitutional framework ..."

That was the proposal that Mr. Kadijevic put to the Presidency at that time. Is that what you also remember?

A. I did not attend that session because I wasn't on the Presidency then. I really can't talk to you about it. I can't give you any details. I know very well that that session lasted three days; on the 12th, the 14th, and the 15th.

On the first day -- on day one, the proposal made by Veljko Kadijevic to the Presidency could not be accepted. There was a break in the session. And I can talk to you about it because I viewed a film from that session that was broadcast several times, and that's how I know about ⁴⁸¹⁸² these things. Otherwise, not.

Q. Do you know that Mr. Jovic agreed to this proposal?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's on page 257, Your Honours.

Q. Mr. Jovic agreed to the proposal? Yes or no answer.

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Mesic rejected it?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Tupurkovski rejected it?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Bogicevic rejected it?

A. Rejected it, yes.

Q. And Riza Sapundzija rejected it? That's the representative for Kosovo and Metohija.

A. That detail concerning Mr. Riza Sapundzija, I really don't know about it in any precision. I think Mr. Sapundzija had the opportunity to vote twice or three times during that session, but I really don't know the details.

Since we are talking about the first day, the 12th of March, I don't know what his position was. I know that in the course of those three days, in one round of voting, as far as I remember the film, the position of Riza Sapundzija was negative. But it could have been the third day of the session, I don't know.

Q. And I would like to quote something from this text of Mr. Jovic. It's page 258 in the English, and it's actually from Mr. Nenad Bucin. That's the member from Montenegro. You have it? ⁴⁸¹⁸³

A. Yes.

Q. He says: "I do not challenge Veljko's assessment. If I were to undertake any analysis, my conclusion would probably be gloomy. As I take the floor, however, I am thinking about all the previous declarations, our total paralysis and inability - I would even say unwillingness - to arrive at decisions even in much more innocuous situations than this one now. For me, the only possibility remains acknowledging that we as a Presidency are not in a position to lead this country ..." Actually, this is not agreeing to -- he is not agreeing here to imposition of a state of emergency.

A. That's not how I understood Mr. Bucin's position. My personal opinion, although I didn't attend the session but from what I saw in the film --

Q. Before -- wait a minute. Before you come to what you think, let's just move a few pages further on, and that's on page 261 of the English. And it's when you have Mr. Bucin again. If you continue a little bit in the text, you have Mr. Bucin again, and he is proposing the following: "He then proposed that our solution be that we not impose but, rather, that we announce the possibility of imposing emergency measures and that we not raise combat readiness, but rather announce that I was surprised -- announced that."

Mr. Jovic then says, remarks: "I was surprised by his explanation that he has no mandate from his republics for any other decision. He said literally the following: We must announce the possibility of imposing emergency measures and also announce the need to order the highest raised ⁴⁸¹⁸⁴ level of combat readiness. I would not want to cross that line this evening in concrete terms. I do not have a mandate from my republic in that sense."

Q. So as we can see here, Mr. Bucin did not agree to the declaration of a state of emergency because his republic had not allowed him to do so. Do you remember that? You were in Montenegro. Do you remember that, that the republic did not want to accept that proposal?

A. At that time, I was on the delegation of Montenegro to the federal parliament. That's the post I occupied. I must say -- insist on this session very much, and you insist on the positions taken by various individuals at that session, and I didn't attend it. But you seem to interpret it in one way while I interpret it in quite another. Maybe I am wrong in my interpretation, but from what that film of the session that I viewed several times, I believe that Mr. Bucin had throughout occupied a very constructive position, and what you are reading is maybe his attempt during the deliberations to find a constructive solution and take the Presidency out of an impasse.

And I have to say that Bucin was in favour, himself, of accepting the proposal of the General Staff, but because the Presidency seemed to be in a tie and it seemed unable to take the decisions that would make it possible to save Yugoslavia and prevent civil war, Mr. Bucin resigned. I am sorry for taking your time, but I think it was important to be said.

Q. Mr. Kostic, the Montenegrin leadership explicitly ordered Bucin not to accept the proposal. Do you know that? I mean, you are from ⁴⁸¹⁸⁵ Montenegro, and you were a part of it at that time. You know that, do you?

A. I don't know that. But earlier in my evidence, I have also said that the mandate of a member to the Presidency of the SFRY from any republic is not imperative in nature. In other words, nobody from the leadership of Montenegro could have -- may I finish?

Q. No. Mr. Kostic, I simply asked you, you --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just let him finish what he was saying, briefly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as Mr. Bucin is concerned, nobody from the leadership of Montenegro could have given him orders, had the right to give him orders not to accept this proposal of the Supreme Command. Only the Assembly of Montenegro that appointed him to the SFRY Presidency could have given him that instruction. And as far as I know, the Assembly of Montenegro, which is the only one who had those powers, did not give such instructions to Mr. Bucin.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. I would like to continue further in this book of Mr. Jovic. Mr. Jovic actually speaks under his note for the 13th of March, 1991. He refers -- he says the following -- he refers to a meeting with General Kadijevic and Slobodan Milosevic, and it's during this session, ongoing session: "Veljko literally told us in the presence of General Adzic, we are going to stage a military coup regardless of whether or not the proposed decision is adopted. If it is adopted, then it will give us cover for mobilisation only during the first 48 hours, but if it is ⁴⁸¹⁸⁶ rejected, we will conduct mobilisation on our own. In that case, however, there is the danger that the Presidency will meet and depose the military leadership. That is why we need a decision." Then after a question of Mr. Jovic what he means by a military coup, he responded: "Deposing the government and the Presidency. They will not touch the Assembly, but neither will they allow it to convene. They will not touch the republican authorities and all the others if they support the coup, otherwise they will be removed as well." Mr. Kostic, that's actually what he refers to as a military coup and a removal of the republican leaderships that do not support that. That means Serbia and perhaps Montenegro if they change their minds. They remain in power, the others not. That was discussed at that time, was it not?

A. I don't think your conclusion is correct. If a military coup had happened, then it would have implied the toppling and detention or isolation of all members of the Presidency of the SFRY from all republics, including Serbia and Montenegro. No distinctions would have been made. But I cannot be asked to interpret here the opinion of Mr. Jovic or any other member of the Presidency. I can only say that if a military coup had been staged, then it would have affected all bodies of authority in all republics. And I've even said earlier in my testimony - but that's my political assessment - it's possible that a military coup would have been more efficient and quicker in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, like what we saw in Greece, the military junta eventually replaced military rule with democracy eight years later, when problems were resolved. ⁴⁸¹⁸⁷

JUDGE KWON: For the record, could you give the page number.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The page -- sorry.

JUDGE KWON: Veljko Kadijevic's comment.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. It's page 264.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. And just --

JUDGE BONOMY: Before you -- just one other question: Is the suggestion that Mr. Bucin abstained in the vote?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. He did not declare this. And actually --

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. -- what I wanted to put to you, you said it was a four-to-four deadlock, but looking at Mr. Jovic's book, it's actually, and he says it, indeed, he says it on page -- what is the page? In his reference to the 14th of March, 1991, Mr. Jovic actually says it was not a four-to-four, surprisingly for him, but he says, "Riza Sapundzija changed his mind and it was three against five." This is what Mr. Jovic says, and it's book page 264.

And Mr. Kostic, given that Mr. Jovic was the president and actually present during this meeting, says there was no deadlock situation at that point in time, there was actually a firm majority against declaration of emergency.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're putting that to him?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. ⁴⁸¹⁸⁸

Q. That's -- that's how it was, was it not?

A. Well, I left that as an open possibility in what I said earlier, because I said I didn't know what Riza Sapundzija decided and how he voted in every round. I said it was a possibility, and I suppose that Mr. Jovic is correct in what he says, because he was there. He was the president.

JUDGE BONOMY: That would mean, though, that Bucin also voted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He did not -- yeah. He did not support the proposal.

JUDGE KWON: Why don't you read the next sentence. "When we complete the voting and concluded that the decision had not been adopted."

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, Your Honour, I've put my --

JUDGE KWON: Please go on, but it's time to adjourn already.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: At least this is my understanding, that Mr. Bucin was not allowed to vote because he had -- he had this -- this recommendations from his Montenegro president.

JUDGE KWON: Is it not in the middle of negotiation? But we'll come to that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will have to adjourn. We will resume tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 8th day of February, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.