⁴⁸⁷⁷¹

Friday, 24 February 2006

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I understand you wish to say something in the absence of the witness.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson. It has nothing to do with the witness. A few minutes ago, I received your ruling. I see that you made the ruling yesterday refusing my request to go for treatment, medical treatment. I should like to tell you that I consider this a highly unjust decision, because your assertions --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not hearing -- I'm not hearing any comments on that. I'm not receiving any comments on that. If that is what you have to say, we'll call the witness.

Please call the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, but I want it to remain on the record that I demand that the Appeals Chamber ...

[The witness entered court]

WITNESS: JAMES BISSETT [Resumed]

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, proceed with the examination-in-chief.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Examination by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued] ⁴⁸⁷⁷²

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bissett, you mentioned yesterday that your American colleague, Ambassador Zimmerman, had told you that Mr. Baker had told the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, that he would not consider inappropriate any use of the army in Slovenia. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct. The --

Q. Are you aware that the federal government did send the federal police and the federal army into Slovenia?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was this army answerable to; the federal authorities or the authorities of Serbia?

A. They would answer to the federal authorities.

Q. Yesterday, in response to some questions concerning misinformation about the events in Yugoslavia during those years, you made a couple of points. Can you tell us why, from what you know, there was so much inaccurate information and misinformation about what was going on in Yugoslavia during those years?

A. Well, I think, as I said yesterday, right from the very beginning it seemed that the -- the worldwide media took the position that Serbia and the Serbians were responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia and that Croatia and Slovenia had broken away because they were frightened of Serbian plans for a Greater Serbia. That impression seemed to be reinforced when the media interpreted the attempt by the federal army to put down the secession of Slovenia. And as I said, the media did interpret that as the Serbia-dominated federal army attacking poor little Slovenia. ⁴⁸⁷⁷³

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do not cover ground that you've already gone over. Use the time profitably. On three occasions the ambassador has had to say, "As I said yesterday ..." Let's move on to another area.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, you mentioned yesterday the role of Germany. Did you have any information as to the ways in which Germany supported Croatia, and how did you view the positions of Germany in the light of preserving peace and geopolitical relations?

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relevance of that? Is this a history lesson?

Do not answer that. Ask another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not a history lesson. I'm following up on what I received in the form of documents from the side opposite, namely wires sent by Ambassador Bissett.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... that may be relevant, and the position of Germany in the light of preserving peace and geopolitical relations is of no interest to the Chamber.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. Then tell us -- tell me what is of interest to you and what isn't.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, in one of your cables, you say that I told you: "[In English] ... threats by Foreign Minister Genscher to recognise Croatia as example of German's 'heavy-handedness.'" ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁴ [Interpretation] Are you aware of those German threats and the threats made by the German foreign minister at that time?

A. Well, I'm aware that Foreign Minister Genscher had threatened to unilaterally recognise Croatia and Slovenia's independence, and it was common knowledge that Germany was pressuring other members of the European Community to -- to recognise both of the countries that were seceding. That was not a secret. It was quite well known. And Genscher himself wasn't -- did not try to hide that.

Q. And what do you know about the evolution of the position of other countries, especially EU countries, towards --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I will not hear that. No, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me make this perfectly clear: You have spent 15 minutes, and you have not yet asked a question that's related to any of the charges in the indictment. If you continue this way, I will terminate the examination-in-chief. Don't waste the time of the Chamber. Don't waste the ambassador's time either. Bring the witness to evidence that is relevant to the indictment. We have had enough evidence on these background matters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not really background. In the indictment and in all the evidence led by the other side, the leitmotif seems to be that the fear was caused among Serbs in Croatia by propaganda from Belgrade, and I wish to ask Ambassador Bissett, who spent precisely those years in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, about this, because some claim that Serbs used their historical suffering through the centuries in ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁵ order to justify crimes they committed at the end of the 20th century. I want to ask him what he knows about that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But didn't he comment on that yesterday? He commented on that yesterday.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think he did in full, but if you consider that he already commented on that, I will not insist. I suppose that Ambassador Bissett is capable of assessing himself whether his brief comments of yesterday are sufficient or not.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'll allow you to make a brief comment on this.

JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you do, yesterday you said: "The premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Union extended under intense German pressure in Maastricht in 1991, was a guarantee that the break-up of Yugoslavia would not be resolved by peaceful means. Once again, Western intervention had exacerbated and complicated a serious Balkan problem." That's a quotation from what you'd written.

Now, that says it all, as far as I can see. There's nothing else to be explored. Why -- why this happened is irrelevant to this trial. The fact that it may have happened is what's relevant.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, a very brief response.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, I don't think it was just the historical fact of the genocide that had taken place in 1941 that the Serbian population in Croatia were frightened of activities that were taking place after Mr. Tudjman's party won the election. I think there was also ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁶ dismissal of Serbs from the public service of Croatia. There was harassment of Serbs. Many of them lost their flats. By -- even before 1993, I think roughly 300.000 Serbs had left Croatia. So they had reason, I think, to fear, quite apart from history.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, do you know that Serbia's support to the Serbs of Krajina and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was interpreted and is interpreted here as my effort to create a Greater Serbia? Are you aware of that?

A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Q. And what do you know about that? Was there indeed an objective held by me or the leadership of Serbia to create a Greater Serbia, which, according to what we were able to hear in this courtroom, could have been a reason to break up Yugoslavia?

A. My view, the idea that Serbia or yourself had entered into any sort of criminal conspiracy to establish a Greater Serbia is pure fantasy. I think the record speaks for itself that every attempt to negotiate a peace agreement and to stop the fighting and the violence, that you were personally involved in that. There were many initiatives taken by yourself, as well as by the international community, that, without your assistance, would have failed. And this goes right from the first Vance-Owen Plan, the Vance-Stoltenberg Plan, both plans which were subverted not by you or by the Serbian side but by others. And at Dayton itself there is no question that had you not been there, that the Dayton ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁷ agreement would not have been signed, which finally brought peace to the warfare there. So I think the idea that you were attempting to establish a Greater Serbia is pure fantasy.

Q. At the end of paragraph 9 of your telegram that we considered yesterday, you quote my explanation for why -- for what I was advocating, what I was working for as regards the problems of Serbs in Croatia. You wrote in that paragraph: "[In English] He did, however, fully support autonomy for those areas of Croatia where Serbs made up predominant part of population; e.g., Krajina."

What you wrote here, briefly, and we discussed it, namely what I was working for then, was that autonomy in case Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia?

A. I'm sorry, I'm having trouble finding the right telegram here.

JUDGE KWON: Tab 1.

THE WITNESS: Tab 1.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It's in tab 1, Mr. Bissett.

A. Yes. As I -- as I recall it, it was related to the idea that if Croatia secede, that it could probably do so lawfully as long as some absolute guarantees were given to the Serbian population in Krajina and that they would have some form of autonomy and their civil and human rights protected.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Bissett. At the relevant time you were following the events, including my actions and the actions taken by the authorities in Serbia. Did you find any indication that we had territorial ambitions ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁸ against those republics?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Was there any indication to the contrary, indication that we did not have any territorial claims?

A. Well, I think in all of the proposals, the possible peace proposals, there was no suggestion that Serbia would gain territory from the settlements. It seemed to me very clear in all of these negotiations and peace plans that the one concern was the protection of the human rights and civil rights of the Serbian populations in Croatia where they were a majority and had lived for many hundreds of years, and for the Serbs later in Bosnia.

Q. Could you tell us, please, from all I told you in our conversation on the 2nd of September and which is partially reflected in paragraph 10 of your cable, what was it that destroyed the unity of Yugoslavia? You say the advent of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence.

A. Well, I think there's no question of what destroyed Yugoslavia. It was the decision by Croatia and Slovenia to secede from the federation. The unfortunate part of that secession was, as I recall, the federal Yugoslav constitution made provision for secession but only if the constituent nations were agreeable, and that was not the case. It wasn't important in Slovenia, but it was very important in Croatia where the Serbian population, via the constitution, were considered a constituent nation and any break-away or any secession would have had to have been done with their agreement. Therefore, it seems clear to me that both the separation of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia, were illegal and ⁴⁸⁷⁷⁹ against the Yugoslav constitution. The fact that the separation -- the secession in Croatia and Slovenia were both done with violence I consider makes it even worse.

Q. Were you able, even at that time, to see clearly enough the violent nature of secession that you've just mentioned?

A. Well, yes. Even by March of 1991, there had been armed conflict in parts of Croatia. There was fighting that had been -- that was -- had been breaking out in parts of Croatia.

Q. Did you have an opportunity of establishing then what the role played by the Yugoslav People's Army was and what it strove for, faced with the situation of that kind, that is to say in this situation of conflict?

A. Well, the Yugoslav national army was, of course, devoted and dedicated to the preservation of Yugoslavia, and I think it certainly assumed that one of its duties would be to put down armed secession.

Q. Mr. Bissett, with respect to the events of which you were an eyewitness yourself, and according to the Croatia indictment and the Bosnian indictment against me, I, the members of the SFRY Presidency who were opposed to the secession, members of the top military echelons, the Serb leaders in Krajina and Bosnia have been termed as participants in a joint enterprise, criminal enterprise.

Now, at that time when you were there, these strivings to preserve Yugoslavia and -- was it a joint criminal enterprise or was it a constitutional obligation? How did you see things?

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not for the witness to comment on. Those ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁰ are legal issues.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I won't ask the witness any legal questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, you were in Yugoslavia doing your job when the Vance Plan was adopted. Who, from whom, and why were the United Nations peace forces supposed to protect?

A. They were supposed to protect the Serb population in the Serbian areas of Croatia, in the Krajina.

Q. And whose duty was it to protect that population from that same source of jeopardy before the United Nations forces arrived?

A. Well, as I recall, it was the EC monitors, who were there prior to the Vance Plan being implemented, but ...

Q. Do you happen to remember whether there were any difficulties over the adoption of the Vance Plan?

A. Over the Vance Plan, yes, I think there was initial difficulties when, as I recall, we were all very pleased -- that is the diplomatic corps in Belgrade were pleased to know that the plan was going to be adopted because it was the first real effort to stop the bloodshed, but at last minute it seemed that the Croatian -- sorry, the Serbian Prime Minister, Babic, backed off and refused to sign.

Q. And do you remember from those days what my reactions to that were?

A. Well, I remember you were upset that Babic had -- who had first agreed to sign and then changed his mind, I remember you were upset about ⁴⁸⁷⁸¹ that and had an article in the front page of the Politika newspaper condemning Babic. I think as a result of your pressure, Babic finally did sign and the plan went ahead.

Q. Do you have in front of you that article of mine that you mentioned a moment ago? And it is number 2. Not in the tab. It's not tab 2, it's just under number 2.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And, gentlemen, that is Exhibit 352, tab 79, exhibits already tendered into evidence.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I should just like to ask you something with respect to that letter of mine that you mentioned. Do you remember what I wrote?

A. Well, I don't remember what you wrote, but I have it in front of me now, yes.

JUDGE KWON: Could the usher put it on the ELMO. Page 5.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did this letter refer to anybody else except for Babic? And would you look at page 6, towards the very end of the translation, because of course you have the English text before you. That very last portion highlighted in darker letters: "Serbia will not stop helping the people of Krajina ..."

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember -- not in reading this, but do you remember generally whether this letter referred to any other person except Babic, who at that time had refused the plan which he had agreed to beforehand?

A. Not that I recall, no. ⁴⁸⁷⁸²

Q. Now, take a look at the previous paragraph. What does it say there? Would you read it out, please. "It has become obvious ..." That one.

A. "It has become obvious for quite some time that you have been creating an impression among the citizens of Krajina that you make your decisions and take your positions following agreement with the Serbian leadership. Thus, I want the citizens of Krajina to know that this is not true."

Q. Do you know, from those times and from following events, how many such abuses there were, that is to say that something was linked to the leadership of Serbia when it wasn't true, as it was in this case when I have to state publicly that it was not?

A. No, I can't really recall other -- other, as you say, abuses that were linked to your leadership when it wasn't true. If you're -- if you're specifically mentioning that other people were publicly saying that they had discussions with you and you said such-and-such, I can't recall any of those incidents.

Q. Well, that's what I asked you, whether you remember. If you don't remember, we can move on. It isn't the most important thing now. In paragraph 11 of your telegram, you say that in talking to me, you were interested in learning about the situation with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that I told you of the risks involved, the risks that a possible secession would create. Do you remember that part of our conversation? You sent out a brief information about it in paragraph 11.

A. Yes, I do recall that, because of course it was the fear of ⁴⁸⁷⁸³ everyone, again among the members of the diplomatic corps and others, that fighting could spill over into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we were interested to know if Bosnia declared its independence what would happen.

Q. And what was the assessment made that we discussed, and do you consider that to have been the right assessment?

A. Yes, I do, and I think it simply confirmed the views of most observers at the time, that if there was an attempt for Bosnia to gain independence without the agreement of the Serbs and the Croatian population, there would be bloodshed.

Q. In paragraph 11, you say something about that. Where I saw the solution lying "[In English] ... to join in some form of federalism or union with Serbia and Montenegro."

Do you remember whether at that time my actions and the actions of the government in Serbia confirmed this assertion that we considered this kind of solution to be desirable?

A. Well, yes, I do. I think there was at least one, maybe two attempts to enter into some form of agreement with the Bosnian president that would avoid the bloodshed and keep Bosnia-Herzegovina within the federation.

Q. Do you remember those attempts or do you just know that such attempts were made? I'm not going to enumerate them if you can't remember them. You said there were several attempts.

A. Well, I recall -- I can't recall the details of it, but there was an initiative taken, as I recall, sometime in the summer of 1991, in August, where Serbia and Montenegro - I'm not sure if Macedonia was ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁴ present - and you invited Mr. Izetbegovic, President Izetbegovic, to come and work out a form of an arrangement that would entail Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining in a new federation. I also think the major effort was, of course, made in Lisbon in March of 1992 when the Portuguese foreign minister, Cutileiro, arranged to have the three constituent parts of Bosnia - Serbs, Croats and Muslims - sign an agreement that would have worked out some form of cantonment in Bosnia, and those -- that effort was seen by -- certainly by myself and many of my diplomatic colleagues as a major breakthrough and a last-ditch effort to prevent the violence from spreading in Bosnia.

Q. May I have your comments, please, to what you wrote in paragraph 12 of your telegram. You say here: "... expressed view that the majority of Muslims [In English] in Bosnia and Herzegovina realised that they must reach an accord with the Serbs so that both peoples could live in harmony."

[Interpretation] At the end of that paragraph: "[In English] He expressed the view that a small minority of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina dreamed of creating a Muslim state in Europe but doubted that many took this seriously."

[Interpretation] Do you remember that part of our conversation and how developments followed?

A. Yes, I do remember that. And I also recall that, of course, there were thousands and thousands of people in Bosnia, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats who were marching for peace, who were frightened that war could break out there, and I think that what you said probably has come to pass, ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁵ although it turned out that it wasn't a small minority of Muslims that voted for independence, but I think at the time you gave me that information I thought that it confirmed with my own views that most of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want bloodshed and violence and were frightened that it was going to take place.

Q. In paragraph 14 of your telegram, you say that I told you that I had hoped that it would be the Yugoslavs themselves who would be able, without outside intervention, to solve their problems. To the best of your knowledge and according to your experience, does that confirm the correctness of those hopes or the falsity of them?

A. I'm sorry, I don't quite understand the question.

Q. In paragraph 14, I'll quote that portion for you from that paragraph. We were discussing the kind of foreign mediators that should come, and it says: "[In English] Such being the case, it was fundamentally important that the mediators be knowledgeable and above all impartial."

[Interpretation] So I'm asking you now, to the best of your knowledge, those foreign mediators in the Yugoslav crisis, did they have the necessary knowledge and impartiality?

A. Well, I think I've already said yesterday that I think that the European Community mediators already started off with a bias against Serbia, and in -- although they were sending observers in to prevent the fighting between Serbs and Croatians in Croatia, they knew at the time, as did everyone else, that the Croatian army had at that time occupied all of Western Herzegovina, and yet nothing was said about that and sanctions ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁶ were applied to Serbia, not equally to Croatia. So I think there was bias from the very beginning, that the interpretation was that Serbia was responsible for the break-up and the violence.

Q. Mr. Bissett, in document 1, which is an exhibit in these proceedings -- that's not important for you, but anyway, there's a report there by the UN Secretary-General, dated the 30th of May, 1992. That is to say -- or, rather, is that -- what you said a moment ago about bias and the presence of -- or, rather, the existence of this, was that something that the United Nations was aware of as to actually happening within the international community and what was actually going on?

A. Well, I --

MR. NICE: Can we have it on the screen, please, before evidence is adduced about it?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.

THE WITNESS: Well, in March of 1991, I think it was fairly common knowledge and reported in most of the media that the Croatian army was in Western Herzegovina. In the document that you've produced - I've had the opportunity of reading it - it's a report to the Secretary-General, it does indicate, I think pretty clearly, that the Croatians had not withdrawn.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And does it say that the JNA had withdrawn?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Well, how do you explain then this: The Croatian army didn't leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had practically previously not existed, ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁷ whereas the Yugoslav People's Army, which had been there for 70 years, did withdraw? So that is the fact. Sanctions are introduced against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- or, rather, Serbia and Montenegro, whereas they kept quiet on the situation going on on the other side, which was quite different. Do you have an explanation for that now, or perhaps did you have one then?

A. I don't have an explanation. But it simply does, I think, prove that there was bias on the part of some of the international organisations that were trying to bring peace to Yugoslavia.

Q. In paragraph 16 of your telegram, you say: "I asked Milosevic if he sincerely felt that there could be a settlement [In English] of these terrible ethnic struggles so rooted in history and bloodshed. He replied optimistically by saying that once the Serb minority problem in Croatia was settled - and it was in the interest of Croatia to do this - then sensible and effective negotiation could begin." [Interpretation] Was that then and now, when you look back, the way to move forward towards resolving the problem?

A. Yes, of course it was. And again, I think I said that yesterday, that if there could have been a settlement of the Serbian minority problem in Croatia, then most of the problems and the great tragedy that overtook Yugoslavia could have been prevented.

Q. And what about the steps made by the Serbian authorities and my own steps? Did they show that we stand behind a stance of this kind, the kind of position that I explained to you?

A. Yes, I think that's -- that's been clear, that you yourself and ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁸ indeed the official Serbian position was that unless satisfactory protection can be given to the minorities in Croatia, that successful resolution of the problem could not come about.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you ask so many leading questions that one tires of bringing it to your attention. That was a very leading question, and it got the response which you -- which was embedded in the question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't understand what a leading question is here if I'm quoting from what Ambassador Bissett wrote in his telegram and then I ask him whether the position was in conformity with a stance of that kind to the best of his knowledge. And he's not a minor for me to ask him leading questions and for me to elicit an answer that I want to hear by doing so.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The proper question should have been, "What did they show?" Just that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In what you wrote, we were discussing security for the Serb minority and then later on negotiations. So those were two points. Security was achieved through the implementation of the Vance Plan. And now I'm going to ask you, did the negotiations ever come about?

A. Negotiations for solving the problems for the Serbian minority in Croatia, do you mean?

Q. Yes, yes. Did the negotiations take place?

A. Well, yes, they did take place. There were negotiations. Unfortunately, they did not -- they did not succeed in the long term. ⁴⁸⁷⁸⁹

Q. And what, in your opinion, was the cause of the failure of those negotiations?

A. The failure of the negotiations, there's different interpretations of that. I can only give you my own opinion. I think in the Vance-Owen Plan, and later on the other Vance-Stoltenberg Plans failed because of primarily outside influence by the Americans.

Q. In connection to what you've just said and mentioning Cutileiro's plan to touch upon the Bosnian crisis now and focus on that for a while, in addition to these attempts and agreements between the Serbs and Muslims, do you know about the relationship of the Serb side in Bosnia towards the peace efforts being made and principally the plan you just mentioned which was popularly known as the Cutileiro Plan?

A. Yes, of course I remember it very well because it seemed to be a last-ditch effort to prevent bloodshed, and the -- Cutileiro had gathered the three leaders, Karadzic, Izetbegovic, and Boban, to Lisbon, and they worked out a satisfactory settlement and all three leaders signed it. It seemed a time for rejoicing because it was a solution to a very difficult problem, and it appeared to be a satisfactory settlement.

Q. Was this the general standpoint taken by your colleagues among the diplomatic corps in Belgrade, or was it only your own standpoint?

A. No, no. I think it was generally acknowledged by certainly the greater part of the diplomatic corps as a great relief; that if the Bosnian problem could be settled, then the Croatian and the Serbian ongoing dispute would probably fall in place. So everyone was relieved, because I think everyone knew that if a referendum was to take place in ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁰ Bosnia and independence given to Izetbegovic, it would be civil war.

Q. Just a little while ago you said that all three leaders, Karadzic, Izetbegovic, and Boban, signed the Cutileiro Plan. What happened after that? Do you have any personal knowledge of what ensued afterwards?

A. Well, yes, I do. My neighbour, the United States ambassador, Mr. Zimmerman, flew to Sarajevo and had a meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic. Following that meeting, Izetbegovic rescinded his agreement to the Cutileiro Plan, withdrew his signature. Mr. Zimmerman has written in his book that when he arrived in Sarajevo to discuss the plan with Izetbegovic, Izetbegovic expressed regret that he had signed it. Mr. Zimmerman then said, "Well, if you didn't want to sign it, why don't you withdraw your signature and go ahead with your referendum? If you do that, the United States will immediately recognise your independence."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Have you written a book, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: No, this is Mr. Zimmerman's book.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I was asking if you --

THE WITNESS: No, no.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You must be one of the very few.

THE WITNESS: I don't plan to write one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, was Zimmerman's role well known, the one he mentions in passing in his book? Was it known to you and other members of the diplomatic corps, at least those among the Western diplomats?

A. We didn't know what had transpired between Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Izetbegovic. We suspected something had happened to make ⁴⁸⁷⁹¹ Mr. Izetbegovic change his mind, but Mr. Zimmerman never discussed the matter personally with me other than having said that Izetbegovic wasn't happy with the plan.

Q. You just mentioned the referendum. What did you know about this referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. Well, I think what I knew about it is that if it took place, it was highly likely the Serbian population would opt out of the referendum, that they considered it to be illegal, and that if the referendum went ahead, Izetbegovic would win it, would be granted independence, and civil war would be the result.

Q. Would you please look at the second telegram you have here. It's the one dated the 21st of March, 1991. Have you found it, Mr. Bissett?

A. Yes. Yes, I have.

Q. Please look at page 4. Towards the end, in the last two sentences of point 4, but you can put it aside now and I will read out to you paragraph 94 of the Croatia indictment, where it says that: "In March 1991 --"

THE INTERPRETER: Paragraph 99, interpreter's correction.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "-- the members of the Presidency ... resigned on ... [In English] 16th of March, 1991, Slobodan Milosevic, in his capacity as president of the Republic of Serbia, declared that Yugoslavia was finished and that Serbia would no longer be bound by decisions of the Federal Presidency." [Interpretation] You have my address in English in the documents before you. Can you find that speech? It's in tab 51 of the exhibits we ⁴⁸⁷⁹² had with Branko Kostic.

Look at page 2 of the text in English and what was used here: "Serbia would no longer be bound by decisions of the Federal Presidency. "[In English] In light of the situation, I wish to announce that the Republic of Serbia will not be recognising any decision of the Presidency of SFRY because any such decision would be illegitimate under the present circumstances." So is it illegitimacy under the present circumstances or what it says here, "no longer"? Do you remember that as you discussed it with me? How long did those present circumstances last, the ones mentioned here?

A. Well, they didn't last very long. A matter of a few days, as I recall.

Q. You say here in your telegram, on page 4, at the end: "[In English] Milosevic added Serb Assembly may or may not accept Jovic's resignation, but by 21st of March ... there should be Serb representative in Federal Presidency."

[Interpretation] As a foreign diplomat, the chief of your country's mission, were you able to conclude in any way that Serbia would no longer participate in the Presidency or recognise its decisions? As it says here, "Serbia would no longer be bound by decisions ..."

A. No. I think as a result of the meeting with you, you clarified the position and made it clear that by the 21st of March, Serbia would be back in the Presidency. I might add to that that prior to the meeting, our meeting, there was a great deal of confusion about Jovic's resignation and about your appearance on television. It was turbulent times, and ⁴⁸⁷⁹³ there was a great deal of tension, and many diplomats, including myself, were uncertain as to what was happening with Jovic's resignation. So it was a difficult time and a time of crisis, because it seemed that there might be some effort made to -- at the last minute to try and stop Croatia and Slovenia from seceding. A lot of misinterpretation of your television appearance. And so it was with some degree of relief that when we met with you, you were able to explain that Serbia had withdrawn temporarily, decide whether you should or should not accept Jovic's resignation, but at any rate you would be back in the Presidency by the 21st, and that happened, as you predicted it would.

JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, for the record I have to note that the passage appears on page 3, not 4, in the English telegram.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. In my copy it's page 4 point 4, but it may be different in the copy you have.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I hope that we have clarified this part, but now let's try and clarify the first element contained here in paragraph 99 of the indictment, where it says: "Slobodan Milosevic declared that Yugoslavia was finished."

Would you please now read on page 1 of the English translation what it says here in this passage. It's a subtitle from a newspaper. "[In English] As to Serbia, she has always been in favour of Yugoslavia --" [Interpretation] Can you find it on page 1 of the translation?

A. Yes. Yes, I have it. ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁴

Q. "[In English] -- and has never tried to hide it. Always in favour of Yugoslavia and has never tried it -- to hide it. It is with profound conviction and a sense of pride that she says this publicly now." [Interpretation] And then at the end of the following passage: "[In English] Yugoslavia does exist, and it may not be annulled by means of unilateral enactments and the policy of fait accompli because the real interests, the achieved freedoms and democratic heritage and the strength of the peoples living there are guarantee of its survival and successful development."

[Interpretation] You had an opportunity at the time while you were there to see me making this speech, to hear me, to understand this. Is this beyond dispute?

A. No. I think -- I think it was -- you made it quite clear in your speech that the withdrawal was temporary and that you still -- that Yugoslavia was still existing and that Serbia fully supported it.

Q. Do you think anyone can draw this conclusion stated here, that I declared that Yugoslavia was finished?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, he can't say that. He can't say that, Mr. Milosevic, as you well know.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I will rephrase the question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. From what I said at the time, and you were then the Canadian ambassador in Belgrade, could you or any colleague of yours in any way get the idea that this was activity aimed against the existence of Yugoslavia ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁵ or declaring that Yugoslavia no longer existed?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes. You can comment on that.

THE WITNESS: No. Certainly it seemed quite clear to me what -- what your intent was, that you were still supporting the concept and idea of Yugoslavia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. Now, let me just take a look at this paragraph 103 from the same Croatia indictment, which says: "[In English] Slobodan Milosevic's calls for the union of all Serbs in one state ..." [Interpretation] I'll skip over "... coincided with those agitating for a 'Greater Serbia.'"

My call for all Serbs in one state. Please read the middle of the passage on page 1 of the translation from my speech made at the time. What does it say? Or maybe we can even read the whole passage so as not to get anything out of context, to avoid objections that we are pulling a segment out of context. It's the passage where I say: "With the obstruction of work of the Presidency." Can you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. "[In English] ... on the part of those pursuing the policy of disintegration of the country, the plan to break up Yugoslavia has entered its final phase. This plan is being implemented to the detriment of the vital interests of Serbian people in both Serbia and Yugoslavia." [Interpretation] And this is what I wish to emphasise, why I'm quoting this: "[In English] In place of a democratic federation which should provide Serbian people and the other peoples with a peaceful life, ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁶ that is in joint state but that is one state --" [Interpretation] I say in one state in the Serbian -- "[In English] on an equal footing, these forces of the anti-Serbian coalition have planned the outbreak -- the break-up of Yugoslavia and are now trying to see this through. Yugoslavia does exist, and it may not be annulled by means of unilateral enactment and the policy of fait accompli because the interests ..." and so on and so on. [Interpretation] That's the whole passage. Is there any mention here of a call for all Serbs to join in one state or does it mention a democratic federation which should provide the Serbian people and the other peoples with a peaceful life in "[In English] one state on an equal footing"? [Interpretation] Can one say that what is stated here was actually a call by Slobodan Milosevic for the union of all Serbs in one state?

A. No.

Q. To your knowledge, was Yugoslavia a state in which all Serbs, Croats, and south southern -- South Slav Muslims lived as well as Macedonians and Slovenians? Was that the state we are talking about?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Just a moment. I'm passing over something I can't find now.

Look at the beginning of paragraph 5 of that same telegram. You talk about my views on ways of solving the Kosovo problem. Can you find that?

A. Yes.

Q. "[In English] Milosevic elaborated on number of points at ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁷ ambassadors lunch, including Serbia's democratic tradition since 1918. Kosovo's demographic pressures could be resolved by economic progress. In meantime, Serb government will not allow that part of Serbia to be annexed by [sic] Albania ..."

[Interpretation] I'm quoting this for the sake of correctness, but does it say here [In English] could be resolved by what?

A. By economic progress.

Q. [Interpretation] I'll now put -- just a moment. I'll now put a few more questions to you about the article we've already used in this book by the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, the article you authored. And it refers to Kosovo. It's on page 56, the second passage from the bottom of the page. Please read it out - it's from your article - and then I'll ask you to comment on it.

A. "Given the experience of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, it is little wonder that the Albanians in Kosovo realised the most effective way to gain independence was to take up arms and resort to violence. This had been the formula for success before and there was every reason to expect it would work again. Indeed, given the successful public relations campaign that had been waged against President Milosevic and the Serbs, and the record of human rights violations in Kosovo, it was inevitable that Kosovo would be the next part of Yugoslavia to break away."

Q. What did you think about the Rambouillet agreement?

A. Well, I -- I thought the Rambouillet agreement was an attempt by the United States, primarily, to force Yugoslavia to accept unreasonable terms. And I am also convinced that when the initial terms of Rambouillet ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁸ were accepted by the Serbian side, the Americans at the last moment attached an Appendix B to the agreement, which called for the permission of NATO troops to enter all of Yugoslavia, not just Kosovo, and as well to have a referendum on independence within three years. I think it's generally known that that Appendix B was attached knowing that any President of Serbia would be unable to accept those terms, and it was a deliberate attempt, I think, to lead to the bombing of Yugoslavia. I am not alone in thinking this. Lord Gilbert, who I think was assistant permanent secretary of the British Department of Defence, in an address to the British House of Commons in July of 2000, in effect said that Rambouillet was a provocation which would allow NATO to use force to try and resolve the Kosovo problem.

Mr. Rubin, of the United States, in an article in the Observer - I don't have the dates - as well has admitted this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll take the break now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, after Rambouillet, the aggression started against Yugoslavia that they referred to as the bombing. In your insight into that situation and in your public appearances, did you appraise -- did you see that as a war crime or otherwise?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Did he see what as a war crime? He can't comment ⁴⁸⁷⁹⁹ on -- the characterisation of anything as a war crime is not a matter for the witness. Mr. Milosevic, you seem to be searching for questions. If you are at the end of the examination-in-chief, then let us stop.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am close to the end of my examination-in-chief, but I'm not searching for questions. I will rephrase this one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, how did you see that attack that followed immediately after Rambouillet?

A. I think I've already described my reaction to it. I thought it was a violation of international law, I thought it was a violation of the United Nations Charter, and for me personally, it was also shocking to find that it was a violation of everything that NATO had stood for since its inception. NATO was originally a defensive organisation. As I said, its Article 1 of its treaty said that NATO would never use violence in the resolution of international disputes, indeed would not threaten to use force. So that was my reaction.

Q. In your article, in the book published by the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, on page 57 you wrote -- please look at the last but one paragraph on page 57. Have you found it?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you write here?

A. Do you want me to read the paragraph?

Q. Yes, please.

A. "President Clinton told the American people that the war was being ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁰ fought for humanitarian reasons and to contain the fighting so that it would not imperil or destabilise the rest of the Balkans. The bombing was necessary, he said, to stop the atrocities being committed there. This was justification for the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty. In the same vein, Canadian ministers of national defence and foreign affairs assured their citizens that the war was being fought to stop ethnic cleansing. It is, of course, a matter of record that the vast majority of Kosovo Albanians were forced out of Kosovo after the bombing, not before it. Nevertheless, these ministers were not alone in heralding the war as ushering in a new era of diplomacy. Humanitarian reasons --"

Q. Thank you. Thank you. So NATO leaders stated publicly that this was designed to stop ethnic cleansing, and you mentioned here the notorious fact that it was after the bombing. It is in cursive here in the text; after the bombing, not before it. How did you see those explanations by NATO leaders? What is your assessment? And finally, what do you believe was the real reason for the NATO bombing of Serbia?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, that's not a matter -- we're not interested in that, Mr. Milosevic. Let me see whether you can ask the witness any of these questions.

NATO leaders stated publicly this was designed to stop ethnic cleansing. What did you want to ask, anything about that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did ask. They did state that, and Mr. Bissett is saying quite clearly that the wave of refugees happened after the bombing, not before. So what was going on really?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. ⁴⁸⁸⁰¹

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm on record saying and writing frequently that I think the real reason that NATO bombed Yugoslavia was not at all because of anything that was happening in Kosovo, but it was an opportunity for NATO, on the eve of its 50th birthday, to demonstrate, particularly to the European countries, that NATO was still a viable and necessary organisation. NATO had been under attack and criticised, wondering why it continued to exist, this powerful military force, when the Warsaw Pact armies had long ago gone home. And the situation in Kosovo was ideal, an ideal opportunity for NATO to demonstrate it was still a useful force. That's my own feeling, and it's shared by many observers, but it's an opinion.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That would make NATO out to be very cynical and opportunistic.

THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed. And I think that might have been proven on the 50th birthday party, where Mr. President Clinton announced a completely new role for NATO which he said would permit it to act out of area. In other words, NATO would now, from now on, be allowed to intervene anywhere in the world whenever it felt that it was necessary to do so. That was not the terms of the original treaty, and I would have thought if the terms of that treaty were to be altered, the treaty would have to be renegotiated and signed by all members, but again that's my personal view.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, you were a career diplomat.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁸⁸⁰²

Q. Please look at the next page in your article, 58, the last paragraph, since you mentioned Clinton. What did you write here?

A. "The US-led attack on Yugoslavia was designed to improve President Clinton's public image and restore credibility to NATO, whose existence since the end of the Cold War was in jeopardy. This was the real agenda of the NATO war. In terms of Balkan history, it is an old agenda. Traditionally, Western intervention in the Balkans has proven to be disastrous. From the Congress of Berlin to both World Wars, the Western powers have intervened in the Balkans for their own selfish policy objectives. These aims have in the end --" Sorry: "These aims have had little relevance to the issues affecting the peoples of the Balkan countries. What was true of the past has proven true again in Kosovo."

Q. And then there is an explanation to be found in the next paragraph, where you say: "Because of the demonic image the Western media had already created ..." Would you please read this.

A. "Because of the demonic image the Western media had already created of Slobodan Milosevic, it was not difficult for him to be blamed for committing outrageous atrocities in Kosovo. In fact, prior to the bombing, the total casualties in Kosovo, Serb and Albanian, did not reach beyond 2000, which by any standard was not cause for military intervention. Nevertheless, NATO needed its war."

Q. NATO proclaimed that the bombing of Yugoslavia, and primarily Serbia, was a great victory. Do you agree with that?

A. No, I don't agree that it was a great victory. I think it set a very dangerous precedent. It now would appear that NATO has taken upon ⁴⁸⁸⁰³ itself the right to intervene wherever it so chooses, without regard to international law and without regard whatsoever to the United Nations, and I think that's a sad commentary on an organisation that was designed to defend democracy and the freedoms and not engage in violence to resolve international disputes.

Q. Could you please tell us what you think about Resolution 1244 that ended the war.

A. Well, I thought that 1244 was a satisfactory solution to the problem. Unfortunately, it doesn't appear to have been fully complied with. 1244 guaranteed the civil rights and protection of all people in Kosovo of whatever ethnic origin. The first results of 1244 was the ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population from Kosovo, and this was done under the eyes of some 30 or 40.000 NATO troops. 1244 guaranteed that the religious sites in Kosovo would be protected, but we've seen that over 130 Orthodox churches have been either dynamited and blasted to the ground or burned.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this evidence relates to a period not relevant to the indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that the entire context is very relevant. If you want to see the whole picture, you cannot neglect this.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, you were there for a while. In another period you followed all that happened in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. How can you explain this great bloodshed and ethnic cleansing and violence in ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁴ general that happened on all sides in the region? Did you write and speak about this? Did you have discussions?

JUDGE ROBINSON: How -- Mr. Milosevic, I think we are now in the period of diminishing returns. His explanation of the bloodshed and the ethnic cleansing is not going to help us very much. If you don't have any more questions, just let us move on to the cross-examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you do not allow the witness to answer this question, let me ask another one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, in view of all that you witnessed in the years when the conflict started in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in the years when you followed it from afar, who do you think is primarily responsible for those crimes?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. No. I'm not allowing that. That is a decision that we will make on the basis of the evidence presented to us. You're in the area now, the period of sweeping generalisations. I take it you have concluded.

Mr. Nice, please begin. There is a tab to be -- we will admit tab 3. Cross-examination by Mr. Nice:

Q. Trinidad and Tobago was the embassy you went to first, was it?

A. Yes, it was a High Commission in the Commonwealth, an embassy position, yes.

Q. And then back to Canada and then two years or a little more in ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁵ Belgrade. Sent there by Prime Minister Mulroney, and at the end of your turn of office or tour of duty, I think you pleaded with the Foreign Minister Barbara McDougall, is it?

A. That's correct.

Q. To stay on while other embassies were withdrawing their ambassadors, and you stayed on longer than any of the others, no doubt with the consent of Mr. Mulroney.

A. That's correct.

Q. Based largely in Belgrade, doing your two years there?

A. Yes, that's correct. I also had responsibility as ambassador for Albania, as I mentioned, and also Bulgaria, so I made trips to both those countries fairly frequently.

Q. As an ambassador, or former ambassador, you can have a reasonable expectation, can you not, Mr. Bissett, that your words will be attended to and accorded some weight?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. Do you think that with that expectation there comes the duty to check your facts?

A. Of course.

Q. You published a little between 1992 and 1999, but the real trigger for your life as a publicist was the bombing, wasn't it, because the bombing was something you absolutely disagreed with, as you made clear today.

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And since then you have published widely. ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁶

A. Well, I've written quite a number of articles, yes. I haven't written a book.

Q. You've expressed views not only on the role of NATO, which you've repeated, but when you were first called here as a witness and this Court had imposed a counsel on this accused, you sent a letter saying that you thought this was a political court rather than a juridical body operating in the interests of justice and in truth. You said that it had already, this Tribunal, determined the accused's guilt and that the proceedings had the characteristics of a Stalinist show-trial. Now, those were your views then. Are they still your views?

A. No, they're not my views now, not all of that. I was reacting to the fact that Mr. Milosevic was not going to be allowed to represent himself, and I thought that was wrong.

Q. Well, did that support -- that's why I asked you about checking your facts. Did that support your assertion that this was a political court? The fact that the three Judges made a judicial decision in the course of their duties, does that make this a political court, please, Mr. Bissett?

A. Well, I don't think I was the only one who was critical of that decision.

Q. Mr. Bissett, I think the question was easy enough to answer. Does the fact that a court, through its Judges, makes a decision with which you disagree make this a political court?

A. Well, in my view, it did. It certainly added to some of my previous views that I've also written about the Tribunal. ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁷

Q. We may come and have a look at those, but just so that we can understand exactly how strong it may be your emotions are, you as a former ambassador, with access to the leading politicians and diplomats of your day, have on your website today - because I'm reading it - a likening of the present Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, to Hitler's favoured prosecutor Roland Fiesler, who presided over the trial of those involved in the July 20th plot. Do you think that, in your position, that is a responsible publication to put out for the world at large to read?

A. Well, I put it out. It may be considered irresponsible by some but it may not be considered by others.

Q. You really -- we are concerned here, Mr. Bissett, as you will well understand, with a ten-year history that involves the consequences of extravagant expressions of opinion by ethnic groups supported by individuals. Do you think likening the Prosecutor here in that way is a responsible thing for a man in your position to do?

A. I think I've answered that.

Q. Have you?

A. I think there's differences of opinion.

Q. Well, it's not just this Prosecutor that you have attacked. I'm going to hand you, please, if I can, a selection of your material on your website. I'm only going to take you through a few examples, but I'd ask you, over the break, to cast your eye over the others and to confirm that they are indeed opinions you have published. Now, looking at this document, as the footnote reveals, unless otherwise stated, they are quotations from your own website, and the first ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁸ one is the letter sent when you were first asked to come here as a witness. But on that same page -- on the first page, page 1, I just draw to your attention this: You said of this Tribunal that it had lost all credibility by its bias in favour of NATO patrons. It had become a political organ of NATO. Its decision to issue indictments against Milosevic in the middle of the bombing campaign was a blatant attempt to gain public support for the bombing. After all, who would not support punitive action being taken against a nation headed by an accused war criminal?

And with in mind that that relates to the former Prosecutor Justice Louise Arbour, would you go to page 2, please. The first bullet point, new bullet point there. You make various allegations against the former Prosecutor, and then you say this: "There seems little doubt the announcement was timed to bolster sagging public support for the bombing. After all, who would dare oppose the bombing of a country whose leader had been indicted as war criminal? That Louise Arbour would violate the Tribunal's policy is not surprising. Her appointment to the Tribunal was conditional upon receiving the approval of Madeleine Albright." Now, you are quite clearly, in public domain, making allegations of corrupt practices by a woman who happens now to be a United Nations commissioner. Would you please tell us what your evidence in support of those publicly made allegations is, Mr. Bissett.

A. Well, I have been told by international lawyers that it was the policy of the Tribunal not to announce or publicise those that were going to be indicted, yet after the bombing of Kosovo had commenced, Louise ⁴⁸⁸⁰⁹ Arbour, the former Chief Prosecutor, did publicly announce the indictment of President Milosevic, was seen in Kosovo before what was alleged to be mass graves, allegedly of Kosovo victims of crimes, and I thought that was probably inappropriate. The fact that the United States -- it was through United States pressure that the court was established by the Security Council and the fact that Madeleine Albright did interview Louise Arbour, I have my own reasons for suspecting that her appointment to the Tribunal was conditional upon getting Madeleine Albright's approval.

Q. Do you know -- have you bothered to research what the process for issuing and confirming an indictment is in this court?

A. No, I have not.

Q. And you think that the material you have referred to is sufficient to make this sort of public allegation on a website, do you?

A. Well, obviously I did because I published it on my website.

Q. Tell me this: Have you made any attempt to contact Justice Louise Arbour about your allegations, to check with her, to ask her, to verify from any source the sort of material you put out?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Let's look at one more example of your decision-making process and then I'll return to what you've given in evidence. On the same page, you deal with Racak.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would you please ask Mr. Nice and Ambassador Bissett to observe the pause. They speak the same language, ⁴⁸⁸¹⁰ and it's very difficult for interpreters to follow.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I'll ask both Ambassador Bissett and Mr. Nice to observe the pause between question and answer in the interest of the interpretation.

MR. NICE: If the interpreters are having a problem and I hadn't heard it, I apologise to them.

Q. On the same page you deal with Racak, and I'm only concerned with this not for your conclusion but for your reasoning processes. "At the centre of the indictment against Milosevic was the infamous 'Racak massacre.'" You set out the allegation. "Madeleine Albright has described the 'Racak massacre' as the galvanising event leading to the air war ..."

You then say: "The final report, published last week by the Finnish forensic experts who examined the bodies of the alleged victims, confirms what many suspected at the time, that there were no evidence to show the bodies discovered in the shallow trench by United States General William Walker were executed at close range." And you then go on to say this: "It seems the victims were armed members of the KLA who were killed in the fighting that had taken place in the hills above Racak the day before. Their bodies had been placed in the trench to simulate a massacre. This would suggest that at least some of the evidence against Milosevic presented by the United States to the Tribunal to support his indictment has been fabricated." Is that still your view?

A. Yes, it is still my view about Racak. ⁴⁸⁸¹¹

Q. Is it? Well, help me, please: Have you spoken to any of the survivors from the gully in Racak of their experience?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Have you spoken to any of the other people in Racak village who survived?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Have you sought to review the evidence that those people have given in this court?

A. I have seen some of the evidence given in this court, yes.

Q. Have you sought to review it?

A. Not to review it carefully.

Q. Have you reviewed the evidence of international observers who spoke of what happened at Racak?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Namely?

A. I think Maisonneuve.

Q. Yes.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. You disregard all that evidence, do you?

A. No, I don't disregard it at all.

Q. Have you -- have you examined and considered the forensic scientific evidence in this case, and there is a great deal of it.

A. Well, I've certainly read some of the reports of the scientific evidence.

Q. Well, tell me, then, please, Mr. Bissett, if people are killed in ⁴⁸⁸¹² a gully - if - in execution by people standing at the side of the gully, mowing them down, where would you expect to find the bullets that killed the people; in the gully or on the bank?

A. You would expect to find them in the bodies of the victims.

Q. In the gully. Where would you expect to find the spent cartridge cases if they had been mown down in execution by people standing on a bank?

A. Around the bank.

Q. Do you know where the bullets and cartridges were found in respect of the gully?

A. Well, I've heard reports from German reporters who were around the trench shortly after, the day after the alleged massacre, that there were no empty cartridges found.

Q. And you haven't followed the evidence in sufficient detail to know that there is in fact evidence of bullets and cartridge cases being found in exactly those places?

A. I have not.

Q. Would that perhaps change your mind?

A. Well, I think if the forensic evidence could prove that the people were shot at close range and that the empty shells were around the bank and there was no evidence of fabrication, it would probably change my mind.

Q. You see, you put out material - and we may look at some more, we may not - you put out material favourable to the Serb side trusting almost everything favourable to them that you hear, don't you? You don't look at ⁴⁸⁸¹³ things in detail and you don't listen to --

A. I don't publish everything in favour of the Serbs, but I will certainly admit that most of my writings have been prompted by the view that the Serbs have been demonised as a people and that this has been guilt by association and has had a dreadfully bad impact on the people of Serbia and the recovery from the war. I have not intended to defend NATO's actions or to defend anyone other than the Serbs and the Serbian people, because I felt they were unable to do so themselves, they had been demonised so badly by the public media.

Q. So you accept -- what was it, in the course of those two years in Belgrade, occasionally going to Macedonia and Albania, was it in those two years that you developed this sympathy for the Serbs?

A. No, it was not. It was --

Q. Before that, was it?

A. No, it was not. It was after the accusations that -- made by the media and by others that the Serbs were -- were responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia and were responsible for all of the crimes that ensued following the conflict there. It was then that I began to feel an obligation to point out that it was not the Serbs or Serbia who broke up Yugoslavia.

Q. That's your opinion, of course. You recognise that --

A. Of course it is.

Q. -- there are many with a contrary view. And your opinion is based on what, a few meetings with this accused?

A. No, not a few meetings with this accused; by the facts that -- ⁴⁸⁸¹⁴

Q. No. I was going to list things. First of all, you had a few meetings with this accused. A couple, was it?

A. I think I had probably four or five meetings with President Milosevic, yes.

Q. Open source material that you received in Belgrade?

A. Yes, open source material.

Q. Contact with your own staff and what they found?

A. Yes.

Q. And other discussions with other people in the diplomatic community at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. And open source reading since?

A. Yes. And it wasn't all open source material in Belgrade.

Q. No. I can accept that, as a diplomat, you have access to other material. But it sounds - but correct me if I'm wrong - that you were never at one of the scenes of alleged criminal acts, were you?

A. No, I never was.

Q. You never spoke, so far as you've said so far, to survivors of alleged criminal acts, scenes, have you?

A. No, I have not.

Q. You've told us a number of things about 1970 -- 1991. Before you arrived in 1989, we have heard from President Kucan of Slovenia that at a Central Committee meeting on the 30th of January of 1989 -- just -- he gave evidence to the effect that this accused said that things would have to be changed that cannot be changed institutionally, because people don't ⁴⁸⁸¹⁵ like them or because they lasted too long, will be changed uninstitutionally; i.e., expressing at that meeting a willingness to use uninstitutional or non-institutional means to achieve results. That fits, I imagine, with your understanding of the man, doesn't it?

A. I'm sorry, I don't --

Q. Was he prepared --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, reformulate the question. It's a little unclear.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. Was he prepared, in your judgement, to act outside the law, outside the proper role of the institutions when he judged it necessary?

A. You're referring to the --

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. He's referring to Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. To Mr. Milosevic, yes.

A. Well, I can't answer that question. I don't know if he was prepared to do that.

Q. Well, we'll see a little more about that. That's Exhibit 447, tab 2, if the Chamber wants to remind itself of that. You're aware, of course, of the 1989 constitutional changes in Kosovo, aren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. What part do you think they played in the development of events?

A. Well, I think they were very important. I think that as with the death of Tito and with the strains on the continuation of the federation, ⁴⁸⁸¹⁶ that Serbia found itself handicapped by the fact that two of its provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, had veto power over their legislation, and this placed them at a decided disadvantage.

Q. Pausing there for a minute, this is a constitution that had operated for a couple of decades. Why do you express your answer in the way favourable to the Serb interest as opposed to the interests of those in the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo who had for a long time had embedded constitutional rights that were taken away from them? Why do you choose the Serbian interest and not the other two?

A. Well, because I'm here to represent the -- the accused, not the Prosecutor. I think it was clear --

Q. That's an interesting answer, but although I happen to be prosecuting or asking questions on behalf of the Prosecution, I'm here to establish the truth, and my question -- through you, if I can, and my question to you was why in answering the question do you express something favourable to the Serb interest rather than to the interests of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are not the same as the interests, if any, of the Prosecution?

A. Because I think there is a great deal of confusion as to why the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo were taken away. They were taken away to enable Serbia to meet on common ground and equally with the other republics. I think it was clear that -- that Tito created the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina to ensure that Serbia would not be able to overpower the other republics in terms of its power and population.

Q. So what if he did? What followed was and what existed was a ⁴⁸⁸¹⁷ lawful constitutional position which gave to the citizens of Kosovo and Vojvodina rights almost equivalent to that of a republic. Why should they have their rights removed, in a way that you seem to think is justified, by Serbia?

A. I didn't say I thought it was justified. I tried to give you an explanation as to why their veto power was taken away.

Q. From your knowledge --

A. Can I just expand on that? I think that while Tito was alive and Yugoslavia was held together by the -- by his party, the question of whether they had special rights or non-rights was not nearly as important as after his death when indeed they continued to have their rights, but as my understanding of the constitutional change was that the reason for it and the only effect of it was they lost their veto power. I don't think the citizens of Vojvodina and Kosovo lost any other rights.

Q. Were you aware -- I'm so sorry.

JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, Mr. Nice. Mr. Bissett, are you able to identify any particular law that Serbia sought to make or act it sought to carry out which was prevented by the veto power or were there events occurring at the time that indicated that somehow or other the veto power was being used irresponsibly?

THE WITNESS: No, I can't specifically say that, but I do feel that Serbia began to feel, as Croatia and Slovenia and others made indications at the time that they may want to split up the federation, that they felt impotent in their own federal institution because of the veto power from Vojvodina, and especially from Kosovo, but -- ⁴⁸⁸¹⁸

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: -- I have no specific examples.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Have you followed the evidence and the questioning about the evidence on these topics in this court that goes to suggest that there were groups of people going to both Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro to enforce the overthrow of the then local leaderships? Are you aware of that part of the history?

A. No, I'm not aware of that.

Q. Very well. Are you aware that as a result of the change of the Kosovo constitutional position, amongst other things, it lost its Constitutional Court and indeed its Academy of Sciences? Are you aware of that?

A. I was not aware that they had lost that.

Q. Because, of course, to lose your own court is a pretty major loss, isn't it?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. Were you aware that it was said at the time that the change in the constitutional position in Kosovo was brought about by force and even by rigged -- by a rigged vote?

A. I know that those charges have been made, yes.

Q. And of course they've never been resolved because the court by which they would have been resolved, although it made an interim judgement, was then itself abolished. Did you know that? ⁴⁸⁸¹⁹

A. No, I did not know that.

Q. Because such events, Mr. Bissett, if you'd had the opportunity of learning about them --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is completely disinforming the witness. He is posing questions that are completely incorrect with respect to the constitutional amendments and some sort of violence. That is a fabrication. You have heard testimony here, you have documents and stenographic notes from the Assembly meetings where we can see that the Assemblies of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the institutional proceedings enacted these amendments to the constitution. How can he then ask the Bosnia, who came afterwards, questions in which he claims something that is just not true and that has been confirmed here not to be true? Of course he cannot know anything like that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, your questions are based on what?

MR. NICE: The questions are based on documents we've looked at with consequences of the constitutional change which deal with both the topics, documents we've looked at which show the constitutional challenge reached the position of a final -- an interim judgement, I've just forgotten the title of the judgement, which was not able to be perfected because the Constitutional Court was abolished, evidence that's been given as to the existence of tanks and so on, I think it came from Rugova, around the building at the time of the vote, and there is other evidence it may be from Merovci or Bakalli, I'm not sure -- from Merovci. And in ⁴⁸⁸²⁰ any event, we now know that the rumours of this were known to this witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see nothing improper in the question. The Chamber will eventually have to make a determination on the matters.

MR. NICE: Let's move on then -- thank you, Your Honour.

Q. Let's move on. You come at the end of 1990, and of course you knew something of Ante Markovic, the Prime Minister, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have many meetings with him?

A. No, I didn't have many meetings with him.

Q. He was an absolutely Western facing -- a modern, Western, democratic facing man, wasn't he?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. He succeeded in bringing inflation down and had economic reforms that, if they'd been carried through, might have carried the former Yugoslavia through its crisis. Do you accept that?

A. Well, there's different points of view on that. There are many who felt that his economic reforms added to the discontent of the people of Yugoslavia because of inflation and that these measures were too harsh and too quickly imposed for the period in the transition from a socialist economy to a private enterprise.

Q. There were equally others who took the opposite view?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And we've had evidence, you see, from Mr. Markovic that he was told that the accused was saying that he shouldn't be allowed to get his ⁴⁸⁸²¹ programme through because it would be difficult to remove him. Now, you had conversations with this accused. In his conversations with you --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, is there any sense in this question? Markovic said that somebody told him that the accused said. I said, you said, he said, we said, and now he's asking Ambassador Bissett the question of what Markovic told him that somebody said I had said. Now, if that is nonsense, then yes, it's nonsense.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just formulate the question so we can hear it.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm certainly happy to re -- to formulate the question, but --

JUDGE BONOMY: He hadn't completed it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. The question is to be formulated.

MR. NICE:

Q. We've heard from Mr. Markovic, Mr. Bissett, of it being said that the accused didn't want Markovic's reforms to go through, because if they did it would be difficult to remove Markovic. And my question to you is that did this accused express that sort of hostility to Markovic to you? Did he say he didn't want Markovic in, first of all; and, if so, give his reasons?

A. No, I can't recall him ever saying he didn't want Markovic in. I do recall him expressing disagreement with Markovic's economic reforms.

Q. Because of course at this time, without any doubt, the accused was ⁴⁸⁸²² still an old-fashioned communist, really, wasn't he? Would that be your impression?

A. Well, I'm not sure if he was an old-fashioned communist. I think I have myself described him and all of the leaders in Yugoslavia at the time as being -- perhaps I did say old-fashioned communist. I'm not sure of that. I did find all of the leaders were former communists, and I think were not used to Western ways, and that this was part of the problem in the country.

Q. Were you aware that following the 14th Congress of the Communist Party in January 1990 that Communist Party had been working through a reduced quorum? Were you aware of that?

A. What Communist Party?

Q. For the former Yugoslavia, with the withdrawal of Slovenia and Croatia from it.

A. That's when I think the League of Young Communists actually expired at about that time, if I'm right.

Q. And is it --

A. Or dissolved.

Q. Very well. Is it your recollection that as we see the democratisation of the various republics, Slovenia and Croatia were the first to have multi-party elections and Serbia was the very last?

A. Well, I wasn't aware of that, but that's -- I'm not challenging --

Q. Very well. Were you aware, because it's in your time of office and again it comes from Ante Markovic's evidence, were you aware of the raid on the federal reserves that was done by the Bank of Serbia, the ⁴⁸⁸²³ money ultimately having to be repaid? Were you aware of that?

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. When I spoke earlier of this accused being prepared to act in an uninstitutional or indeed unconstitutional way, thinking back, is this one example of the sort of things he was prepared to do to get his own way?

A. I don't know the circumstances under which the reserves were taken, but ... Perhaps Mr. Milosevic can explain that. I can't.

Q. We've also heard from Mr. Markovic - and your comments on this before I move forward - that it was after the Kosovo crisis in the end of 1989, beginning of 1990, when this accused wanted to send in the army to Kosovo, and Slovenia refused in its vote to allow that to happen, that things took a downward turn. Do you accept that, that Slovenia stopped this accused, in the interests of Kosovo, sending in the army?

A. I wasn't aware of that.

Q. We'll look at the notion of confederation or confederal models shortly, but you suggested to us, I think - correct me if I'm wrong - that federal institutions were thwarted because of Slovenian and Croatian independence and moves towards independence. Is that your evidence?

A. I don't think I said that, but I think there's no question that the federal authority was --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is asking Ambassador Bissett whether he knew that I sent some kind of army to Kosovo. As I need this for my redirect, I'd like to know what sort of army I'm supposed ⁴⁸⁸²⁴ to have sent to Kosovo. Mr. Bissett hasn't heard about it but neither have I. So could Mr. Nice explain what sort of army I'm supposed to have sent to Kosovo, what sort of army I could have sent to Kosovo? This was supposed to be Markovic's time, I assume.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I will not require Mr. Nice to do that, but if he wishes he can.

MR. NICE: Yes. I'll come back to it in detail. It's a matter of evidence and what's being suggested is that in the desire to have emergency powers to go to Kosovo, this accused was thwarted by the disinclination to vote by Slovenia. Kucan in particular, and it comes from his evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, Mr. Nice.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you should provide the transcript page reference of the evidence.

MR. NICE: Very well. And I'm just finding that. I've got the other ones, and if I haven't got that one I'll turn it up for you in a second. Perhaps I'll come back to that. No. I'll get you that page reference in a minute. It's, I think, in the range T30878. Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, have --

MR. NICE: 30878, but I'll try a get a more precise figure for you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That will assist the accused in his re-examination.

MR. NICE: And I can give the other ones that I'm going to come to ⁴⁸⁸²⁵ immediately.

MR. KAY: Could the date be given, which is an easy way of tracking it?

MR. NICE: I'm afraid not. I can possibly dig it out, but on this occasion I've done it the other way -- or, rather, I've been fortunate enough to have it done the other way.

Q. Dealing with the cessation or the interruption in the functioning of the federal institutions and your evidence, Mesic has told us, amongst other things, that it was the accused who created the conditions for disintegration because Mesic was blocked access to his position as president of the SFRY. That's to be found at 31307 to 31314. You were there at the relevant time and most of your time in Belgrade, with your ear to the ground. It's right, isn't it, that Mesic was -- your ear to the diplomatic ground, as it were. It's right, isn't it, that Mesic was rendered incapable of performing his functions even after he was eventually elected?

A. I think there was a great deal of concern on the part of Serbia that Mesic should become the president at a time when his own republic was trying to separate from the federation, and it seemed ironic for many people that this would happen, but that was the way the constitution worked. I know there was opposition to his assuming his duties, and I think his credibility as the president was damaged, there's no question about that.

Q. Could you now perhaps help me with my question. Is it right, maybe as a result of the factors that you've helpfully identified, that it ⁴⁸⁸²⁶ was actually made very difficult or dangerous for him to attend meetings where he could perform those functions?

A. I couldn't say that I knew anything about him being inhibited from attending meetings or dangerous for him to do so.

Q. We now move on rather more specifically to the topic that you touched upon with tab 1 of the accused's exhibits, that diplomatic cable of September 1991. Before we look at it again, because there's no need to, The Hague proposals, the Carrington proposals, were for a confederal system, weren't they?

A. I'm sorry, I can't recall exactly what his proposals were, Carrington.

Q. So that I don't waste your time and ours, you can't remember the Carrington proposals. Can you remember the Vance proposals, the Vance-Owen proposals, and the Cutileiro Plan?

A. Yes, those proposals, and the Carrington proposal was really, in my view, an attempt to have a cease-fire and stop the fighting and to bring the negotiating parties to the table to try and resolve their disputes. Whether it was a federal proposal or confederal, I don't recall.

Q. Well --

A. And quite frankly, I'm not sure I know the difference, really.

Q. You come from Canada. How is your constitution organised?

A. Well, we think we have a confederation but we really operate as a federation, so ...

Q. I suspect, Mr. Bissett, if there is any nationality to whom we ⁴⁸⁸²⁷ should be turning for an understanding of the distinction between the two, then it is to you or to another Canadian. But passing over from that, what I want your help with is this: In the period of time of 1991 and until The Hague Conference, is it your understanding that approval of a system of confederation, that is something looser than a federal system, was one way of holding the former Yugoslavia together?

A. Yes. I think that's correct, and I think that the concept of a looser federal system was -- was broached on more than one occasion.

Q. Is it your understanding that this accused was at all times in favour of that?

A. I don't -- I don't think he was in favour of that, but I could be wrong.

Q. Is it your understanding and evidence that he was at all times opposed to the departure of Slovenia and Croatia?

A. I would have to qualify by that. I think he was certainly trying to keep Yugoslavia together. He was not unhappy about the departure of Slovenia. I think he felt that that was a fait accompli, but I do feel, and I've said this before, his major concern, as any Serbian President would have to take into account, the position of the Serbian minority in Croatia, and he felt that they had to have protection.

Q. When did he first make it plain to you that he was happy for Slovenia to depart?

A. He never said that to me, but --

Q. How did you infer it?

A. I inferred it from the fact that for the most part when Slovenia ⁴⁸⁸²⁸ left and the army was pulled back from there, it was pretty well accepted that Slovenia would go its own way. And since there was not a minority problem in Slovenia, this did not present a problem that might lead to violence.

Q. It's a function of political leaders sometimes, isn't it, to say one thing in public and to mean something else inside their heads; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And so far as diplomats are concerned, when politicians are talking to diplomats, it's almost, or can be, like talking to the public because the diplomat -- the politician cannot know where the information will go.

A. Yes, I suppose that's right.

Q. So that if we look at the one paragraph of tab 1 that we were not taken through, I think, by the accused, tab 17, on page 8, on this date in September to you, a comparatively public audience for the reasons I've given, the accused says -- perhaps Mr. Nort would be good enough to place it on the overhead projector for those viewing. Paragraph 17 of tab 1, page 8 of tab 1. There's a copy for Mr. Nort. While it's being found I'll read.

"He outlined his own vision of what future settlement would look like - a federated union of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia with some form of association with autonomous Serbian regions of Croatia - linked in loose fashion with sovereign states of Slovenia and Croatia for purposes of business and trade." ⁴⁸⁸²⁹ Does that look to you something like a confederal plan?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. So that if I'm right, and I realise you don't know this and the Judges will have to decide this for themselves later, but if I'm right and The Hague Conference proposal that was rejected was a confederal plan, we have this position that in September the accused is announcing a confederal system as his preferred option, but in October he's rejecting it. My first question on this topic is: Did he ever explain to you why he rejected it?

A. He did not.

Q. Was it ever published why he rejected it?

A. Not that I'm aware of.

Q. Have you followed the evidence in this court as to why he rejected it?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Let's go back a little earlier in 1991 and we'll just play a little clip -- we've got the transcript. On the screen at the moment is a transcript of part of the video of 447, tab 6, the parliamentary speech given by this accused on the 25th of June of 1990, produced by the witness President Kucan at transcript 20883. And if I can enlarge it a bit. Yes. You see, if you look at this passage here, this is the accused speaking, eight lines up from the bottom: "Should the state system in Yugoslavia be changed; i.e., should Yugoslavia become a confederation, all constitutional issues would be opened. A confederation is not a state but a union of independent states, therefore the ⁴⁸⁸³⁰ confederation would not be a reality even in the case that all political subjects in Yugoslavia would accept it in the existing, administratively set, borders among the republics. In that case, that is in the case that the federal Yugoslavia is rejected, the issue of borders of Serbia becomes an open political issue."

Now, I suggest to you that the reading of that is clear, that the accused at that time, distinguishing between federal and confederal, said if it's confederal, then Serbia's borders are an open issue. Did he make that position clear to you at all?

A. No, he did not.

Q. No. And you, of course, have never considered, for example, this evidence before, have you?

A. I have not seen it before.

Q. No.

A. I have --

Q. I'm just drawing that to your attention. We've also heard from Milan Kucan - reference is 20890, 91, 93, and 20923 - that at a Presidency meeting in January 1991, of -- attended by republican authorities, Slovenia and Croatia explained that they were in favour of a confederation of states, and indeed they'd already prepared a concept for a confederation, but that the accused was against it then. Were you aware of a history of Slovenia and Croatia favouring confederation and of this accused at that sort of a meeting opposing it?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Thank you. Indeed, we hear that in the course of that, the ⁴⁸⁸³¹ accused argued that any plans to divide the Serbs into different states would not be accepted. Did he ever make that position clear to you?

A. Well, not directly, although his position always was very clear that the Serbs in Bosnia and the Serbs in Croatia must have protection, and -- but it was not in this context.

Q. There's another piece of evidence that's been given in this court and I want you to consider, because I'm looking at your earlier expressed opinions, you see. Milan Babic, at 13011, 12, 19, and then 13802 to 805, explained that this accused said that all Serbs had the right to remain in a single state and that sometime in April or May, when he discussed the Slovene-Croat proposal for a confederation, explained he didn't mind if they left Yugoslavia provided the Serbs could remain in a single state. Now, did he ever make clear to you in your -- one of your five meetings that his true position was that he didn't really care if Slovenia and Croatia left the former Yugoslavia?

A. No.

Q. Can we look next, please, at Exhibit 613 -- ah. Tab 34 I was going to suggest, but -- no, I don't think I -- would Your Honours just give me one minute.

[Prosecution confer]

MR. NICE:

Q. Can we look at -- beg your pardon for this administrative error of mine -- Exhibit 613, tab 9, please.

Now, of course, you've never had access to -- you've never had access to intercepted telephone calls, and you -- I wouldn't expect you ⁴⁸⁸³² to, so this is not material that you could have researched unless you heard it in the course of the trial proceedings. This is an intercepted telephone call of the 17th of June of 1991. And if you'd be good enough to look at page 2, and if Mr. Nort, if there is a spare copy, lays that on the overhead projector. If there is a spare copy. If there isn't, it doesn't matter. This is a conversation between this accused and Karadzic, and the relevant short passage says this -- thank you very much. That will do. That's fine.

"How is Koljevic ..." Then: "... not [sic] very pleased, we're going to Banja Luka ..." The accused: "No, nothing, I expect to see what he will tell me now."

And then Karadzic: "There are, I suppose, information from the head of the General Staff that they will not let Croatia and Slovenia do it."

The accused says: "... that's why I'm preparing this amendment - to enable them to do it."

Karadzic: "That would be presented at the Assembly session, right?"

And then it goes on: "This man of mine is late, and what is most important ..." and so on.

The next sentence: "This man of yours cannot escape ... "Yes ...

"And if he does not escape, they step out anyway. And if he escapes from his statement, then he does not have a state." ⁴⁸⁸³³ Now, if we look at that passage and we then look at the next one, and I'll ask you to look at these two together, 613, tab 15, of course it will be for the learned Judges in due course to decide on the particular meaning of these intercepts, but if -- this one is a little later. This is the 1st of July of 1991, and it's at the bottom of the first page. And it says this: The accused says: "There have nothing more to do, now we are the ones making the moves, it's time for our move now. Gligorov and that man can do whatever they want, they won't ... the thing is clear there we can't discuss it in detail now. They want to separate. "That's clear.

"That's clear and they should be allowed to separate. "Yes."

Over the page: "There is only one question left, to have disintegration in the line with our inclinations. "Karadzic: Yes.

"Nothing more. "Karadzic: Okay. They cannot wait for that man any more, because they are in a hurry, aren't they?

The accused: "Who are they expecting? "The first one expected of them is this man of ours. "Karadzic: Bosnia."

The accused: "Well, they mustn't wait for him, no. Concerning Slovenia, I would let them go immediately. "Yes.

"Let them go immediately, and the others as well after they have ⁴⁸⁸³⁴ settled the issues of borders with us. And I cannot let your man, because your man cannot even bring it to you."

Now, in all your dealings with this accused, in this middle part of 1991, did he ever reveal to you that he was actually quite happy for there to be disintegration provided it was in accordance with his own inclinations?

A. No.

Q. And looking at this evidence, of course it's a matter for interpretation for the Court in due course, but looking at this evidence, this is evidence that has to change, does it not, the view you must form of the man who came and saw you in September, protesting that he wanted Yugoslavia to stay together? It does, doesn't it?

A. Well, not necessarily, I think it depends on what he -- by that time what he meant by Yugoslavia. I think when he was speaking to me he had pretty well accepted the separation of Slovenia and Croatia. He certainly wasn't objecting to the separation of Macedonia. I think his major concern was keeping Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia together.

Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Bissett, we must go back to tab 1 of the accused's exhibits, the paragraph you and I looked at that he didn't take you to. And you agreed with me that what you reported was the accused telling you he favoured effectively a confederal system.

A. Yes.

Q. Loose fashion, nothing there about being happy for them to go. A confederal system. You see, my suggestion to you, Mr. Bissett, is that, amongst other things, you may have been being taken in, as diplomats may ⁴⁸⁸³⁵ be, by politicians who hide their agendas. It's possible, isn't it?

A. Of course that's possible.

Q. Thank you. Very well. I'm going to move swiftly then.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, could you just explain to me what you see as the difference between the import of these communications and paragraph 17.

MR. NICE: These communications are making it clear, and the court has heard other evidence about this, that the accused was willing for Slovenia and Croatia to leave on his terms.

JUDGE BONOMY: Is that not what paragraph 17 says?

MR. NICE: No. Paragraph 7 says he looks forward to a confederal system.

JUDGE BONOMY: I thought it was 17, sorry.

MR. NICE: Yes, 17, on page 8. "He outlined his own vision of what future settlement would look like - a federated union of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia with some form of association with autonomous Serbian regions of Croatia - linked in loose fashion with sovereign states of Slovenia and Croatia for purposes of business and trade." And I understood the witness to accept that that is a confederal proposal.

JUDGE BONOMY: But it looks like Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries, something like the European Union, for the purposes of trade. It doesn't seem to me to be any different from what's in the communication, but there are we.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁸⁸³⁶

Q. As we move through the process at The Hague and the Carrington Plan, are you aware of the steps that were taken -- no. There's one other document I must ask you to look at, because I think it fits in chronologically at this stage.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we're going to take the adjournment now.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. NICE:

Q. Look at this document that's being distributed. There was a man called Bob Djurdjevic. Do you remember that man? He was, I think, a Serb businessman, probably quite a wealthy man, who had access to various people, including yourself, and he spoke to them about matters that were happening at the time. Ms. Tromp tells me that despite the way the matter's noted, on the document it might be Djuretic, but it's recorded as Djurdjevic, and this man met you probably in the 21st, 22nd, 23rd of September and made a note of a conversation with you. You can see it there. This is part of a diary that's, I think, about 800 pages long. Do you remember that man coming to see you?

A. Yes, I vaguely do.

Q. All right. I'm not going to take much time of yours on this but ⁴⁸⁸³⁷ it's just something that you might be able to help us with. He deals with your personal circumstances, Winnipeg and so on, the current situation on media censorship and give expressions about freedom of press being worse in Croatia. And you said this, though, incidentally, under -- you're recorded as saying this: "As for Serbian press censorship, he said --" that's you, Mr. Bissett -- "said that this weekend you had been to Budapest, saw the pictures there as on the Belgrade Television, but in Budapest you saw the bodies, something which the Belgrade Television had carefully edited out." Do you remember saying something about that?

A. I can't say I clearly do remember that.

Q. Well, because time is short, if we turn over the page, casting our eyes down the various things that you talked about, then Tudjman and the minorities, and you say how Tudjman should have acknowledged the genocide and reassured the Serbs - this was your opinion - failed to do so, no wonder the Krajina erupted.

But it's the next paragraph that I would be grateful for your comment on because you're recorded as saying that you feared most an escalation of violence into Bosnia and that when you talked to Milosevic about the Croatian situation, he told you that he wasn't necessarily for annexing the Serbian districts in Croatia, maybe a part of Slavonia, he said, with the Krajina getting an autonomous status. So if this recording of your words is accurate, and that's a matter I'll ask you to deal with in a second, but you said that Milosevic told you he didn't encourage the fighting for a secession from Croatia, but if this is accurate, then he would appear to have said something to ⁴⁸⁸³⁸ you along the lines of no annexation for districts of Croatia but maybe part of Slavonia.

Now, do you remember, first of all, whether Milosevic did say things like that to you?

A. Never. He never said anything of that kind to me.

Q. Because to say something like that to you would be to make a distinction between his then plans for Croatia and for -- or for one part of Croatia than for another.

A. No.

Q. The rest of it, casting your eyes over it, would appear to be accurate, wouldn't it?

A. Not necessarily so, but I can't --

Q. Very well. Well, I wanted you to have a chance to deal with it but if you -- if you can't testify to its accuracy generally, then we'll take no more time with it.

A. May I just say that this man has a website as well --

Q. Does he?

A. And --

Q. Very well.

A. -- it's not very credible in many areas of what he has to say on the website, and I'm afraid this is the same case here.

JUDGE BONOMY: He's testifying to its inaccuracy, I think, Mr. Nice, rather than not able to testify to its accuracy.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. I'm not going to take the matter further in any event, one way or the other. I wanted him to have a ⁴⁸⁸³⁹ chance to deal with it and he's dealt with it.

THE WITNESS: I would say clearly before the Court that I never had any conversation with President Milosevic in which he said these -- these, or made these remarks to me.

MR. NICE:

Q. Very well. When we come to the ending of 1991 and The Hague process itself, you've explained that you don't have a recollection of the nature of the agreement beyond what we've already discussed, so I shan't press you further on that, however -- I don't imagine you've taken an opportunity to read Bulatovic's book, have you?

A. No, I have not.

Q. However, he's written - and we understand we're going to see him - he's written in his book whereas The Hague proposals were going to be agreed to and in -- he got an intermission -- a message in the intermission that this accused had told him not to accept the proposal, that Bulatovic was unable to persuade his own parliament to change mind because they were dealing with its ratification, and so that, in the event, he did vote for it, against this accused's will. There's another part I'm going to come to in just a second, but did you learn from the accused or from anybody else in the former Yugoslavia at the time that in favouring The Hague agreement, Bulatovic was working -- was acting against this accused's will?

A. No, I was not aware of that.

Q. And he goes on to say in his book, pages 85 to 86, was that the military rejected the plan because the confederal proposal would abolish ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁰ the SFRY and, by it, the JNA. Now, the JNA was regarded really as a separate republic, wasn't it, in the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore -- I mean, it didn't have the voting rights and political rights but it was effectively such a large interest. And Bulatovic explains that the army made it plain, he pieced everything together, he says, in his book, that if needed, the JNA would rise against the civil leadership, which would be breaching its constitution in agreeing to The Hague proposals. Basically, the army announced a coup d'etat and that's what forced this accused to vote against The Hague proposals.

Now, again, you were there, ear on the ground, talking to the accused, occasionally to others. Were you aware at the time of the rejection of The Hague proposal that the army was effectively threatening a coup if it had been agreed to?

A. No, I was not aware of that. I must say there were rumours, of course, during that whole period that the army might stage a coup d'etat because it was one of the major institutions of the Yugoslav federation and would have lost a great deal if Yugoslavia did break up. So there were always rumours abounding that one of these days the JNA was going to stage a coup d'etat.

Q. So --

A. But I wasn't specifically aware of this.

Q. So -- very well, I'm not going to take you any further on that. ⁴⁸⁸⁴¹ If we go back to the events and we move away from the settlement of Yugoslavia just for a couple of sentences to go back to March of 1991, you've touched on this a little bit yourself with the withdrawal of Jovic from the Presidency and the accused's statement on television. Again, have you looked at Jovic's book - and he's been a witness and given his evidence in line with much of what's in his book. Have you looked at his book?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. Or reviewed his evidence here?

A. No.

Q. Then I want your comment, please, in light of your last answer. He explains that the desire at the beginning of -- well, first of all, we have the -- the demonstration at the beginning of March of 1991. I think it's a demonstration you spoke of yourself. Do you remember?

A. Yes.

Q. That was a demonstration triggered in a peaceful way by people who were concerned at lack of press freedom, wasn't it?

A. That was one of the --

Q. Yes.

A. -- one of the reasons, yes.

Q. And it was a peaceful demonstration that would not justify a state of emergency in using the tanks.

A. That I could not agree with.

Q. Well, it became a violent demonstration, didn't it?

A. A very violent demonstration. ⁴⁸⁸⁴²

Q. And --

A. I witnessed that myself.

Q. And how it was turned from peaceful into violent is something you can't help us with?

A. No. All I can say is that the mob was very violent, was smashing windows --

Q. Became very violent?

A. When I saw them, they were violent.

Q. Yes.

A. They were armed with two-by-fours and sticks, and I think there was no doubt that they were intent on causing trouble.

Q. But I think you confirmed that it was initially a peaceful protest --

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Really?

A. No.

Q. And then the tanks were out with the authority because -- but then the next passage, which is connected, about a week later, the withdrawal of Jovic from the position he held, he explains that there was a plan whereby there would be a military coup if he withdrew from his position as president and the army would take over, but what happened was that the army either lacked the nerve or didn't like what had been done and they didn't have the coup that they'd planned and that's why he went back into his position. Do you remember that being made clear at the time?

A. No, I do not. ⁴⁸⁸⁴³

Q. But it's not, again, in light of what said about the army's interests and the possibilities of coup, it's by no means unrealistic, is it?

A. It's not unrealistic, no, but I wasn't aware of it.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, this is all dealt with in Exhibit 596, tab 2, and also tab 1, and has been dealt with in evidence.

Q. I move very rapidly, for want of time, through to 1992. The two plans that you say this accused agreed to, the Vance Plan and the Cutileiro Plan, both provided for, if you can remember the details, ethnic separation, didn't they?

A. No, I don't think the Cutileiro Plan called for ethnic separation. It called for three geographical units in Bosnia, but the population would have been of mixed ethnic origin.

Q. But those units would have been determined by essential ethnic dominance, wouldn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Paving the way so that the Vance Plan, with the UNPAs, were carving out from -- not carving out but identifying within Croatia areas of Serb domination which could, if they became consolidated, ultimately be joined on to other areas of Serb domination; correct?

A. Well, that's a hypothesis. I don't know. I suppose that one could interpret it that way.

Q. Well -- and I notice that you explained to the Court earlier on that all the agreements seemed ultimately to allow for the increase in Serb territory. Would that increase in Serb territory under something ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁴ like the Vance Plan have been by joining up connected areas?

A. I don't think I did say that all the agreements allowed for increase in Serb territory. I think I said that all of the plans allowed for the protection of the Serb majority populations in Croatia.

Q. Very well.

JUDGE BONOMY: I think you said -- I think they all allowed for the alteration of the boundaries of Serbia. That doesn't necessarily mean an extension of them.

MR. NICE: Well, we can --

THE WITNESS: I don't recall saying that. I mean, it wasn't part of Serbia. They were talking about Croatia. And these areas that they were talking about were -- had been populated, of course, by majority Serb population for hundreds of years, but ...

MR. NICE:

Q. The -- then the Cutileiro Plan is the three distinct areas with ethnic domination. The Vance-Owen Plan, of course, was less appealing because although it may have broken territory up according to ethnic dominance, there was no contiguity between, for example, Serb or Croat areas, was there?

A. No, but the Cutileiro Plan was talking about Bosnia, of course; the Vance-Owen Plan was really to stop the fighting and to give guarantees to the Serbian population and the Serbian majority areas, that they would be protected. As I recall, it even -- it even held them under the Yugoslav federal law at the time and not Croatian law.

Q. I think you may be confusing the Vance-Owen Plan with the Vance ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁵ Plan.

A. It could be, yes.

Q. I see that you don't claim special knowledge on those plans and therefore I'm not going to test you further on that. Just a few other topics, very quickly. I didn't -- oh, yes, just one thing: You've expressed some views about -- you've expressed some views about -- very strong views about the nature of the Rambouillet and Paris agreements, and as you appreciate, those of us working in this court have, as I think the Court made clear, no concern with those overarching political decisions, we are just here to run this court and its trials. But since you deal with the process that led to this happening, can you just have a look at this document, please, in case you can help us with it.

MR. NICE: These are two letters, Your Honour. I'm not sure whether we've looked at them before. They were published in a newspaper. We have the newspaper produced. And we have English translations for both letters, and I'll take them swiftly. They're there in full.

Q. There is a translation here of a letter, Mr. Bissett, coming from Foreign Secretary Cook, and Foreign Minister Vedrine of France, and it says this: "We finished the talks about Kosovo in Paris. We send you a copy of the statement co-presiding, explaining the reasons for this decision. The Kosovo delegation signed --" I'm sorry if you haven't found it. It looks like this. There it is.

"The Kosovo delegation signed the complete Rambouillet ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁶ agreement. It is still not too late for you to accept it as well. The intermediaries are ready to respond to every kind of indication -- indication from your side that you're ready for it. The agreement remains on the table. We urge you to take the possibility which is offered by the agreement in Rambouillet to achieve peace in Kosovo in order to make way for a new chapter in the relations between the federal republic and the international community. You will also find a serious warning in the statement regarding any kind of military offensive in Kosovo. Large movements of your security forces are very disturbing. We remind you of your obligations ..."

Now, this is the last-minute offer that was made by those two foreign secretaries. Do you recall that offer being made?

A. No, I can't say I recall that.

Q. Because I must suggest to you that whatever the rights and wrongs of the negotiations is simply not a matter for us at all. Whatever the rights and wrongs, it would appear that the accused was given at the very last minute a sincere offer. You don't challenge that the foreign ministers would have done that, do you?

A. Well, the offer was to sign the agreement.

Q. Yes.

A. But he'd already rejected it because of Appendix B.

Q. And if we now look at the reply, which I'd like you to look at, please, for one particular purpose. I've got it in English and I hope that Mr. Nort has the newspaper article there as well. If you'd like to lay the -- if we just look at the English version first on the overhead ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁷ projector, please, Mr. Nort.

The talks in Paris which you call adjourned, didn't take place at all. Various other paragraphs. I'm happy for that detail to be gone into but time doesn't permit us to, but I do want -- then we go over to the next page, but before we go to the next page, Mr. Nort, if the English readers will look at it in the English, I'm going to ask the interpreters if they can help us from the newspaper article. Could you place the newspaper article on the overhead projector. Next page, please, to make sure there is no problem with translation. Right. Right at the bottom of that page. A bit further down. Down. No. That's it. Now, if the interpreters can see that paragraph there -- back out a bit, we need the end of the paragraph, "stolse" [phoen], whatever it is. The last paragraph, I'm going to ask them, please, if they follow my English translation as I read, if they'd be good enough to follow that passage.

In the English there's this passage: "Regarding your threats with NATO military intervention, your peoples should be ashamed of them for you prepare yourselves to use force against a small European nation just because it protects its territory from separatism, protects its citizens from terrorism, and its historical dignity against rats who know nothing about history or dignity."

Now, I hope the word "rats" is correctly translated.

THE INTERPRETER: There is no such word here. What is written means scoundrels or something like that.

MR. NICE: Thank you. I wanted to because this is -- ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁸

Q. Do you accept that he would have rejected that proposal in those emphatic terms?

A. Yes, I think I can clearly understand why he rejected the letter, because, as I said, there is no way that he or any other president of Serbia could have accepted Appendix B, particularly the allowing of NATO forces on its sovereign state. You know, Serbia had accepted all of the UN resolutions regarding Kosovo. They had permitted troops from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- well, of observers to come in, and I think, as I recall, Serbia had accepted all of the ten factors of Rambouillet, the ten sections. It was the Appendix B that was put on the agreement at the last minute which forced the Russian delegation to walk out, because it was a surprise to them. That was the -- the trigger that --

Q. There was an opportunity --

A. -- guaranteed the rejection of --

Q. But there was an opportunity, right until the last minute, to save this.

A. Yes.

Q. Can we go back, please, to your published statements. I'm sorry, I forgot to remind you to look at them over the adjournment and you probably didn't take them with you. And I've got just a few questions on those on two different topics, and then we're done. Would you go, please, to page 4. And it's really -- this is to do with you, Mr. Bissett, the third bullet point, you've set out, again on your website, that: "It appears our NATO leaders didn't realise with more ⁴⁸⁸⁴⁹ care, by supporting Albanian extremists, the scourge of Albanian racism would be unleashed in the Balkans." You don't, I think, make reference as against the Serbs ever to their racism. I'm not sure about Croatian racism. Do you think it's unfortunate for a man in your position to be using words like that?

A. Possibly, but that's the word I used.

Q. Can we go over two pages, please, to page 6. The first bullet point, four lines down -- no, two lines down, you say this of the Kosovo struggle: "It is true that the Yugoslav security forces used ruthless methods to do so to put down an armed rebellion." What was your knowledge of those ruthless methods?

A. Well, I think it was common knowledge -- knowledge and reported in the media that many of the villages accused of harbouring KLA terrorists were shelled, were occupied by Serb troops. There was displacement of people. I think the United Nations said approximately 200.000 people had been displaced because of the fighting.

Q. And you accepted that these villages had been shelled?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And not just in 1999 but also earlier in 1998?

A. Well, I don't now about 1998. I think the beginnings of the fighting took -- started in 1998, but I think the major fighting was taking place in 1999.

Q. You went on to say this: "One could argue that it was to Yugoslavia's credit that it didn't pulverise KLA villages by dropping tons of bombs on them from the safety of 15.000 feet." Was it really your view ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁰ that that would have been a proper way to deal with this terrorist --

A. No. I was being sarcastic --

Q. Very well.

A. -- because that's the way the Americans are doing it and they are doing it in Iraq, and that's what they did to Yugoslavia.

Q. A matter of detail towards the foot of the page, the second to last bullet point, you say that: "Milosevic had no reason to look favourably upon NATO. Prior to Kosovo, the biggest ethnic cleansing took place in Croatia. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs who had lived there for hundreds of years were cleansed out of Croatia with the help of NATO airstrikes."

Can you explain that? Are you under the impression there were NATO airstrikes at either Flash or Storm?

A. In Storm I think there definitely was.

Q. Do you accept that that's incorrect?

A. If you can show me that it was incorrect.

Q. Very well.

A. There have been reports to the effect that there were interruption of Serb communications and airstrikes on some of their communications. The fact of the master is I find it a bit ironic that the Serbs are accused of being the great ethnic cleansing, but if we do take a look at the record, there are very few Serbs left in Sarajevo, there are very few left in Croatia, and almost none at all in Kosovo. There are well over 300.000 or so refugees still in Serbia. Highly unlikely they'll be able to return. ⁴⁸⁸⁵¹

Q. The consequence of these wars are as they are and we are concerned with the offences, if any, committed in the courses of them. Can you turn over, please, to page 9. At the bottom of the page, last couple of bullet points but I shan't bother with your comments about this court. We've dealt with that already. But you said here: "Milosevic was the product of an old communist era elite, driven solely by power and privilege, not the interests of his nation's people." Still your view?

A. I characterised all of the leaders in the Balkans as being old former communists, I suppose with the exception of Izetbegovic, who had never been a member of the party, to my knowledge. But with the collapse of the communist ideology, these leaders, including Mr. Milosevic, tended to then use ethnic and religious differences to continue in power, and I found that by their actions many of them were not particularly interested in the -- in anything other than keeping their power, their prestige, and their privileges.

Q. Mr. Bissett, your observation here couldn't be clearer. You may have said similar things about the others, but your judgement of Milosevic was that he was driven solely by power and privilege and not by the interests of his nation's people. Is that your view? You published it.

A. Can you show me again where I am in this document?

Q. Second bullet point from the bottom.

A. Oh, from the bottom.

Q. It follows the observation that he should face trial, but I'm not going to ask you about that because that's probably a legal question.

A. I think I was probably too strong in saying "solely." ⁴⁸⁸⁵²

Q. Can we turn over to the next page, then, and see how you set things out in the last passage that we have here of your writings. About the winter 1996, 1997 demonstrations against Milosevic in Belgrade -- are these the ones over the elections, by the way, Mr. Bissett?

A. Yes. These were the elections of 1996, 1997.

Q. Those were the rigged elections where eventually he gave in, didn't he?

A. Yes, I think that's right, yes.

Q. Yes. Somebody actually managed to get some evidence that the elections were rigged and he stood up for a long time, with the support of his wife, and then he finally gave in. But -- I think that's fine. But we'll go on from that. "The people realise now he wasn't really interested in Greater Serbia but in preserving and expanding his own power and prestige and that he would sell them out at any time over any issue in order to keep that."

Now, that was your view.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What year was that?

MR. NICE: It's interesting, indeed, Your Honour, because I was going to put that to the witness.

Q. You published this before the Kosovo crisis, in 1997 in the Hamilton Spectator.

A. I don't think I published that, I think it was an interview.

Q. You're quite right, it was an interview, and I apologise for that, you're quite right. But it's a very clear expression of view, and if I may say so, cannot, of course, have been affected or infected by your ⁴⁸⁸⁵³ reaction to the 1999 NATO bombing.

A. No, it had nothing to do --

Q. No, quite.

A. -- with the bombing, but I think I should put it in the context. I was trying to be -- the interviewer was asking me about Mr. Milosevic's designs to create a Greater Serbia, and I was saying that that was not the case, that I didn't think he had any interest in establishing a Greater Serbia.

Q. Quite.

A. I said that, if anything, many Serbs had felt that Mr. Milosevic had sold them out in all of the peace plans, and most certainly at Dayton.

Q. But --

A. He is not looked upon, in my own view, by many Bosnian Serbs or Croatian Serbs as someone who did give them what they fully expected, which was protection.

Q. But, Mr. Bissett, remember what I said to you right at the beginning of my questioning. A former ambassador's words carry weight and have to be measured. You were saying this in 1997 about a sitting president, and Kosovo was yet to come. And you said in terms: "... in preserving and expanding his own power and prestige and that he would sell them out at any time over any issue ... to keep that." Is that the truth?

A. Well, I mean, if it's an accurate reporting of what I said, and in the context, that's what I was trying to say. I mean, I think I have to make it quite clear that I'm not a personal friend of Mr. Milosevic. I do ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁴ feel, however, that he was doing his best as the president to solve the problems of the Balkans peacefully and through negotiation, and had it not been for him, none of these peace plans would have worked. Some of them didn't work. But certainly if he had not applied a great deal of pressure on his -- on Karadzic and on the Croatian Serbs, these peace agreements would not come about. And I think that, in my view, clearly indicated that the man was not in the slightest interested in a Greater Serbia and none of his actions indicated that. He was interested in keeping himself in power and enjoying the prestige and privilege of being a president.

Q. My last question relates to what's on your website. There is still an article on your website that questions in strong terms whether 8.000 people were killed at Srebrenica, links that figure with the general corruption of this court. Are you aware of the concession that's been made by the RS about the number of people who have been killed at Srebrenica?

A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Q. Do you think it's time to withdrew that article from your website?

A. No, I don't think it is time yet to withdraw it. I will certainly withdraw it if there is conclusive proof that 8.000 were executed. I followed it very carefully. The 8.000 figure was used initially by an international representative of the International Red Cross who came out of Srebrenica after it had been taken over by Serbian troops, interviewed by a New York Times reporter, in which he said that there were 8.000 young men missing. That was interpreted by the New York Times reporter as though they had all been executed. That figure has stuck with the media ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁵ ever since.

Q. And you don't think that the RS's concession is likely to be relied on?

A. No, I don't think so --

Q. All right.

A. -- under pressure.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination? Mr. Nice, any exhibits?

MR. NICE: Yes, sorry. May the witness's statements please be exhibited, from his website. I forgot to get him to deal with them at the break. I would have preferred to have got him to deal with that.

JUDGE KWON: This is just a citation from the website.

MR. NICE: It is, yes.

JUDGE KWON: Not in its entirety.

MR. NICE: It's gathered together by topics, as you'll see.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll admit only those parts that were dealt with in evidence.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit 955.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I heard the witness say that those matters were taken out of context, and so I don't think it is commensurate that if the witness indicates those quotations were taken out of context ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁶ that they be introduced into evidence, just like that. Mr. Nice has made objections during the last testimony that there were exhibits which -- whereby some short passages were given, taken from documents, whereas this was taken out of context, and that's something the witness pointed out.

JUDGE KWON: They were admitted and you can put this into context in your re-examination, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I can't put it into context if it's something I don't know about, because we had fragments taken out from their context from a website of Mr. Bissett's. So I can't analyse the website now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There was no outright denial on his part. He may have disputed some elements of it, but I believe that there was sufficient acceptance for them to be admitted, and if there is any matter that you wish to dispute, you can do so in re-examination. So let us proceed with the re-examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm going to challenge something straight away, something that the witness either forgot about or doesn't know about. Anyway, the question was demonstrations in 1996 and 1997, where the witness agreed that it was a hand-over of power. Re-examination by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. So I'm going to ask the witness now: Do you know, Mr. Bissett, that those demonstrations were staged in connection with -- the local elections and not the federal elections that were held at the same time?

A. No. As a matter of fact, I'm not -- I wasn't clear what the elections were all about that were referred to here. I accepted ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁷ Mr. Nice's explanation that they were the elections that led to your defeat in the elections after, as he said, they were considered to be rigged.

Q. Very well. So you accepted that considering that -- because you considered that he was stating a fact. Is that the -- is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, do you allow for the possibility, for example, that since these matters that are very transparent, you can't qualify elections in any other way except in the way they were conducted, because at that time federal elections were held at which the coalition which I led won, whereas here we were dealing with local elections, of course in a large number of towns where demonstrations were being staged in protest against elections that were thought to be rigged. Do you allow for the fact that that might be true, might be correct? And I'm saying that publicly here, in television, that the federal elections -- or give or take a few days, the federal elections and the coalition where I won, so it wasn't a question of my leaving power, and that wasn't challenged, but what was challenged was the elections held in a certain number of towns. I don't know if there were 20, 30, 40 of them, perhaps; it doesn't matter.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the specific question, Mr. Milosevic?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The question is this: Do you allow for the fact, Mr. Bissett, that the truth is that these demonstrations were staged in connection with the local elections? Might that have been the case?

A. Yes, it might have been the case. I'm afraid I can't -- I can't ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁸ testify about these elections at all. I wasn't there and I wasn't involved in any way.

Q. Very well. Thank you. I'm just asking you because a moment ago, when asked by Mr. Nice whether that was the case, he --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on, Mr. Milosevic. The witness has answered. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Mr. Bissett, do you allow that Mr. Nice, in asking you questions, stated matters that were not correct?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, that's -- that's a meaningless question. I mean, if you have specific matters to put to him which you say incorrectly stated matters, then you can put it to him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Mr. Nice quoted certain witnesses, Prosecution witnesses, in connection with the constitutional amendments that were adopted in 1989. Now -- and he quoted what some witnesses said, or he paraphrased what they said. I'm going to paraphrase because I don't have the material to quote them exactly in front of me, but the then-president of the Assembly of Kosovo testified here, Kosovo and Metohija. His name was Vukasin Jokanovic who was chairman. He presided over the meeting of the Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija when the amendments were adopted, and he brought with him the stenographic notes from that particular session, and he showed us that completely institutionally and in conformity with the ⁴⁸⁸⁵⁹ constitution was the procedure adopted for the amendments and how they were adopted, and he testified that there were no tanks or violence at the time. Now, do you allow for the fact that he was testifying truthfully?

JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness doesn't have any personal knowledge of these matters, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, you should have told Mr. Nice that when he asked his questions about the constitution amendments of 1989, which were, he said, adopted in the presence of tanks, through violent means, et cetera. You should have told him that. You should have said the witness had no knowledge of that. That's what I expected of you, but as you didn't say that, now I'm asking the witness whether he allows for the fact that the president of the Assembly chairing the meeting was telling the truth. And he even brought with him the stenographic notes from that session and that that was the truth of it, because Mr. Bissett said it was possible, I didn't know about it, as if it was something that actually happened, whereas it's not true. So a competent witness brought documents with him here to show us and showed us how things stood. So I now ask him whether he allows for the fact that what the president of Kosovo and Metohija Assembly testified about is true and correct, and his name was Jokanovic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you in a position to answer that question? Are you in a position to answer at that question?

THE WITNESS: Well, I mean, in terms of is it possible that it was correct, of course yes, but I have no knowledge one way or the other.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let's move on, yes. ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁰

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, speaking about sending out the army, you mentioned an example that Zimmerman told you about, about sending the army by Ante Markovic to Slovenia. Do you remember that?

A. I remember when Zimmerman told me that during Secretary of State -- US Secretary of State Baker's visit to Belgrade in June of 1992 in a last-ditch effort to try and prevent Yugoslavia from breaking up, where he met on a marathon all-day session with all of the leaders of all the republics, he started off his first morning meeting with Anton Markovic, the federal Prime Minister, and he ended it with Markovic. And Zimmerman told me that it was still United States policy to keep Yugoslavia united and that Baker, the Secretary of State, had told Markovic that if Slovenia did anything overtly and with violence to break away and the army was sent in, the United States would not criticise that decision.

Q. Well, do you remember that Markovic called the army to Slovenia?

A. Well, I'm not sure who ordered the army into Slovenia, but certainly it was -- it went into Slovenia in order to restore the federal customs posts along the border that had been seized by armed Slovenian Home Guard personnel.

MR. NICE: I wasn't listening whether the witness said June of 1992 or whether he said a different year. The transcript reads June of 1992. It may be an error.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that? Where is that, Mr. Nice? Would you like to just clarify that.

THE WITNESS: Yes. I think it was June of 1991. ⁴⁸⁸⁶¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm asking you that because Mr. Nice here quoted Ante Markovic testifying and allegedly saying that I asked that the army be sent to Kosovo. Now, do you know anything dating back to those times whereby I would have asked the army to be sent to Kosovo, and was there any need at all to send the army to Kosovo in the first place, especially bearing in mind the fact that the army already existed in Kosovo, was already there?

A. Are we now talking about Kosovo and not Slovenia?

Q. We are talking about this: That Mr. Nice quoted Ante Markovic, the federal Prime Minister of the day, about saying that I had asked the army to be sent to Kosovo. Now, from those days, do you know that anybody sent the army to Kosovo? Otherwise, the army was in Kosovo, as it was in all other parts of Yugoslavia, it was present there too?

A. Yes, of course the army always had a presence in Kosovo. I can't really comment on who ordered or if there were orders to send the army to Kosovo. Certainly some elements of the army were in Kosovo.

Q. Well, he asked you in connection to Markovic's testimony that, and you said, "I didn't know about that," as if it was something that had happened, and that's why I asked you my question just now. Now, my next question is this --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have to be careful. If you want my advice, this is not the kind of witness that you should re-examine in any great detail. You have the evidence that you wanted from him in your examination-in-chief, and it might turn out to be unhelpful to your cause. ⁴⁸⁸⁶²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm going back to certain matters which Mr. Nice presented here as being fact which are not facts. And so, for example, we have this:

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Bissett, now I'm addressing you. Mr. Nice quoted a witness, Milan Babic, do you remember?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember that you read out here a quotation from my letter to Milan Babic this morning in which I publicly announce and state that he was creating an illusion with the citizens of Krajina, that he was consulting the leadership in Serbia about what was going on, whereas he wasn't? Do you remember that I said that that was not correct?

A. Yes, I do remember that.

Q. Well, now, I did that in the papers. I made this announcement to the papers and said that he was lying that he was negotiating with us. Now, I'm asking you the question because he quoted Babic that testified about something that he and I allegedly discussed. Do you consider it to be the proper case that he quoted Babic in connection with my views, bearing in mind my letter and everything else that happened --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is getting out of hand. You can't ask the witness whether he considers it to be proper that Mr. Nice quoted Babic in connection with something or the other. That's not the purpose of re-examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you should have cautioned Mr. Nice when he asked his questions of this witness and asked ⁴⁸⁸⁶³ him what Babic had told him, whereas he said he didn't know. He said possibly. Well, everything is possible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm cutting you off. If there was occasion to caution Mr. Nice, I would have done so. You don't understand. You do not understand the mechanics of the adversarial system, and I've advised you not to pursue re-examining this witness. Live with the evidence that you have adduced through him in examination-in-chief.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice here showed us a letter by Vedrine and Cook to me, and my answer to them, and the witness answered questions in that regard. So I have to ask him questions connected to that now. You have it in English, and in their letter it says that they completed talks about Kosovo in Paris, and then it goes on to say that: "The Kosovo delegation signed the agreement in its entirety. It is not too late for you to accept it too. The mediators are ready to answer any indications on your part that you're ready to do so, that we're ready to accept the agreement which was signed."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Mr. Bissett, is it quite clear here that they are just insisting once again that this agreement be signed without any changes? Is that quite obvious?

A. That is how I read it, yes.

Q. Very well, then. Now, take a look at what my answer was. "I'm sending you the following answer, gentlemen ministers. The talks in Paris for which you say have been completed were never held. The delegations of the government of the Republic of Serbia and representatives of the ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁴ Albanian separatist and terrorist movement never held discussions, not even once."

And then two paragraphs later, the second document that you term an agreement from Rambouillet is not actually an agreement from Rambouillet because neither in Rambouillet nor in Paris those who had come to negotiate did not do so. There was no discussion amongst them, no negotiation, and therefore there could not have been a joint document to reject or adopt.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the question? You are not to give evidence, comment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, since Mr. Nice told you that another opportunity was given us to accept the Rambouillet meeting whole-heartedly, do you know that there were no talks, there were no negotiations, and that everything that you said about the Rambouillet meeting was an offer to be signed?

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... and I only offer this: If the accused wants these letters in as exhibits, I'm quite content for that to happen. I didn't ask for it to happen because the witness seemed to have no recollection, triggered by seeing them, of the letters themselves certainly, and as that accords with your normal practice, I didn't think you'd admit it, but if the accused wants them in, I'm happy.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And in any event the question was exceedingly leading.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I think this should be ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁵ included, because I think it's a very good and honest letter, and I would like to tender it into evidence.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, just take a look at the last paragraph of that letter, or, rather, the penultimate paragraph and the last one too. "You are, gentlemen, ministers of foreign affairs of two European countries, and as such you are distinguished diplomats. In such a capacity, you have the right to mediate, to negotiate, to advocate goodwill, to strive for peace in Europe for -- and the world and better relations among nations. But you do not have the right to threaten other countries and their citizens nor to arrange life in those countries. We stay with our strong option to solve the problems of Kosovo and Metohija by peaceful means, through negotiations. The fact that negotiations did not take place either in Rambouillet or Paris does not mean that we should give up negotiations, at least from our peaceful and democratic standpoint." And that's the end of the letter.

Therefore, can we consider that this is causing war, endeavouring to cause war, or is it an effort to hold negotiations that weren't even held?

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not for the witness to comment on. We'll read it and make up our minds.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Nice quoted paragraph 17 of your own telegram as illustration of the fact that I hadn't told you that we had nothing against Slovenia and Croatia seceding. ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁶ Now, please take a look at what it actually says in paragraph 17, where it says the following: "... vision of what future settlement would look like - [In English] a federated union of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia with some form of association with autonomous Serbian regions of Croatia - linked is loose -- in loose fashion with --" [Interpretation] What does it say here? What does it say after that? Would you please read it out. Can you see that portion, Mr. Bissett?

A. Yes, I can.

Q. "[In English] ... loose fashion with ..." what?

A. " ... sovereign states of Slovenia and Croatia ..."

Q. "... for purposes of business and trade."

A. "For purposes --"

Q. [Interpretation] So does it say sovereign states there?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, was that challenged at all, that I told them that that was a possible vision, or what is the difference between what he explained to you here, saying that I wasn't truthful to you, whereas I told you the same thing? Do you see any difference there?

A. No, I don't see any real difference.

Q. He said to you that The Hague document was a proposal for a confederation. Do you know that Article 1 of The Hague document read six republics become independent states? Do you remember that? If not, I'm not going to ask you about it. But once they become six independent states, then what is the difference between the establishment of their ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁷ relations and the relations between Serbia and Croatia and Serbia and Bulgaria to the west and to the east? If they're all six independent states, then where's the difference?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you answer that?

THE WITNESS: There's no difference.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Mr. Nice also asked you something in connection with your position on the Tribunal, as regards the Tribunal, your attitude to it. Now, this is from Jamie Shea's press conference, NATO spokesman, given on the 17th of May, 1999, in which he says the following: "[Inaudible] is the friend of the Tribunal."

MR. NICE: Doesn't seem to me to be re-examination, unless I'm mistaken, but it's up to the Court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: How does this arise?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it arises from the question of why Mr. Bissett said that this was a political court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Mr. Bissett, is this Tribunal or did this Tribunal take on the role of covering NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia through this trial?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I'm not going to allow that question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Nice asked you a question in connection to my alleged ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁸ intentions to eliminate Markovic. Take a look at page 5 of your telegram now, please. At the very beginning you state the following: "[In English] He was hard on Prime Minister Markovic, claiming Prime Minister was destroying country -- when economy was collapsing one should not play single string -- one should not play single string of tight monetary policy. All republics of like mind with him on this." [Interpretation] And then you go to explain: "Milosevic had been president of Yugoslavia's biggest and most successful bank." Was president. Used to be a president. "[In English] Now all were forced to support even weakest banks."

JUDGE KWON: That is tab 3, page 4.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, my conversation with you, did it boil down to criticising Markovic's economic policy or did I say that he ought to be done away with or I don't know what? Because we were saying that he had only one lever and that was a restrictive monetary policy. Was that the topic of our conversation, or did I speak about other political topics?

A. No. Our conversation was confined to his monetary policy and his approach to resolving Serbia's -- or Yugoslavia's economic problems.

Q. Now, once again in connection with the question of the preservation of Yugoslavia, look at point 3 of your telegram, please. Four lines down. If you can find this portion. "[In English] Milosevic said he was doing all he could to keep Yugoslavia together but if parts wanted to separate, they must do so in legal fashion." [Interpretation] So how is that different from what he said I'm ⁴⁸⁸⁶⁹ talking to Karadzic in what way? Everybody has the right to break away but in a legal way. And then what does it say? "The way to proceed was a multi-party federal election [In English] with new federal parliament adopting new constitution providing secession mechanism. Milosevic wants federated Yugoslavia with common monetary, fiscal, defence policies, customs union and common human rights."

[Interpretation] Is that some sort of centralised federation, with a single monetary and fiscal system and defence policy and customs? Is that some centralised federation, in your experience as a career diplomat dealing with matters of this kind, or is that a minimum that I talked to you about?

A. Well, there are very many different kinds of federation. I mentioned that Canada calls it a confederation when in fact it's really a federation. And there's various -- the division of powers can differ from one federation to another. I think it's significant that in the Yugoslav federation the central government had very little power. It had foreign affairs, monetary policy, and the army, and the republics had a great deal of power and that, I think, contributed to some degree at least to the desire on the part of the republics to separate. But your version of federation seems fairly typical in terms of my knowledge of federations. And I'm not an expert on federations.

Q. Very well. I see my time is up. Thank you. I have no further questions. Excuse me. Just one -- just one more, very brief. He spoke about the Cutileiro Plan being a plan of national division. Did you understand Mr. Nice to be accusing Cutileiro or me, me ⁴⁸⁸⁷⁰ who did not even participate in the conference? And did you feel that this was a good plan or a bad plan? Just answer this last part.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, just the last part.

THE WITNESS: I thought it was a very good plan because it would have stopped the violence and bloodshed that eventually occurred when a referendum was called and independence declared.

JUDGE ROBINSON: On that note of appropriate self-censorship from Mr. Milosevic, we are going to adjourn, but we have to admit first -- what is it?

JUDGE KWON: Two letters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the record -- excuse me. For the record, I said "scoundrels." That cannot be translated as "rats."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We took note of that, Mr. Milosevic. And these documents, the replies to Ministers Cook and Vedrine, are to be Defence exhibits, as I understand. What are the numbers?

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the first letter of the 23rd of March, 1999, will be Exhibit D336.

And the second letter, or the article of 23rd of March, 1999, appearing in the Politika will be Exhibit D337.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, and we are adjourned until Monday at 9.00.

[The witness withdrew]

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 27th day

of February, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.