Special Report: The Kosovo Liberation Army in Transition: Post-War Rivalries

Special Report: The Kosovo Liberation Army in Transition: Post-War Rivalries
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis - March 29, 2007, Thursday

Note: Where applicable, Serbo-Croat accents have been used in location and personal names. They may not appear on all computers.

Analysis. By Sla ana uri , in Belgrade.* Research into any issue in Kosovo and Metohija today is an enormous challenge, as well as a problem.

There are almost no objective indicators of any aspect of social life. Moreover, any serious academic effort to explain an issue is overshadowed by the impossibility of direct access of researchers, and traditional unapproachability of both Albanian community and relevant international community institutions. Those formal problems are additionally aggravated by the ever-present, and now very emphasized, possibility of having the obtained findings labeled as "non-scientific", "biased", "malicious", etc.

Nevertheless, the relevancy of the need for more detailed insight into and knowledge of developments in the territory of this region at the time of intensification of negotiations on its status constitutes our motive for at least attempting to create an overview of the dominant courses of security conditions in the post-war period as well as a review of the activities of the network of legal and illegal security structures.

Data used in this paper come from regular "Reports on the Situation in Kosovo" by the US Mission in Pristina,<1> relevant documents and reports by the UNMIK police,<2> KFOR,<3> OSCE,<4> periodic reports by the International Crisis Group,<5> UNDP in Kosovo (United Nations Development Program in Kosovo) analyses,<6> analysis by the Institute for War & Peace reporting (IWPR),<7> analysis by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN),<8> field investigations by the author in the Kosovo and Metohija area in 2000-2006 period, as well as a series of interviews with Albanian and international officials.

Kosovo and Metohija, the Political Context

Kosovo and Metohija has been an entity under interim international administration for seven years. This southern Serbian province, covering the territory of approximately 10,849 km<2> and having a population of some two-million, became an area of intense interest for politicians, military strategists, intelligence services, and media several years ago.

A powerful conflict of interests which had existed in this area for several decades between the aspirations of the Albanian population for secession and formation of an independent state, and our state, striving to preserve the territorial integrity, culminated in 1999. Namely, it was then that the international community appraised that the state administration of Serbia had overstepped its authority in applying excessive force, which had resulted in ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population in the province.

The response to such an appraisal was the NATO air campaign against FRY in the March 24-June 9, 1999, period. The end of the intervention was followed by intensive restructuring of life in Kosovo and Metohija, where administration of Interim Administrative UN Mission in Kosovo was established (UNMIK) pursuant to the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council ( uri , 2005).

Pursuant to the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, Kosovo is under the civil administration of Interim Administrative UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK passes regulations related to civil and legal obligations of government bodies and private persons, and ratifies laws passed by the Kosovo Parliament. UNMIK has published the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo (Constitutional Framework), which defines Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG: Assembly, Kosovo President, government, judiciary, local self-government institutions).

Kosovo has a multiparty system, dominated by four practically mono-ethnic Albanian parties. There are also several ethnic minority parties and coalitions. In the last parliamentary elections, held in October 2004, the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves : LDK) proved to be still the most popular political party in Kosovo (45.4 percent votes won), but failed to obtain sufficient majority to be able to form a central government on its own. LDK formed a ruling coalition with AAK (8.4 percent), led by Ramush Haradinaj (the Hague arrestee for a time, accused of war crimes), and with the parliamentary Six Plus group, which is a coalition of Turkish and Bosniak parties.

The leading opposition political parties are PDK (28.9 percent), led by Hashim Thaqi (also transliterated as "Thaci"), and Reform Party ORA (6.2 percent), led by Veton Surroi.

The last elections in the Province were almost completely boycotted by Serb voters, so the two Serb parties in Kosovo got only the 10 parliamentary seats guaranteed by the Constitutional Framework. The very fact that a coalition government was created between the erstwhile bitter foes - LDK and AAK - "was one of the strangest political combinations Kosovo had seen since the end of the armed conflict" (Qirezi, 2004). This is when a serious political conflict in the Kosovo political scene, still reflected today in various ways, was conceived. Namely, after the announcement of the election results, Thaqi proposed a creation of a broad-based government of all parties where he would have the prime ministerial post, hoping to secure for himself the post of prime minister during whose office Kosovo would gain independence.

Rugova decided to form a coalition with Haradinaj rather than to create a broad-based government. It was during the talks between LDK and AAK about the formation of a joint government on November 6, 2004, that the Hague Tribunal sent its request to question Haradinaj about his activities during the war. The negotiations between the two parties were suspended for a time; and when, as it was then generally believed in the province, Soren Jessen-Petersen (the then UN special representative to Kosovo) arranged for the indictment postponement in the Hague Tribunal, the coalition agreement was reached and Ramush Haradinaj was appointed the new prime minister of Kosovo.

When analyzing political life and power distribution, it is easily noticed that party affiliation is very important for obtaining public service positions as well as for social approval.

Simultaneously, a strong network of traditional social division and tribal loyalty is maintained, which makes the work of social and political institutions in Kosovo very complex. The three most influential parties are chiefly led by the wartime leaders.

The biggest LDK party was led by Ibrahim Rugova until his death, the AAK party is led by Ramush Haradinaj, and the PDK is a party formed as a political opponent of the KLA, with Hashim Thaqi as its leader. In the recent years, and especially following the death of Ibrahim Rugova, analysts find, the LDK is no longer a united national movement. Many intellectuals have left its ranks, and much fewer individuals willing to maintain relations with other political parties and to overcome differences have remained in the party (ICG, 2005: 16). It is difficult to divine the exact number of assassinations carried out in the post-war period over the LDK functionaries. Be it as it may, the number was quite high and "sowed fear among the members of the party". A report of the International Crisis Group stated: Although none of those murders were solved, they are chiefly attributed to KLA and its successors (ICG, 2006: 17).

Disputes and rivalries in this area frequently have fatal outcomes due to the large-scale revival of blood feuds, a custom previously suspended. Since the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999 and by the end of 2003, 40 blood-feud related murders were recorded in the Province, according to the data of the Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, KLMDNJ. "Cases of blood vengeance are reappearing as a consequence of the poor functioning of law and order and the institutions that enforce laws", said Pajazit Nusi, the president of this council (Bytiqi, 2004).

Numerous political murders, assassinations, chiefly committed under unresolved circumstances and by unidentified perpetrators, have pushed into the background the otherwise chronic problem of minority safety in some periods of post-war Kosovo and Metohija, the foreground being held by the problem of inter-Albanian conflicts and lately an increasingly marked expression of hostility toward the representatives and institutions of the international community in the province.

Soon after the municipal election in 2000, Rugova's closest associate Xhemail Mustafa was murdered at his home entrance. Several months later, Ismet Raci, president of the Klina municipality and of the local LDK branch was also murdered. After the parliamentary elections, Smail Hajdaraj, senior LDK official and a member of the Kosovo parliament was killed. A day after the end of 2002 local elections, a high party official of Rugova's LDK and president of local self-government in Suva Reka, Uke Bytiqi, was murdered. His two bodyguards were also killed. The UNMIK police arrested two members of the rival PDK for this murder. Murders and intimidations of the LDK officials continued over the following years, and one of Rugova's followers stated that "intimidation was preventing members from taking office and was responsible for a decrease in LDK activism" (Qirezi, 2002).

Thus, the political life in Kosovo and Metohija does not have many similarities with the usual mechanisms of political fighting: first of all, the strongest political parties are led by former warriors, drawing their popularity and influence from their participation in the 1998-1999 guerilla war against the Serbian state, rather than professional politicians or experts in any field (with the exception of Veton Surroi). Further, the usual methods of "political" action are murders, blackmails, threats and robberies, which means that political power is neither gained nor lost primarily in elections or through other procedures of a regular political system, but depends on a variety of personal, family (clan) and religious structures which are always ready to bolster the persuasiveness of their "political" programs with violence.

A good part of current political life in Kosovo and Metohija has a criminal background, both in terms of it being financed from suspicious sources and in terms of the intertwinement of political structures with criminal gangs, especially at local levels. In any event, the very programs of Albanian parties, as well as the political debates among them, show that they are both similar and different only regarding the speed and determination of the fight for independence, whereas all other topics, predominant in normal circumstances (economic, legal political, social, etc.), and are of less interest.

Hence it follows that, since the consensually accepted criterion of successful political action is actually the ability and readiness to use any available violent means to achieve independence, influential political parties may indeed be led only by those who have built the appropriate paramilitary infrastructure through guerrilla fighting and already tried the "alternative" mechanisms of achieving political goals.

The Many Faces of Rivalry

Rivalry is reflected at various levels as a phenomenon in Kosovo and Metohija. The most traditional and still strong form is regional rivalry. When we speak of a similar phenomenon in Albania, the usual distinction is made between the northern Gheg and southern Tosk tribes between which there is a centuries' long feud over domination. In Kosovo and Metohija, although significantly smaller in size, there are three culture-wise relatively distinct regions: Kosovo, Metohija and Drenica.

An already deep-rooted regional rivalry is today intensified and interconnected with political, military, business motivated rivalries, sometimes driving the regional affiliation into the background. A certain balance was achieved regionally by situating the capital in the very heart of the province although the area of Metohija is traditionally the leading Albanian region of Kosovo. The investigation of the presence of arms in Kosovo and Metohija organized by the UNDP shows that the biggest quantity of illegal weapons is held by the inhabitants of Pe , akovica and De ani (UNDP, 2004: 20).

The report also stated that the prices of weapons in this area are much lower than in the central and eastern areas, which again indicates the weapon market saturation. All this, along with maintenance of dominantly traditional relations in social communication, has lead Western analysts to attribute a "Sicilian flavor" to the Metohija region. Simultaneously, the Metohija population has strong diaspora as well as kinship ties to Albanians living in Albania and Montenegro. All this taken into consideration, the leading role of this area in arms smuggling becomes clear. Describing the complex security situation in the Pe area, Albanian analysts state: "In this region, law and order has broken down and shootings have become part of the fabric of life. Acts of violence are prompted by a variety of motives, ranging from rivalries left over from the politics of the Kosovo conflict, through organized crime and business disputes, to tit-for-tat blood feuds. It is sometimes hard to tell where one type ends and the other starts, but the overall picture is of a gangland culture holding the rest of society hostage." (Xhara et al ., 2005)

Intense war rivalry between two paramilitary Albanian formations of KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo), inconsistent enforcement of laws, continuous fight for supremacy in organized crime and trafficking, continuation of the blood feud custom, and so on constitute the context which brought the Metohija region a high number of murders, assassinations and altercations after the 1999 war (ICG, 2005: 7). It is therefore no wonder that the international prosecutor described Pe as a town which "resembles at time Chicago of the 1930s, with a per capita homicide rate five times greater than the rest of Kosovo" (Xhara et al ., 2005). At the same time, the resistance to both newly established institutions and to the UNMIK presence is the strongest in this area. It is necessary to say that the reputation of the UNMIK, although the lowest in this area, records continuous decline in the entire Province: in November 2002, its work was approved by 63.8 percent Kosovo inhabitants, whereas in July 2004, its work was approved by only 20.7 percent (periodic "UNDP Reports of Early Warning").

The drop in popularity of and trust in UNMIK is accompanied with increasingly open threats and attacks against this international institution. "By February 2005, indications given by former KLA circles in Dukagjin [ie: Metohija] were not encouraging - a hardcore of several dozen were reportedly determined to hit UNMIK, anywhere in Kosovo; some had already disappeared or figuratively 'gone to the hills'." (ICG, 2005: 10)

In the security reports of various international institutions, the focal point is the municipality of De ani, with several thousand chiefly unemployed KLA members, and "the burgeoning post-KLA generation of eighteen to 22-year-olds that local observers see as more radical and "trigger-happy" than the KLA veterans, anxious for a chance to emulate their war" (ICG, 2005: 8). In further description of the sentiments among the young, the same report states: "There is a blithe recklessness about political consequences among the young men who indulge in rhetoric about avenging Haradinaj and expelling UNMIK. Enthusiasm for newspapers is low, unless it is their own 'war values' weekly Fokusi ... exude an unhealthy air of military over-confidence. After the successive achievements of the KLA, the UCPMB [LAPMB] in South Serbia's Presevo Valley, and the NLA in Macedonia -- in all of which Dukagjini fighters played a part -- some are tempted to see the solutions to Kosovo's problems in terms of one last military push. Awash with weapons and eager young recruits, it would not take much for the Decan groups to mobilize sizeable forces either to attack UNMIK or to confront a Serbian military incursion into north Kosovo (a likely consequence of any violent destabilization of the international presence in Kosovo). Former KLA in Decan and Peja/Pe emphasize that conditions for a military campaign are far better now than in 1997-1999: a secure hinterland, easier communications, more experience, more arms, and a larger pool of fighters." (ICG, 2005: 9).

Experts assess that Kosovo inhabitants possess some 400,000 pieces of illegal weapons. In the course of 2003, UNDP launched a three-month action of amnesty for those who surrendered their weapons, which resulted in the yielding of 155 pieces of fire arms. The analysts see the reason for the failure of this action in "a combination of continuing uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo, distrust of the security forces, suspicions of corruption among local officials, and a growing culture of violence", which Pristina sociologists explain in the following manner: "Kosovar Albanians society is witnessing a rise in violence in the home, in schools and in sport, there's a fascination with militarism and army folklore is starting to dominate local culture" (Mustafa, Xhara, 2003).

At the pubic level, rivalry is manifested through constant mutual accusations and threats, whereas at the secret level it is manifested in an uninterrupted sequence of politically colored security incidents. Although the key functions of authority have been gradually transferred from the UNMIK to local institutions, this is yet to happen in the fields of internal security, defense, judiciary and diplomatic relations.

Although there is an almost constant threat of peace violation and escalation of violence in Kosovo and Metohija, situations in which the security is additionally threatened to the extent that mobilizes all institutions dealing with security in the province are numerous. One such situation was surely the indictment against and delivery of Ramush Haradinaj (AAK) to The Hague. Quoting their interview with a participant in the event, the authors of the Crisis Group for Europe (ICG, 2005: 6) report state that in the days preceding the indictment there had been significant transfer of arms from Pe to other towns in Kosovo, including Pristina, whose inhabitants had noticed the arrival of "rough and rude men". In the same report, the motives of the "rough newcomers" are identified and revealed. They were "... armed fighters from disparate groups in Glo ani and elsewhere came to Pristina to watch over UNMIK headquarters in early November 2004 when Haradinaj was questioned by ICTY investigators, and stood down only when he emerged and convened a press conference to emphasize that his dealings with the Tribunal were 'over'". (ICG, 2005: 10).

Allow us to remind you that the arrest of Ramush' brother, Daut Haradinaj, two years earlier also caused commotion in this area, which resulted in an AAK initiative submitted to the Kosovo Assembly to unanimously proclaim independence.

The strongest surge of hostility by the Albanians against the Serbs remaining in Kosovo and Metohija occurred in March 2004, in a true outbreak of violence which followed an alleged murder of three Albanian boys. The consequences of the March events were, in addition to some twenty killed Serbs, additional tens of thousands of forcibly transferred ones, destroyed and damaged churches, huge material damage on Serb homes and other structures.

Surprised by the vehemence and massiveness of Albanian violence in March, international community institutions responded by placing barbed wire and sand bags as protection for KFOR, KPS, and UN police buildings. The Albanian analyst Jeta Xhara described the situation in those days: "As recently deployed British reinforcements patrol Pristina, several streets in the centre of the city around the UN headquarters and UN police central station have been sealed off for civilian vehicles. Analysts fear the security forces can expect new attacks in revenge for arrests of more than 200 people following the riot." (Xhara, 2004)

To this day, two and a half years after the violence against Serbs, no indictments against the key agents have been processed. The media speculated about the chief organizer - frequently ascribing this role to Fatmir Humoli, chief of another of the numerous LK K (Levizja Kombetare lirimtare e Kosoves, National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo) formations, who made the following statement in the same period: "It is obvious that political means have produced no results, so we are now ready to use other means." (Koha ditore, March 26th 2004) And, in a response to the scenario which could imply open opposition to international community institutions present in the province, "the UN officials have drawn an evacuation plan, which involves staff keeping money aside for immediate withdrawal to Thessaloniki in northern Greece and restricting their travel around the territory so that they can be pulled back to Pristina rapidly" (Xhara, 2004).

Even the newly formed Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has difficulties in accomplishing its task in some areas. The attitude of the De ani population towards the KPS is especially illustrative. " The KPS there does not enjoy unequivocal backing and is sometimes seen to conduct its duties "on tiptoe", not wishing to offend local KLA sentiment. " (ICG, 2005: 9)

Another phenomenon essential for the understanding of the current security architecture of post-war Kosovo is the rise in religiousness of the Albanian population of Islamic faith. It is difficult to determine the degree of Islamization of paramilitary Albanian formations objectively. The degree of unapproachability and discretion that would accompany such a process would certainly not leave much possibility for precise explanation of this phenomenon, which has been intriguing both numerous intelligence services and media for some time. In a sparse report, quoting an interview with Kosovo and Metohija international police representatives, Tanjug news agency gives a piece of news that the UNMIK police have launched an investigation on possible activities of radical Islamists in the vicinity of Urosevac, because the police have found "a quantity" of materials which may be connected to the activity of al-Qaida during a search done in early August. "During a search of the house of a Kosovo Albanian in the village of Talinovac near Urosevac, a quantity of materials indicative of a connection to al-Qaida has been found", said an international police official who wished to remain anonymous.

Even cursory observation makes it obvious that huge changes related to the strengthening of religiousness have been happening in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija for the last few years. Whereas 13 mosques have been built in the municipality of Pristina in the 2000-2004 period, ( uri , 2005), the last two years were marked with intensive building of a large number of new religious Islamic structures throughout Kosovo, mass increase in the number of religious schools, and the external signs of the strengthening of Islam are increasingly obvious in the streets: a rich supply of religious books in the bookshop windows, an increasing number of young people who indicate their affiliation to Islam through a particular dressing style. This year, no one is any longer surprised to see men who are adherent of the vehabi movement walking the streets in characteristic beards and trousers with shortened legs.

In the period after the 1999 war, an entire network of various non-governmental, humanitarian, and religious organizations was spread in Kosovo and Metohija. Many of them carry out solely their legitimate activities and have played a significant role in remedying the consequences of war by offering the population their aid in food, medicines, and finding temporary housing. For many organizations from a long list of the registered ones, however, there is a justified suspicion of the true reasons for their presence in Kosovo and Metohija as well as of the true nature of activities they carry out. One of those is the El jilah organization, which is suspected of being a link between Albanian drug dealers and Islamic countries. Another known Islamist organization with developed activity in Kosovo is the Saudi Committee for Assistance to People from Kosovo and Chechnya; and it is maintained that this organization works intensively on the strengthening of Islam in the Albanian population.

Kosovo Liberation Army

Without entering into a broader elaboration of the rich historical experience of the Albanians in joint resurgence enterprises and activities, we will focus only on such type of joint enterprises in the period from the 1980s to date. The 1980s in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija were marked with mass gatherings of Albanians, organized occurrences of violence and intensification of terrorist attacks, which, as a rule, were aimed at the members of armed forces of the then federal state.

In early 1990s, the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija made more significant connections with groups from diaspora, which resulted in the formation of an organization named Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK). This provided the possibility for any further plans of action to be made by the extremist Albanian emigration, which, being involved in a broad array of criminal activities in the West, was also able to provide funding for accomplishment of Albanian goals.

Creation of such a reinforced infrastructure in turn additionally radicalized the political demands of the Albanians and the basic goal of "independent Kosovo" was shortly announced publicly. Soon, the process of formation of local insurgent groups began and, until the mid-1990s, the main effort was to connect thus created formations and to bring them under a common command. It is maintained that a sort of "common headquarters" was formed in 1995, that it was first situated in Podujevo, and then moved to the Gnjilane area.

As of mid-1990s, the bringing in of illegal military groups and individuals from abroad intensifies. After the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the Kosovo groups were joined by the Albanians who have gained war experience in those regions.

Developments in the neighboring Albania in early 1997 were very significant for the process of spreading and strengthening of the armed movement of Kosovo Albanians. The big ferments in March 1997, accompanied with several weeks of unrests, the fall of Pres. Sali Berisha' Government, complete falling apart of law and order, also resulted in a plundering of the Albanian army weapons storages. Over half a million pieces of plundered weapons quickly found its way to the neighboring regions as well. The established situation of complete anarchy in Albania provided the founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army "with both a supply of small arms and a stretch of ungoverned territory in northern Albania in which they could arm and train a guerrilla force" (ICG, 2004: 5).

The process of unification of increasingly numerous and massive individual paramilitary organizations required a global consensus of the key players of Albanian life, which was not reached until August 1998. Many later problems with the functioning of the military hierarchy come partly from the fact that the unification was somewhat late in coming. Some formations had already achieved significant success at the level of military actions, accomplishing a domination of power in the regions of their activity and were reluctant to agree to a loss of their sovereign status. This is indeed the context in which numerous later disputes and conflicts of different parts of the formation implied under the common denomination of "Kosovo Liberation Army".

The 1997-1998 period was characterized with a fierce intensity of actions of Albanian paramilitary troops, which, in contrast to the 1980s, also target the civilian Serb population, driving them in massive numbers from numerous villages in Metohija, and enter into open armed conflicts with the state authorities. Intensive military activity of Albanian formations continued even during the NATO air campaign.

Speaking of the nature of KLA, the IWPR analysts claim that it was a "pan-Albanian force, which included many fighters from Macedonia and southern Serbia, as well as Albanians with roots outside Kosovo" (Miftari, Quin, 2003). Here, we will only mention another formation, the "Black Eagles", formed as a special KLA unit, which was under the command of Idriz Balaj during the war. He was convicted of torture and murder of several members of the rival FARK. In February 2005, the members of this formation went public with a statement in which they claim that "failure to take into consideration the pretences of Kosovo Albanians will lead to reorganization of the guerrilla structures of the KLA as a guarantee for accomplishment of a sovereign and independent state" [Epoha e re, 18 shkurt 2005). It is maintained that a significant number of members of this unit remain together today and that they are jointly involved in trafficking and smuggling enterprise.

Formal Transition - KPC

Soon after the arrival of international forces to Kosovo and the establishment of Interim Administrative UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), a plan was designed for the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Based on a Treaty ("Statement on Demilitarization and Transformation of KLA"), which was signed by the first KFOR commander Michael Jackson and the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army Hashim Thaqi on June 21, 1999, Kosovo Liberation Army was transformed into a civilian institution. The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo defines the newly established institution under the name of "Kosovo Protection Corps" as: "a civilian emergency organization, established under the law, which carries out in Kosovo rapid disaster response tasks for public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance".

The Regulation of the Special UN Representative for Kosovo defines the tasks of the KPC in more detail. These are: removal of consequences of disasters, provision of disaster response services, the performing of search and rescue, provision of a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assistance in demining, and contribution to rebuilding infrastructure in Kosovo. Simultaneously, the following principles of the KPC activity are defined among others: "service to all nations of Kosovo without any political connotation, respect of internationally recognized treaties on human rights without any forms of discrimination". All activities of the KPC, expert supervision and control are under the authority of the special UN representative to Kosovo. It was envisioned for the KPC to have 3,000 active and 2,000 reserve members. Out of 2,000 pieces of small infantry weapons planned for the needs of KPC, only 200 are in constant use, whereas 1,800 are in the KFOR storages. The KPC members wear uniforms with insignia almost identical to those of the KLA, prevalent in the former times.

The defined principle of operation that "each member, if he does not abide by the provisions regulating work, is subject to criminal charges" has already constituted grounds for punishment and suspension of a large number of the KPC members. Based on the Proclamation 452 and Resolution 13219 of the US President (which prohibits entry to the territory of the US and any financial or other material support) from 2001, several senior KPC officers were "blacklisted" for providing assistance to terrorist forces in Macedonia. Five senior officers found themselves in prison, and four commanders of Operation Zones were suspended. The following were put on the so-called "black list": Liberation Army of Presevo, Medve a and Bujanovac (LAPMB), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), National Liberation Army (ONA or NLA), National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo, Popular Movement of Kosovo, and the Political Council of Presevo, Medve a and Bujanovac.

In addition to those armed groups, the list includes the names of eight KLA members who are currently the KPC officers (Sami Lushtaku, Daut Haradinaj, Ramiz Ladrovci, Rustem Mustafa, Rexhep Selimi), three members of the LAPMB (Shefqet Musliu, Muhamet Xhemaili, Shaqir Shaqiri), nine members of NLA (Ali Ahmeti, Xhevat Ademi, Nura Bexhet, Xhavit Hasani, Gezim Ostreni, Hisni Shaqiri, Emrush Suma, Fazli Veliu and Kastriot Haxhirexha), one member of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Sabit Gashi), two members from the ranks of the Popular Movement of Kosovo (Gafur Elshani, Emrush Xhemaili) and two members each from the Political Council of PMB (Tahir Dalipi and Jonuz Musliu) and the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo (Skender Habibi and Azem Sulja).

The operation of the KPC is financed from the budget of the province, with significant funds inflow, however, being made through donations, which again opens the possibility to connect the KPC with parts of criminal emigration and organizations of suspicious character. The most infamous among such organizations is the "Friends of the KPC", with the seat in Switzerland. Although it is officially registered in Germany as well, UNMIK prohibited its activity in Kosovo after the insight into the criminal activities carried out by the members of the "Friends of the KPC". Another organization, with a longer history of financing the activities of Albanian formations in Kosovo, "Homeland Calling" also has a widespread network of branches in West Europe.

It is questionable to what extent this formal transformation has actually stopped the activity of KLA. The International Crisis Group (ICG, 2006) states that some 2,000 of the KLA members transferred to the KPC and that the same number entered the ranks of the new-formed the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). A certain number of people from the highest KLA leadership entered politics and today hold significant positions in the political life of the province: Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj, Agim eku, Jakup Krasniqi. Where are other former KLA members and does their participation in the demilitarization program, conducted in 1999 by the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), denote the end of their military ambitions?

Some analysts maintain that the KLA, despite its disbanding and formal transformation, has fully kept its operative core, and that, in the years after the war, it even broadened its field of activity, joining the military operations in southern Serbia and Macedonia. An illustration for this claim is the destiny of the Chief of Staff of the KPC, Gezima Ostreni, who went to Macedonia in 2001 and became the leader of National Liberation Army (NLA). Agim eku suspended Ostreni in the KPC. Also, Shukri Buja, the commander of the KPC Zone 6, was removed from office after the charges that he provided aid in the smuggling of arms to the sourthern Serbia for the needs of the LAPMB.

The NATO sources point to the existence and occasional activity of several Albanian armed groups: Liberation Army of Presevo, Medve a and Bujanovac, Armed Forces of Republika Kosova, National Liberation Army, Popular Movement for Kosovo, Liberation Army of Eastern Kosovo, Albanian National Army; and have also registered the activities of the Liberation Army of Gusinje and Plav in Montenegro, as well as of the Liberation Army of Chaimeria in Greece. The fact that a large number of separate military organizations has been formed in post-war Kosovo is confirmed by the ICG report, which states, among other things, that "These military and ex-military groupingss are only loosely connected with each other" (ICG, 2005: 10).

In the Report from the Special Research Project of the IWPR "KLA Under Scrutiny" reminds us that the international community "began openly talking about the links between the protectorate's civil defense force, the Kosovo Protection Corps, and the militant Albanian group the Albanian National Army, ANA, which aims to rid Kosovo of its remaining Serb population" in May 2003 (Miftari, Quin, 2003).

Although the Albanian National Army - ANA - took the responsibility for the mining of the bridge near the Serb town of Zve an in northern Kosovo in April 2003, it turned out that active members of KPC were involved in the planning of this bombing. Two persons were killed on the occasion due to inexpert placement of the explosives in the bridge construction, and one of them was a KPC member. For suspicion of possible involvement in this bombing, 12 persons, former KLA members and KPC members after the war, were soon arrested. The arrests caused a strain in relations between the KPC headquarters and UNMIK. The then-commander of KPC, Agim eku, "reacted angrily, saying there was no evidence against his men" (Mustafa, Xhara, 2003). A long questioning procedure ensued, and, during the investigation, the object of inquiry of the judiciary broadened from the bridge bombing to include the cases of trafficking in humans and arms smuggling. In December 2003, the KFOR issued a statement saying that the 12 suspects from the ranks of the KPC would be suspended for six months during which an investigation into their involvement in the assault was to be conducted.

Criticizing the idea and achievements of post-war KLA transformation, father sava Janji from Visoki De ani monastery writes: "The best indicator of the 'credibility' of KPC -- for which western taxpayers have generously given millions of dollars through their governments -- is the sheer fact that almost all its post-war leaders are now either in prison, have been suspended for various violations, or have been added to President George Bush' blacklist, an impressive record for an organization that was proclaimed as a great post-war success in Kosovo." (Father Sava in Decani, 2002)

"Kosovo Army"?

Dissatisfaction with their assigned role and efforts to modify the resolution defining this organization as civilian so as to provide for its status as a legitimate military formation arose very early within the KPC. In late April 2002, an official request to UNMIK was initiated to revise the resolution. The request was rejected by the UN special representative, the solution for the growing discontent of an increasing number of KPC members being postponed for "better times". That those "better times" for KPC may well be nearing is hinted at in the most recent report of the International Crisis Group, which, along with the prediction that the "international community is just months away from decisions that are expected to make Kosovo a state", adds that "a key component of post-independent security structures should be an army built in part upon the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)..." (ICG, 2006). The report further states that there are no conditions in Kosovo for full demilitarization and that a demilitarized Kosovo would become "a facade, behind which unofficial paramilitary groups would coalesce". Such a newly formed army, ICG concludes optimistically, could lead to the creation of a "stable, multi-ethnic or at least ethnically neutral identity of the new state... With its partial evolution from paramilitary roots, dependency on NATO expertise, and willingness to undergo substantial change, KPC offers it an opportunity to exercise a free hand in molding the army that it should not refuse." ICG also recommends the profile of such an army, which should consists of "small, lightly-equipped, multi-ethnic force of between 2,000 and 3,000 personnel, trained by a dedicated NATO mission to a transparent plan and schedule, and brought to operational capability by 2011-2012". Aware of possible regional risks inherent in stronger armament of such a military formation, ICG maintains that the newly formed Kosovo army must have "no tanks, heavy artillery, ground-to-ground missiles or attack aircraft - until such time as both Kosovo and Serbia join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program".

KLA vs. FARK

One of the fiercest military rivalries is certainly that between the units of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the FARK members.

Begun since the very formation in 1990s, intensified during the war, escalated in the summer of 1999, this rivalry still has significant effect on security structures in the province. Manifestations of this rivalry in various contexts reflect all the complexity of inter-Albanian relations and explains many post-war security incidents and much of the re-structuring. Therefore this line of conflict deserves a more detailed review. KLA originates from the Popular Movement of Kosovo, despite the fact that other organizations and movements were also active at the time. The analysts would later establish that "LPK gained a lead over rival Albanian groups because, in part, the international community took them more seriously than others". This view is illustrated by the recollections of a foreign diplomat in an interview to the IWPR: "Out of the several guerrilla groups that were operating in Kosovo, the LPK were the group we considered to be the most serious" (Miftari, Quin, 2003). The favoring of LPK, and later KLA, as a "serious" military formation has deepened an already deep-rooted dispute between this formation and that founded by Rugova's government in exile - FARK. Although Ibrahim Rugova publicly promoted the policy of passive resistance in 1990s, his prime minister in exile Bujar Bukoshi conducted intensive fund-raising and enlisting of volunteers for execution of terrorist attacks and participation in the armed fights in Kosovo. As the IWPR analysts conclude: "But indecisiveness over the right time to strike meant that few of the planned attacks ever materialised, and the FARK remained largely ineffective." (Miftari, Kvin, 2003). Frustrated with such ineffectiveness, a group of activists from the Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK) set up the "Homeland Calling" ["Vendlindja therret ") fund and stepped up its effort at collecting money, mobilizing fighters within Kosovo and carrying out operations on the ground.

The growing success of LPK marginalized the status of FARK. This caused the attempt of Bujar Bukoshi to make Ibrahim Rugova "the supreme commander of all ethnic Albanian forces fighting in the province" to be rejected by the Albanian resurgents. Bukoshi attempted to save the position of FARK by organizing a meeting with the LPK representatives in Instanbul in the spring of 1997. Although the main goal of the meeting was to establish a joint strategy for future action, that did not come to be, either during the Instabul meeting or in several following meetings mediated by the government of Albania. The KLA representatives justified their refusal to cooperate with the FARK with the explanation that Bukoshi was insincere and that he only wanted to enable the government in exile to take control of the KLA. Disputes occurred on the ground as well, and there were no joint actions. The depth of division between the key figures in the KLA and FARK is illustrated by a quote from a book published in 2003 by the assassinated FARK general, tahir Zemaj, to whom Hashim Thaqi told: "I will fight you, Tahir Zemaj, as though you were Serbs, I will fight you and your units." (Ahmetaj, Krasniqi, 2000) After this dispute, Zemaj left for Tirana; he did not return to Kosovo until 2001, and was assassinated in Pe in 2003, together with his son and son-in-law.

Soon after the end of the NATO air campaign against Serbia, two power structures formed in Kosovo. Thaqi became prime minister with support in the KLA, ceding the position of the supreme commander to Agim eku. Regional KLA commanders were also appointed to positions of responsibility in the zones where they commanded the KLA units: Rustem Mustafa in the Lab region, Ramush Haradinaj in Metohis, Sami Lushtaku in Drenica, Gezim Ostreni in Pastriku, Shukti Buja in the Karadak region, and Rrahman Rama in Salja (ie: Upper Lab). Ibrahim Rugova set up his provisional government and it was not until December 1999, after several weeks of conflict-ridden negotiations, that those two provisional governments were disbanded. UNMIK promised Rugova and Thaqi equal inclusion in new province structures, as well as appointment of the LDK and PDK members for section chiefs in the interim UNMIK administration, which came to pass in February 2000.

Rivalry in Intelligence Activities

The overall security chaos in the province was significantly heightened by the parallel and competing activities of several intelligence services. In the years after the war, the following were active in this area: Intelligence Agency of Kosovo (AIK), National Intelligence Service of Kosovo (KSHIK), Albanian National Service, "Eagle Eye", Albanian National Secret Service, Albanian National Security, Fighters and Protectors of Albanian National Territories. In addition, the Intelligence Section of the Chief Headquarters (G-2), known under the name of SHIU (Sherbim Informativ Ushtarak ) within the KPC is also involved in intelligence activities. A part of staff of this organization was made up of individuals from the KLA Military Police, who were involved in intelligence work both before and during the war. Within the Kosovo Police Service, a body was set up for intelligence work - the KPS Intelligence Service (Sherbim Informativ SHPK ). A former member of special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, subsequently a senior KLA officer, heads this service.

For present-day Kosovo and Metohija, the activities of the two dominant, otherwise rival, intelligence groups, both linked to the intelligence party sector are the most interesting to follow (Lulzim Peci, TV debate "Life in Kosovo", November 23, 2005, RTK). Those services, until then discreet in public appearances but very active in their operation, were given a stimulus to appear in the public by the initiative of the UN Mission in Kosovo to allow formation of the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs in the province. It was the starter shot to the race in which the competitors wished to gain the best position they could and to secure a dominant place in the planned security structures. Simultaneously, a successful crossing of the finish line offered a possibility to legitimize former, in a good part criminal, activities of those party services.The statement of one of the key players in this process should be taken in this sense: "The time has come to demystify these intelligence structures and show we are real people and not monsters." (Xhara, 2005)

We will provide brief introduction of two main intelligence groups which are still operating covertly in Kosovo. The KIPRED report suggests that the activities of those two groups "range from protection of party interests to information gathering and intimidation of political rivals".

To understand the nature of relations between them, it is important to recall that they were formed as an expression of opposition between the KLA and FARK. The Kosovo Intelligence Agency - AIK (Agjencia Informative e Kosoves ) - was formed to meet the needs of the FARK, a paramilitary formation formed under the patronage of Rugova's LDK. This agency operates under the guise of a non-governmental organization of the Institute for Public Opinion and Strategy research (IHPSO), headed by Rame Maraj, former Rugova's special advisor for security and, as many claim, his top man of confidence. After the war, the agency continued to deal with intelligence issues for the politically dominant LDK. IHPSO draws its roots from the "ministries" of defense and internal affairs formed by the Kosovo parallel government in exile in 1990s (Xhara, 2005). The initiator and creator of those institutions was Bujar Bukoshi, the prime minister of Rugova's shadow government, and all this occurred in Germany in the second half of the 1990s.

An event that speeded up the disclosure of facts already anticipated by everyone about the secret intelligence war concerns the investigation launched after the unsuccessful assassination attempt against Rugova. As assessed by Albanian analysts and as confrmed by the investigation intiated by the UNMIK and KPS, an opinion is crystallizing "that the elements within the LDK ranks are responsible for this explosion". It is suspected that the planted bomb, which damaged Rugova's car and injured a passer-by, was to provide the president with an excuse to avoid acceptance of a broad coalition in power.

There ensued a quick reaction by the Kosovo and UNMIK police, whose members broke into the Kosovo Presidency at midnight and seized the equipment of Rugova's parallel police.

It was followed by Hashim Thaqi's act that was intended to discredit Rugova's LDK additionally. PDK submits an initiative to the Kosovo parliament to launch and investigation into the activity of the Kosovo Vice President Adem Salihaj from LDK and three ministers, his fellow party members, who were accused by the PDK of being behind the Safety of the Homeland organization, which was again, allegedly, behind some political murders and the bombing attack on Veton Surroi's Ora party. And, although Kosovo parliament rejected the initiative to launch the investigation, the public got the possibility to view some 500-page long file with accusations against senior LDK officials.

The IHPSO is thought to have some 300 staff, half of whom receive their regular monthly salaries of some 200 euros per month from this organization, whereas the other half is employed in the municipal and other public services. A part of the employees are former servants of the National Security Service. As claimed by the authors of the Balkan Insight report, quoting a source close to the IHPSO, who wished to remain anonymous, this organization is in part financed from donations of Kosovo Albanians in diaspora. It also receives a part of the bribe local business people pay to the LDK in hope of winning the tenders for reconstruction projects and other works (Xhara, 2005).

The rival, National Intelligence Service of Kosovo (Kombetar Sherbimi Informativ e Kosoves - KSHIK), is linked to the leading opposition party - Hashim Thaqi's Democratic Party of Kosovo. KSHIK evolved from the Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK). More accurately, it was formed in April 1999 through the transformation of the "Zbulimi kunder zbulimit (ZKZ)" counter-intelligence agency. ZKZ had a two-year experience in intelligence operations within the KLA and a developed infrastructure throughout Kosovo, so that the majority of members were taken over by the newly formed agency at the time of transformation of the ZKZ into the KHIK. Although formed during the operation of the Provisional Kosovo Government of Hashim Thaqi, the agency continued its operation even after this government was ended in February 2000.

Continuing its operation in accordance with its roots, this agency claims the right to financing from the collected money remaining after the war in the Homeland Calling fund, from which the KLA had been financed. Additional financing is provided from donations and local followers' aid.

Today, this organization is quite open regarding its activities. Kadri Veselji, Hashim Thaqi's man of confidence, a member of his Provisional Government, and presently the director of KSHIK, does not deny that he manages the intelligence gathering operations. "We have been in the transformation process, for the last five years", he told the researchers from the Balkan Insight, adding that KSHIK hoped to have "a more active role" in future in such a way that the "capacities of this organization would be nationalized" (Xhara, 2005). Jakup Krasniqi, the head of the PDK parliamentary group, asked the Kosovo parliament "to accept SHIK as a legitimate part of the Kosovar Intelligence Service, which is to work inside the newly established interior ministry" (Mustafa, 2005).

Summing up the results of the rivalry between those two agencies, the Balkan Insight analysts mention a large number of murders of the LDK party officials, which caused anxiety among the members of this party. Although almost all murders remain unsolved, they are attributed to the groups linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The dispute was especially heated up by the events surrounding the surrender of Ramush Haradinaj when KSHIK and IHPSO "were deeply involved in the efforts of their parties to profit as much as possible in the period of political uncertainty that then ensued" (Xhara, 2005).

In early 2003, members of the newly formed Homeland Security organization showed up at the funeral of the murdered FARK general Tahir Zemaj. The following year, that organization, which identifies itself with the FARK forces and claims that its task is to monitor the LDK, issued several statements in which it threatened violence to party "deserters" and their families if they tried to drag more members out of the party before the elections. The statement by this organization that it enjoyed confidence of president Rugova caused quite an uproar in the Kosovo public. "An LDK official claimed its intelligence service is taking over the party, from which platform it also endeavors to take over the government and secure its economic interests. Electoral success and the coalition with the AAK have given that intelligence service the confidence to dispense with the sharing of spoils with the PDK and its intelligence service that marked the broad multiparty coalition of 2002-2004." (ICG, 2005: 18)

Albanian National Army - ANA (Armata kombetare shqiptare - AKSH): A Post-War Accomplishment

It is believed that the Albanian National Army - ANA - was established in 2001 at the time of conflicts between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian security forces. It built its reputation through a veritable virtual war for publicity, most often through international web sites, with a basic motto that it was the only Albanian military formation active in the territory of Kosovo, Macedonia and southern Serbia after the war. And whereas other paramilitary formations - KLA, ONA and LAPMB - at least verbally rejected the demand for pan-Albanian unification, ANA has the creation of "Greater Albania" as the main goal of its program. When ANA took trhe responsibility for the bombing of the Zve an bridge in 2003, the then administrator Michael Steiner designated it as terrorist.

In demonstrations staged in February and March 2003 in De ani, the protest was against the UNMIK sentence against the so-called Dukagjin group of the KLA members, who were charged with torture and murder of the FARK soldiers in the summer of 1999. In those demonstrations, the crowd cheered the ANA and, though many western analysts were inclined to designate this formation as an "Internet army", its presence was becoming increasingly obvious in the territory of De ani, akovica and Istok. Ever more frequent patrols by persons in black uniforms, interception and ID inspection of passers-by, setting up of checkpoints, even incidents in which policemen were disarmed, pointed to the strengthening of the stronghold of this organization in the territory of Metohija.

By their official statement which was intended to deny the spreading of problems with the ANA, especially the incident with the disarming of the KPS and UNMIK police, the competent security structures actually provided a clear confirmation of the spreading of the new paramilitary: "The competent police sources reject any idea that the patrol was disarmed. Having encountered several masked persons armed with the AK-47 rifles at night, the patrol car drove away from the checkpoint and waited for backup units. When the backup units arrived, the masked and armed assailants fired several shots and escaped through the woods and fields. The police sources also deny that the patrols were reduced afterwards and emphasize that the presence of non-uniformed police, as well as subsequent KFOR ambushes in the woodland areas along roads where the activity of the ANA members was reported, were actually increased." (ICG, 2005: 8)

Is it really necessary to raise the question of safety of the "woodland" areas which are not situated along any significant roads?

The emergence of a new paramilitary formation has stirred up the area of Drenica. In April 2004, at the fifth anniversary of the death of two KLA members, several masked persons "emerged from behind the hill, approached the crowd and read a speech on behalf of the Albanian National Army, ANA, in which they called for a 'fight for the freedom' of Albanian lands that are not controlled by KFOR and for Albanian interests wherever they are" (Salihu et al ., 2004). It mimicked the manner in which the masked members of the KLA appeared in in this area at the funeral of their killed fellow soldier on November 27, 1997.

In reaction to the similarity of appearance of this organization in public, Rexhep Selimi, an AAK member and former KLA commander, wrote a comment with the indicative title of "Beware Cheap Copies" (Selimi, 2004). Pointing out that the ANA actions were "unnecessary, unproductive and lacking in strategy", Selimi fears that they could "risk tainting the image of the Kosovar Albanian war of liberation" and criticizes the practice of the ANA member who were "stopping vehicles in the middle of the night, demanding to check villagers' IDs and checking whether the travelers they encounter are on certain 'lists'".

The IWPR report authors state that they have managed to contact a person who claims to be a member of the ANA organization. "He said the militants are a guerrilla movement, active throughout Kosovo not just in the western region. The group is organized so individual members have no idea who else is involved, he said, adding they are not fighting KFOR but those who work against the interest of Albanians." The report then conveys the sentiment of the Pe residents toward the appearance of a new armed group in their midst. They appeared unconcerned and "some even support its goals, saying radical action is needed to ensure independence is the outcome of the negotiations on Kosovo's status." (Limani, Kelmendi, 2005).

As stated in the International Crisis Group report from May 2005 (ICG, 2005): "Kosovo's society has a residual addiction to the clandestine -- a preference for focusing on shadow rather than daylight and upon the hidden rather than the open agenda." And, as the last illustration of such a pattern, the report quotes the threatening statements and calls that the ANA issued in March 2005 to all former Albanian armies to become active again: the KLA in Kosovo, the ONA in Macedonia, and the LAPMB in southern Serbia. Such a call was accompanied with a demand to the institutions to form a Kosovo police intelligence service. Numerous incidents followed: the bombings throughout Kosovo, blown up or shot UN vehicles in akovica and Pe , hand grenades thrown at the UNMIK head office, shots at the telecommunications node on top of the UNMIK head office, shots at the police communications node at Pristina airport. The ANA has appeared with the statement in which it accepted responsibility for them in the following words:

"We have received the blessing from the people to start a new fight for dignity and independence, to fulfill the will of the generation that sacrificed itself for freedom and independence... Last night's explosions in many Kosovo towns are just a warning that there are people who love freedom and await its call, people who do not fear either death or enemies, however strong they may be. We will allow no one to push this country into the abyss... We are resolute in our intention to accomplish our goals peacefully, but will not reject the concept of armed fight ... our structures have been preparing intensively for seven months already." (March 4, 2005)

Only a few days later, on 15 March, a remote controlled device exploded in Pristina downtown in the moment when the trash can in which it was placed was passed by a line of cars accompanying the then president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova. The incident ended with injured passers-by and damaged Rugova's vehicle. This incident remains unsolved and the police were surprised with Rugova's refusal to talk about the assassination attempt. The public, recalling a similar incident in 2004, when a hand grenade exploded in the yard of Rugova's home, designed varying explanations for itself, with increasingly frequent claims that the two incidents were indeed faked by Rugova's security staff.

Conclusions

The presented material shows that seven years after the end of war the Albanian political players in Kosovo and Metohija have not transformed their activities in a direction which would allow for a prospect of a civil society with institutions ensuring personal safety, respect of legal standards, conditions for normal business activities, accomplishment of social rights, infrastructure supply and, generally, all those functions of a state implied by normal life in a European society at the beginning of the 21st century.

On the one hand, the very political life is occurring in a tight relationship with criminal groups, which prevents any principled effort and discussion which would not be supported with sheer force and suspicious financing. On the other hand, it appears that various Albanian players, from purely political, through para-political, para-humanitarian and intelligence, to paramilitary and criminal ones - torn by their old and new disputes and struggle for power sources - are not able to reach a minimum consensus which would guarantee at least personal (physical and property) safety to the members of the Albanian people, even with the assistance of international institutions.

Data on the dependence of the political life on arms smuggling, human and drug trafficking, etc. and on the rates of various forms of crime (murders, abductions, robberies, extortions), which even intensified in the post-war period, show that crime is a structurally embedded phenomenon in present-day Kosovo-Metohija life and that, at least without deep systemic changes, it is a factor that cannot be eliminated from political relationships. The data also show that crime permeates and destroys all segments of social life to the extent that the state cannot guarantee its citizens even elementary rights. This corroborates the assessment that things would be worse still in the event of (partial or conditional) independence, since the mechanisms through which Albanian political agents could stamp out or curb the rampaging crime are not nowhere in sight.

The presented situation points to some paradoxical conclusions: although the declared (according to the official views of Albanian politicians) and at first glance actual obstacles to accomplishment of civil society in Kosovo and Metohija are the inter-ethnic tensions between the Albanians and Serbs, as well as the presence of international factors and their execution of key functions of state authority, the analysis of the described developments could even hint at the fact that Serbs, Roma or Gorani actually constitute an integrative element for the Albanian ethnic majority; ie: that their very (drastically diminished and unwanted) presence contributes to the homogenization of Albanian political and para-political groups.

Similar is true for the imposition of legal and political standards by the international factors. If those "external" sources of homogenization were to disappear and if Albanian players were to be left to themselves, those frictions and disagreements would just intensify, because, on the one hand, there would be no external control over political processes, and because, on the other, the vacant political space (ie: the division of any newly gained leverages of power) would generate new conflicts.

Since practically no Albanian party offers any concept of a different shaping of social relations after the demanded gaining of independence even in their programs, it may be easily assumed that new struggles for political, military, and economic influence on the social scene would start as soon as on the "day after"; and, judging by the experience to date, such a struggle would only be limited by the means available to wage such conflict.

Such a conclusion is also supported by the fact that, regardless of the prevalence of violence against the Serbs and members of other minorities, crime affecting Albanians themselves has also risen sharply for the past seven years. Albanians are probably the most numerous victims of the disorderly situation, which keeps being perpetuated, without any serious indications of improvement. Those institutions of power (and, generally, services, both of infrastructure and suprastructure) which the international powers handed over to local factors -- ie: authorities and public enterprises held by the Albanians themselves -- do not show any capability to perform their basic activities, quite independently from the attitude toward the minority members.

Crime and corruption, in which many international officials are also involved, thus remain a constant of the Kosovo-Metohija society and its political structures.

The Author:

Dr Sla ana uri , is a Professor at Belgrade University's Faculty of Security.

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Footnotes:

1. Available at http://www.pristina.usmission.gov/

2. Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/

3. Available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/

4. Available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/

5. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/

6. Available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/

7. Available at http://www.iwpr.net/

8. Texts and analyses in the publication of Balkan Insight, internal publication of the regional Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, available at http://www.birn.eu.com/kosovo/

See also other recent reporting:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, September 29, 2006: Meeting the Burden of Statehood: Is Kosovo Ready?

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, January 31, 2007: Arms Smuggling Routes Enhance Extremist Capabilities in South-West Balkans; Albanian Separatists Expected to Mobilize in Spring if Kosovo Does Not Get Independence .

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 2, 2007: As Ahtisaari Plan Delineates Essentially Independent Kosovo, Jihadists Move to Expand Ops in FYROM, Greece, Serbia .

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 28, 2007: Kosovo Albanian Power Struggles and Attendant Factors Overwhelm UNMIK Capacities as Major Violence Looms .

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, March 1, 2007: Terrorism and Organized Crime in South-Eastern Europe: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sanzak, and Kosovo.