Wahhabism
and Islamic Extremism in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: a General
Overview
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis - June 1, 2006, Thursday
With the growing polarization of communities within the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM), GIS, through its South-Eastern Europe bureau, asked its
correspondents and sources in the country to develop a small briefing paper on
the the influence of Wahhabists in FYROM:
The first Wahhabist inroads in Macedonia began in 1992, following Macedonia's
independence from Yugoslavia. With the Orthodox Church weak, and the official
Islamic Community (IVZ) almost immediately in turmoil, wealthy backers from
Saudi Arabia and other Islamic states started to fund the fundamentalist
movement through charities and secret payments.
The small but tightly-knit group was allowed to grow due not only to Arab
wealth, but also to the schisms and infighting which characterized the IVZ since
1992. Through most of the 1990s, two rival camps challenged one another. One was
led by a man who had been reis (the highest national Islamic official) during
Yugoslav times, Jakup Selimovski, a Macedonian Muslim. The other camp was led by
an Albanian, Rexhep Sulejmani. Both called one another "enemies of Islam" and
shouted about who should be excommunicated. Nevertheless, after a time their two
factions rejoined, although details of the deal which allowed them to come back
together remain undiscussed.
A more serious challenge to IVZ stability, and the one which led directly to the
rise of the Wahhabi movement, was the empowerment of Zenun Berisha as Skopje
Chief Mufti in the late 1990s. Although this man was a classic communist-era
bureaucrat, interested mostly in making money, under his control the IVZ was
left exposed to outside fundamentalists. Berisha was very corrupt, primarily
through fraudulent leasing scams. The IVZ has been estimated to own between
35-50 percent of the shops, homes and businesses in the old Turkish quarter of
Skopje (Stara Carsija). Berisha was alleged to have made a lot of money by
renting out numerous properties to his friends for low rates, who would then
re-rent them for much higher prices to the general public.
In 2004, this practice was discovered by the majority of moderate imams, and it
became another reason, together with other corrupt practices, to remove him.
However, Berisha had developed around him a group of Albanian criminals, thugs
and Islamic extremists who protected him violently from the democratic will of
the majority. Berisha had also made sure that in every mosque in Skopje there
were at least some individuals, whether the imam or bureaucratic officials, in
some position of power. Through this, either the Wahhabi doctrine was being
preached or they were able to cut off the payment to non-extremist imams who did
not agree with the doctrine. This policy continued at least until February 2006,
when Berisha was formally overthrown in elections for Skopje chief mufti, won
convincingly by Taxhedin Beslimi, an apparent moderate.
However, during 2004 and the Summer of 2005, Berisha was able to wreak havoc in
the community. In one incident, armed men stormed the office of then-reis Arif
Emini, demanding that he install imams from the Arab world and South-East Asia.
In another, outside the village of Kondovo in the Summer of 2005, armed men from
the Wahhabi camp attacked a car carrying Beslimi and some of the other imams who
spoke out against the Wahhabis. In a strange twist, the moderate imams were
saved when another armed group, that of Kondovo native and young militant Agim
Krasniqi, attacked the Wahhabis.
Now, since the election of Beslimi in February 2006, the situation seems to have
stabilized. However, it is still proving very difficult to remove the
now-powerful Wahhabi faction and their sponsors from their entrenched positions.
For example, the epicenter of their extremist control remains the Yahyah Pasha
Mosque, for the past five years. This January 2006, the opening of the Muslim
ceremony of Kurban Bajram had to be moved for the first time in history from
this mosque to another one, because of a desire to get away from the Wahhabis.
The competition can be expected to increase in the future. No matter who will be
in power, the IVZ is demanding up to $500-million in property assets from the
communist denationalization process. This makes a very attractive prize for the
Wahhabis and others, especially considering that the Islamists have plans to
radically increase their mosque-building program and to create new madarasas,
even in areas where very few Muslims live.
Recruitment Objectives
The policy of Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, etc. has been to
increase the influence of Islam in Europe, through the Balkans. The rich Arabs,
using the proceeds of the zakat charity tax applicable to Islamic financial
transactions, pay Muslims in Macedonia to grow long beards, cloak their wives
completely, and follow various austere marks of behavior.
Some of these paid Wahhabis begin their experience through higher education in
the Arab world, where they are sent back with instructions on how to convert
more people. Others are exposed to radical Islamic in mosques in Western Europe,
for the many migrant workers among Balkan Muslim populations. Finally, it is
believed that Wahhabi leaders in Macedonia help support the heroin trade so as
to create a better "applicant pool" for future conversions.
Outside of Skopje: the Villages
Although Skopje has the highest population concentration in Macedonia (about
700,000 people out of two-million total population), there are significant
Wahhabi communities in formation outside of the capital. And this is not limited
to Albanian villages; several Macedonian Muslim villages now have a Wahhabi
presence as well, and a very few Turks. However, since most Muslims in Macedonia
are Albanian (25 percent out of around 30 percent total Muslims), most of the
Wahhabis are also Albanian. Certainly, all of their important leaders are
Albanian.
In the Skopje area, the autonomous Albanian villages north of the city are prime
sponsors of Wahhabism, especially Lipkovo and Matejce near Kosovo, as well as
Aracinovo (basically, an eastern extension of Skopje). To the west of the city,
the madarasa village of Kondovo receives a lot of Saudi funding and also has
Wahhabi representation, though as in neighboring Saraj to the south, they are
definitely in the minority.
South of Skopje, an interesting developing trend is apparent in villages such as
Patiska Reka, one of a handful of Albanian villages on remote points of the
Karadzica mountain range, which divides the country in half at peaks of
1,000-2,600 meters. Visitors to isolated villages such as Patiska Reka have
noted that after a couple of years of Islamic influence, the visible wealth of
the previously poor local Albanians had increased substantially.
Further west, the Albanian-majority cities of Tetovo and Gostivar also have
organized Wahhabi presences. But the most unusual of all is the situation in the
southwestern Macedonian Muslim (Torbeshi) villages of Oktisi, Labunista and
Podgorci. Since they are Slavic, the Torbesh are disliked by the Albanians;
however, since they are Muslim, they are disliked by the Orthodox Macedonian
majority. This precarious situation has led the Macedonian Muslims to be more
open to the offers of help from rich Arab nations.
Again, the Wahhabis in these villages are very much in the minority, but the
interesting phenomenon is that they are both very conservative and secretive,
and that when a man "converts" to become a Wahhabi, his entire family must
convert also. Over time, this will have a strong effect on increasing Wahhabi
percentages in remote villages where
Other information
The Wahhabi organizations in Macedonia are somewhat decentralized. While leading
figures are all in the Skopje area with strong Kosovo connections, various
international delegations visit the villages as well. In Labunista, for example,
local Wahhabis spend several months a year in camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Well-funded youth groups have popped up in this village and others, to spread
Wahhabi influence in lavish, double-minaret Saudi mosques.
Migrant workers from such villages are also indoctrinated in radical mosques in
Western Europe. The major center of control for the Macedonian Muslims of the
south, especially, is Graz, Austria as well as Treviso, near Venice in Italy.
It is also clear that the Islamic extremists in Macedonia are directly connected
to the ones in Kosovo carrying out ethnic cleansing against the Serbs. Macedonia
is not yet at this dangerous level but the threat will increase in the years to
come as the Albanian population continues to expand and grow closer to their
religious identity, with many individual Albanians, their Islamic identity is
now at least as important or more than their national one. This is a major
change to the old trend by which Albanian nationhood was the definitively most
important aspect of identity.
Copyright Defense &
Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies Association
Reprinted with Permissoin.