Wahhabi Fundamentalists Push for Power in FYR of Macedonia, and Expand Operations after Albanian Party Benefactor Not Selected for New Government

Wahhabi Fundamentalists Push for Power in FYR of Macedonia, and Expand Operations after Albanian Party Benefactor Not Selected for New Government
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis - August 30, 2006, Wednesday

Analysis. By Valentine Spyroglou, South-East Europe Station. A very significant peripheral result of the struggle to form a new Government in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) following the July 5, 2006, parliamentary elections has been the increasingly radical efforts of Wahhabi Muslim extremists to take power, improve their financial and logistics basis, and to expand operations into new parts of Skopje and elsewhere in FYROM, for the purpose of "converting" Albanian Muslims to their version of Islam.

These developments have been largely taking place behind the scenes, because the local and international media remains overwhelmingly concerned with the political dispute between former banker Nikola Gruevski, leader of the winning VMRO-DPMNE party, and Ali Ahmeti, the Albanian former terrorist leader whose DUI party was in power since 2002. DUI won a majority of the ethnic Albanian vote over chief rival DPA. Nevertheless DUI was not selected to be part of the new Government by incoming Prime Minister Gruevski, who was able to collect enough seats in parliament, together with DPA and the New Social Democratic Party (NSDP) of former presidential candidate Tito Petkovski, who broke away from the incumbent SDSM of Vlade Buckovski in order to form his own party.

Although Ahmeti declared his "natural right" to be in the new Government according to the Badinter Principle, this safeguard for minority rights does not involve elections, and FYROM is not an ethnic federation anyway. So since Prime Minister Gruevski did not have to take the terrorist party, and since the international community supported his decision, he chose to make an alliance with traditional partner DPA, controlled by Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci and with a power base in Tetovo. Although DPA also has its own criminal and corrupt elements, it is expected that the experienced Thaci alone can muster the strength of forces necessary to keep DUI militants under control.

Nevertheless, Ahmeti and his militant-controlled party began daily protests and roadblocks, while also sending letters and messages to the international community to demand that he be allowed to be involved in the new Government. However, the Western powers denied DUI's request and Prime Minister Gruevski has named a Cabinet filled with young professionals and educated advisors, meaning the new FYROM Government should expect to enjoy good relations with the West and especially the United States.

With the downfall of DUI, however, the Islamists must change tactics to continue their strategy for regional penetration. The Wahhabi extremists have been funded through Saudi and other foreign channels, and sustained by cooperation with corrupt Albanian police and militants close to DUI. Originally they were brought to power in late 1990s by former Skopje Mufti Zenun Berisha, who was officially deposed in democratic elections in the Islamic Community (IVZ) in February 2006. What was at stake with the change of power was control over millions of dollars of funds and the numerous properties owned by the IVZ in the Old Turkish quarter (Stara Carsija) of Skopje, which falls into the Albanian-majority municipality of Cair.

According to Albanian sources close to the municipal leadership, a private security company was established with the assistance of Cair Mayor Izet Mexhiti to help DUI -- and the Wahhabis -- ensure control over the area after the end of Berisha's time in the IVZ, and after the potential end of power for DUI in the national Government. This turned out to be the case now that the IVZ has made efforts to uproot the Wahhabi elements associated with Berisha and militant groups associated with Ramadan Shiti, currently incarcerated by US forces in Kosovo.

With the changing of the national Government in FYROM, the party of Ali Ahmeti has only certain local, municipal governments under its control. On the bigger level, DUI loyalists in the Interior Ministry secret service (DBK) are being replaced, and the same is true for the other services. According to IVZ sources, it was the presence of pro-Wahhabi DUI police appointees in the Bit Pazar police station (with jurisdiction for the IVZ headquarters in Cair) that has allowed armed Wahhabis to intimidate and attack the legitimate Islamic leadership. When DUI loyalists are replaced by DPA ones in the new Government, the Wahhabis would lose institutional protection.

Therefore, Ahmeti's men decided to create a security company to operate in Cair/Stara Carsija, with Mayor Mexhiti, stating that it was done to bring "law and order" to the largely ethnically-Albanian area, Skopje's most historic neighborhood with many old mosques and hamam structures, and other signs of Ottoman times. However the company, staffed partially by bearded Wahhabi Muslims in black uniforms, is in the business of racketeering shops and businesses in the area for protection money: essentially doing the same job which Berisha's loyalists were doing when they enjoyed protection under IVZ status.

The actions of the private security company have not only been limited to racketeering, however. By intimidating and pressuring the ethnically Slavic-Macedonian shop-owners in the areas of Stara Carsija and Mavrovka shopping center, on the edge of Cair (Boulevards Krste Misirkov and Goce Delcev), they are trying to remove the last non-Muslim owners in the area.

The same goal of removing Christian Slavic people for radical Islamic interests is ongoing, too, on the other side of Skopje, in the neighborhood of Taftalidze also known as "Dolno Nerezi." Here more than 95 percent of the population is Slavic-Macedonian, but a very small Albanian minority of less than 2,000 people lives in a long stretch of old, one- or two-storey homes.

The Wahhabis, together with DUI, made a strategic goal of building a mosque in this area with very few Muslims, in order to force the non-Muslim population to leave, which is already slowly starting to happen as people sell their apartments. The mosque was built illegally, and the "anonymous" builders threatened away local media crews with guns when they tried to investigate in 2005.

In the campaign before the July 2006 elections, Ali Ahmeti, DUI Vice-President Rafiz Aliti and other top leaders personally visited the new mosque. The local Albanians there thanked DUI and Ahmeti for the personal assistance they gave to creating this mosque, which for the Albanians was seen as the most important investment they could receive.

Reliable local sources in the Albanian community have reported a very recent ramp-up in activity from well known Wahhabi leaders from Ferizaj and Gnjilane in Kosovo, and Lipkovo and Cair in FYROM, in the area of the mosque. These leaders have taken over an apartment on a street opposite it, and also near the DUI local headquarters, where they "disappear" for several hours each day inside with their students and plot the next stages in their plan for "capturing" this strategic neighborhood. According to the local sources, they drive cars with Kosovo license plates. The Wahhabi leaders are creating a bookstore in the area of the mosque where they will present fundamentalist literature and CDs, and provide "spiritual guidance" for young Muslims. In fact, a major tactic of these leaders is to preach inside the private homes of Muslims and try to convert them to the Wahhabi faith.

The strategic nature of the Taftalidze neighborhood is, first of all, because it is so far largely non-Albanian, and it represents a missing link between Albanian-inhabited areas to the south and southwest, and to the north of the Vardar. The primary goal of the radicals is to create a religiously "clean" Muslim base to which they can convert to Wahhabism and, eventually, jihad against Israeli, US and other Western interests. While the group is currently decentralized and trying to remain out of the spotlight, internal tensions in the FYROM Islamic community ensure that violent incidents will continue and the influence of the extremists will continue to grow.