Serbian commentary questions NATO's motives for signing troop transit accord

Serbian commentary questions NATO's motives for signing troop transit accord
BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - July 27, 2005, Wednesday

Text of commentary by Dragoslav Rancic entitled "Strategic gain or loss" published by the Serbian newspaper Politika on 21 July

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's visit to Belgrade has resulted in the signing of the "Agreement on Ground Lines of Communication for NATO Forces Through the Territory of Serbia-Montenegro". That clumsily titled agreement constitutes our government's consent to henceforth allow NATO to use roads and rail lines on our soil for the transport of its troops to destinations of its choosing, in keeping with its own intentions, plans and objectives.

It was not our guest, but rather Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic, the signer of the document, who provided journalists with an interpretation of the importance of the Agreement to NATO. He said that "the Agreement will allow NATO forces, including Kfor [Kosovo Force], to react anywhere in the region where human rights, people and peace are threatened, as needed. And in the event of any attempts to repeat the events of 17 March [2004] in Kosovo-Metohija, this agreement will greatly facilitate a rapid and energetic reaction by NATO forces."

Since it is believed that NATO forces aiming to preserve peace and human rights "anywhere in the region" will henceforth travel on our roads and rail lines mostly with regard to Kosovo-Metohija, that implies the assumption - even the conviction - that the agreement brings us an important strategic gain. As far as we can tell, however, there is no mention of Kosovo anywhere in the agreement.

In order to determine what exactly the agreement means for NATO and what it means for us, it is necessary to explain the nature of the document itself. Is the agreement on the transport of foreign troops (with no time limits) through a sovereign country that is not a member of the same alliance as those troops a technical issue or a political one? There is no easy answer to that question, since the text of the document was not made public for unknown reasons, even though that should have been done.

If it is a technical issue, that means that the chief diplomat was in fact authorized to take the action that he did. However, we are not aware of any institution of government having decided to reduce our relations with NATO, which are of prime political importance, to the technical level and having informed the public of that decision. Nor are we aware of any public debate in the highest legislative and executive bodies of government about this agreement, which goes straight to the heart of the state union's sovereignty.

It is clear that the agreement is a political issue, not a technical one, and that there can be no third option. In our people's minds, however this is a very sensitive political issue. To recall, in 1999 in Rambouillet, the United States sought what NATO has now gotten, albeit partially, and so when its ultimatum was rejected it led to the aggression against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], after which foreign troops occupied Kosovo-Metohija.

If we were previously asked to allow NATO to cross Serbia in order to "impose order" on Kosovo-Metohija and thus be spared bombardment, it is unclear what danger today makes it necessary to ask us for the same thing that we were asked for in Rambouillet (although, to be fair, without public threats). NATO has been "imposing order" on Kosovo-Metohija for six years now, amid praise from the major Western powers, but now it is suddenly fearful of renewed tension, and so preparations are again under way to apply stronger force in Kosovo-Metohija, and through the territory of SCG [Serbia-Montenegro] instead of from Macedonia and Albania.

Before travelling to Belgrade, de Hoop Scheffer met in Brussels with Jessen-Petersen. As usual, the head of Kfor said that "Kfor is doing an extraordinary job" in maintaining security and that this is "the basis for further progress in the political process". According to him, there is no need to reinforce the NATO troops. But Scheffer said that "the situation in Kosovo is fragile" and that "tension is on the rise".

These assessments are contradictory, whereby Scheffer's is more in keeping with our anxieties. It follows from that that the agreement on NATO troop transit through our territory is beneficial to us because it makes it possible to curb any new Albanian unrest and to better protect Serbs in Kosovo, in keeping with Vuk Draskovic's interpretation.

However, the magnanimity of NATO's motives is dubious for at least three reasons. First, the existing NATO forces are in Kosovo-Metohija in order to prevent unrest, not to allow it to flare up and only later extinguish it with reinforcements. Second, there are certain reasons why NATO wants, as it did before Rambouillet, when it was not present in Kosovo-Metohija, to be able to move about freely in Serbia-Montenegro, although at this point another reason is being cited for that. Third, since stronger alliance forces are mentioned as a possible means of assisting the "political process" - which could result in independence for Kosovo-Metohija - from NATO's perspective the instigators of tension are not necessarily limited to Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija, but could also be Serbs intent on preventing the secession of their southern province.

Serbs remain criminals and potential enemies in NATO's eyes. The US Congress says that they are guilty of genocide, and in Brussels they have been accused of intolerance and human rights violations, in Vojvodina for example. Recently British members of parliament asked NATO to send troops to Serbia, whether the Serbs like it or not. Now there is no need to do that by force.

The signing of the Agreement is a political mistake on our part. The proposal should have been considered after we become partners, within the framework of a Council for Cooperation with NATO, which Scheffer is proposing as a way of institutionalizing relations, so that the alliance would also have certain obligations towards us and so that we could stipulate that, say, any transit of foreign troops across our soil must first be approved by the SCG Assembly.

As things stand, foreign armies have a continuous "green light" for transit across our soil, even though they are neither our partners nor our allies. They have no obligation to be friendly either. Instead of emphasizing that unfortunately there is still no mutual trust between SCG and NATO and that time is needed to gradually establish it, it appears that we have gullibly slipped into a camouflaged protectorate that is even being denied membership in an unimportant organization like the Partnership for Peace, like a baby deprived of its rattle. This protectorate will perhaps have the heaviest European concentration of foreign troops, ready for any sort of intervention, but unlike the other protectorates in our vicinity, it will not also enjoy the protection of the UN Security Council.